GULIELMUS D:Gratiæ
Angliæ.Scotiæ.Franciæ.et
Hiberniæ.REX fidei Defensor etc

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# Christian Bleſſedneſs:

OR,

# DISCOURSES

UPON THE

# BEATITUDES

Of our Lord and Saviour

# JESUS CHRIST.

Written by *JOHN NORRIS*, M. A. Rector of *Newton St. Loe* in *Somerſetſhire*, and Late Fellow of *All-Souls-College* in *Oxford.*

To which are Added,

Reflections upon a late Eſſay concerning Human Underſtanding: With a Reply to the Remarques made upon them by the Athenian Society.

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UMI

To my much Honoured

Friend and Patron

*JOSEPH LANGTON*, Esq;

*SIR*,

'TIS a Maxim of Prudence given by some of the Nicer Describers of the Bounds of *Gratitude*, That it ought to be temper'd between a total Neglect and a full and just Requital. To strike off *all* Scores is, they say, as uncivil as to discharge *none*, and every whit

as diſingenuous not to *ſuffer*, as not to *acknowledge* an Obligation.

Now, Sir, 'tis one of the proper Happineſſes of my little Fortune to be neceſſarily caſt upon this meaſure. I am got too far in your *Accounts* to be able to requite to the full, ſome part of them I muſt ever leave *uncroſſed* as a ſtanding *Hold* upon me; and tho my Gratitude it ſelf be never ſo ſtrong and pregnant, yet the moſt forward Inſtance of it can riſe no higher than an *Acknowledgment*.

And

And as this is the utmoſt I can do, ſo of doing this too I have ſo few Capacities and Opportunities, that I am the leſs willing to let go any that offer themſelves; which indeed has given a ſpeedier Iſſue to my Deliberation, whether I ought to addreſs theſe Diſcourſes to your Patronage or no, which perhaps without the Formality of a *Dedication*, would of right belong to you, as falling within your Diſtrict, and as being the Fruits of that Retirement which by your *Free* Bounty I enjoy.

As an Acknowledgment therefore of this and your other constant Favours, I presume to put these Discourses into your Hands, which I hope will be able to do both *You* and *Me* that Justice, as to convince the World, that as you proceeded by generous and uncorrupt Measures in disposing of this Publick Trust, so you was not altogether mistaken in your Choice, when you thought fit to Oblige

*Your Humble Servant,*

*Newton St. Loe*
*April* 21. 1690.

John Norris.

# TO THE
# READER.

I *Here commend to thy ſerious Peruſal a* Set *of Select Diſcourſes upon the* Beatitudes, *which were at firſt undertaken, and are now publiſh'd for the Public Benefit of all well-diſpoſed Chriſtians. The Subjects themſelves are as Great and Noble as any perhaps that occur in all Practical Divinity, being the Prime and Capital* Aphoriſms *of our Saviour's Excellent Sermon upon the Mount, and containing the Fundamental Principles of all Chriſt's Practical Inſtructions, and of a True Chriſtian* Temper *and* Life.

*Here*

*Here we may see (what the* Philosopher *so much desired) the true* Living Idea *of Vertue and Goodness; nay more, what 'tis to be a Christian, an* Interiour *Christian, a Christian indeed. And I heartily wish that those whose Orthodoxy is chiefly employed in giving out* Marks *and* Signs *of Conversion and Saintship, wherein their end seems rather to be the distinction of a Party, than any real Promotion of Godliness, would choose rather to dress their Interiour by this* Glass, *and afterwards try it by this* Measure. *For here they will find that Real Christianity consists in Poverty of Spirit, Humility, Self-denyal, Mortification, Meekness, Mercifulness, Purity of Heart, Peaceableness, and such like inward Dispositions of Soul, and not in a few outward Formalities, Sighs and*

*Groans,*

*Groans, Looks and Poſtures, Words and Phraſes, and ſuch other affected Badges of a fond Diſtinction.*

*And as the Subjects themſelves are Great and Noble, ſo I hope theſe Diſcourſes will be found in ſome meaſure to riſe up to their Dignity. I am ſure there has been no care wanting on my part to make them worthy of their Subjects, to which I have endeavour'd to do the utmoſt Juſtice. But however I may fail of that, yet I hope the Reader will not be altogether diſappointed of his Expectations, or repent of his Labour, but will find here ſufficient Entertainment both for his* Speculation, *and for his* Devotion.

*It may perhaps be a Surprize to ſome to ſee me appear again ſo ſoon in public. To this, if there needs any*

*Apology,*

*Apology, that which I ſhall offer is, That if theſe Diſcourſes be not worthy of publick View, then 'tis not fit they ſhould ever be ſent abroad; but if they be, I cannot underſtand how they can be publiſhed too ſoon. The Truth is, conſidering the ſhortneſs and uncertainty of Life, I have been lately very much of Opinion, That a Man can never live too faſt, (the Heathen will tell you* Never faſt enough) *nor make too much haſte to do good; eſpecially when a Man's Sphere is ſuch, that he has but* Few *ways and opportunities of doing it, which by Experience I am well convinc'd to be my Caſe.*

*I am afraid (where-ever the fault lies) that it will not be my Happineſs to be able to do that good where I am, which I might have done in ſome other Station. Which makes me the more*

*more frequent in* Public, *that I may ſupply this Defect by the Service of my* Pen, *having ſome reaſon to hope that my Diſcourſes will meet with better Liking* Abroad, *than they uſually do at* Home; *and that there are ſome in the World to whom I ſhall not be a* Barbarian.

*What has been here the performance of* my *Pen, was (as I learn from Dr.* Ruſt) *intended, and in part performed by the Excellent* Biſhop Taylour, *who while he was meditating upon the* Beatitudes, *was receiv'd up into the Enjoyment of them. And I have lately ſpoken with a Gentleman, who told me, That he himſelf ſaw a* Manuſcript *of it in the Biſhop's own Hand. I am very ſenſible how much the Subject has loſt by the* Change *of its Author. All that I can ſay is, That*

## To the Reader.

*I have done my Best, and I hope God will accept of my good* Intention, *and that the World will be something the better for my* Performance.

John Norris.

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The

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Chriſtian

# Christian Blessedness:

OR,

# DISCOURSES

UPON THE

# BEATITUDES.

## Discourse the First.

Matth. V. ver. iii.

*Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.*

THus the Divine Angel of the Covenant, Christ Jesus, begins that Great and Noble Institution of Christian Philosophy, his Sublime Sermon on the Mount. This was he that was pointed at by that emi-

nent Prophecy, *I will raise them up a*
Deut. 18. *prophet from among their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him.* And now it was that this Prophecy had its full Accomplishment; Christ was now entring upon his Prophetick Office, and was to shew himself a Prophet like unto *Moses*. This great Trust he discharged with as great Care and Fidelity, and (as the Author to the *Hebrews* observes)
Heb. 3. 2. *was faithful to him that appointed him, as also* Moses *was faithful in all his house.* As therefore *Moses* gave a Digest of Laws to the People with whom he was entrusted, so it became this Divine Prophet also to give Laws and Precepts for the Instruction and Order of *his* Disciples. He was to be a Law-giver as well as *Moses*. And to carry on the proportion yet further, he thought fit to imitate him in the very *manner* and *circumstance* of delivering his Law, and accordingly ascended up into a Mountain, from whence he shower'd down his Heavenly *Manna* upon his Hearers. So also making good another instance of resemblance relating to *Moses*, who speaks thus of himself, *My Doctrin*

*shall*

*shall drop as the rain, my Speech shall distil* Deut. 32. 2.
*as the dew, as the small rain upon the tender herb, and as the showers upon the grass.*

But the Parallel will not run throughout. For the Divine Oracles were not now accompanied with *Thundrings* and *Lightnings*, with *Blackness*, and *Darkness*, and *Tempest*, but were deliver'd in the small still Voice of *Blessing* and *Consolation*. 'Twas with a Beatitude that *David* began his Collection of Divine Hymns; and in like manner does the Son of *David* usher in his sublime Instructions. And this was very suitable and agreeable both to the Character of his Person, and to the Genius of his Doctrin. As to his *Person*, Blessing became the Mouth of him, who was the Reconciler of God and Man, the great Embassadour of Peace, the Author of Salvation and Happiness, and at whose Nativity the Angels sang Peace on Earth, and good will towards Men. And as to his *Doctrin*, the Precepts he was to deliver were of so refined and high-raised a Nature, so little agreeable either to the Maxims of the World, or to the grosser Relishes

of the Animal Life, that they would have found but cold Entertainment had they not come recommended with a Reward, and been guarded on each side with a Beatitude.

'Twas requisite therefore that the *Duty* and the *Blessing* should go hand in hand; and accordingly our Lord, who well understood the Temper of the Sons of Men, how passionately we pursue any thing that looks like *Happiness*, and how apt we are to ask that Question, *Who will shew us any good?* thought it expedient to joyn them both together in his Discourse, as they will be in the *Event*, and to pronounce *them* Blessed here, whom he intends to pronounce so hereafter, when he shall say, Matth. 25. *Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the World.*

And the better to win us over to the practice of his Divine Sermon, our Lord like a wise Master-builder, lays the Foundation of his *Discourse*, where we must lay that of our *Obedience*, and assigns the first place among his Beatitudes, to *Humility* and Poverty of Spi-

rit.

rit. For Humility is the Foundation of Obedience; we must be first poor in Spirit, before we can be rich in Good Works; first Humble before we can Obey, and first Obey before we can Reign. And therefore with good reason does our Lord lay down this as the first Principle and Ground-work of his Institution, *Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.*

In my Discourse upon these words I shall,

I. Resolve what we are to understand by Poor in Spirit.

II. Shew that this Poverty of Spirit is a Christian Duty, and the reasonableness of it.

III. Shew the Happiness of those who are so disposed.

As to the Resolution of the first, I consider that this Poverty of Spirit here recommended by our Saviour, is not a state of *Life*, but a state of *Mind*; and we may take it either in Opposition to *Covetousness*, or in Opposition to *Pride* and *High-mindedness*. If in Opposition to Covetousness, then to be poor in

Spirit, it is to have our Souls so disposed, as first, Not to be eagerly carried out in our Desires after any created good; particularly the good things of this lower World, whether Honours, Pleasures, or Profits; especially not to be greedy and craving in our desire of Riches. But Secondly, To be so moderately and indifferently affected towards all these, as to be well contented without them, and also ready to resign and part with them, when either God shall think fit to deprive us of them, or when we can no longer retain them with a good Conscience. This is to be poor in Spirit, consider'd in opposition to *Covetousness*.

But it may also be considered as opposed to Pride, or High-mindedness; and then to be poor in Spirit will denote, First, A Just, that is, a low and mean Sense and Apprehension of our own selves, of our Souls, and of our Bodies, of our Intellectuals and of our Morals, of our Acquirements and of our Performances. And Secondly, as a Consequent of this, a Contentedness whenever any or all of these are disesteemed or disparaged, either tacitly and interpretatively,

pretatively, by Affronts and dishonourable Treatments; or else directly by expres undervaluations, a readiness to prefer others before our selves, and a willingness that the same Preference should be given them by others; an utter *Captivation* of our Understandings to the Obedience of *Faith*, and a modest *Submission* of them in all doubtful Cases to the Dictates of our *Superiours*; a declining of Fame and Popularity, and a studious concealment of our own Praises and Excellencies; but when either the Glory of God, or the Good of our Brother is concern'd in their Publication. In short, (to use the Description of the Psalmist) he is truly poor in Spirit, who from his Heart can say to the Searcher of Hearts, *Lord, I am not high-minded, I have no proud looks; I do not exercise my self in great matters which are too high for me; but I refrain my Soul and keep it low, like as a Child that is weau'd from his Mother; yea, my Soul is even as a weaned Child.* Psal. 131.

Having thus briefly shewn what it is to be Poor in Spirit, both with respect to Covetousness, and with respect to Pride and High-mindedness, I come

now in the second place to shew, that this Poverty of Spirit is a Christian Duty, and withal the great reasonableness of it. And First, That Poverty of Spirit, according to the *first* acceptation of it, is a Christian Duty, 'twould be Conviction enough to consider how often we are call'd upon in Scripture to withdraw our Affections from the Creature, *to seek those things which are above, to set our affection on things above, not on things of the earth; to mortifie our members which are upon earth*, among which is reckon'd *Inordinate Affection, Evil Concupiscence*, and *Covetousness*, *which is Idolatry*. Again, we are bid to *beware of Covetousness*, and to have both our *Treasure* and our *Hearts* in Heaven; to be as indifferent in the very enjoyment of any worldly Good, as if we enjoy'd it not; and if in the *enjoyment*, then certainly much more in the *desire*. Lastly, to add no more, we are caution'd by St. *John* not to love the World, neither the things that are in the World. And lest we should take this only as a matter of *Advice* and *Counsel*, not express *Command*, he further adds, *If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him.*

Coloss. 3.1.

Luk. 12.15

Luk. 12.33

1 Cor. 7.29.

1 Joh. 2.15.

But

But that 'tis a Christian Duty to be thus poor in Spirit, will be further evident from the very *Nature* and *Design* of the Christian Institution. The Grand thing intended in the Christian Religion, was to reduce straying Man to his true Good and Happiness, to sublimate, refine and spiritualize his Nature, to loose him from the Cords of Vanity, and from his fast adhesions to created Good; to purge him from all earthly Concretions and Alloys; to disingage and separate him, not only from the World about him, but even from one part of himself; in one word, to raise him from Earth to Heaven, not only by a *Local*, but by a *moral* and *mental* Elevation.

Indeed 'twas much otherwise under the Jewish Dispensation. There was then great Indulgence afforded to the Animal Inclinations and worldly Affections of Men; and their very Religion was indeared to them by Temporal Promises and Blessings. Not that God intended hereby to express any liking or approbation of Covetousness and Earthly-mindedness, but only to comply

ply with the infirmity of that gross stupid People, which rendred them uncapable of being won upon by more noble Proposals. And besides, it being a received Notion among the Idolatrous Inhabitants of the Land (as is observ'd by a late Learned Author) that the Worship of their Idols and False Gods did procure them fruitful Seasons, and increase of all manner of store, 'twas in proportion requisite that God also should promise *his* Votaries the like worldly Affluence to keep them from running over to the *Gentile Superstitions*.

Dr. *Spencer* de Legibus Hebræorum Ritualibus.

Upon these and the like Accounts much was indulg'd to the Jewish State and People. They were never expressly required to abstract their desires from the things of the World. Nor, unless they proceeded to covet *unjustly*, that is, what belonged to another, were they even taxable for a too earthly and downward disposition of Soul. Not but that earthly-mindedness was as much an Imperfection in it self as 'tis now, and was really forbidden according to the more retired and involute sense of the Law; but the Letter did

not

not reach it, because then was the time and state of Imperfection, and 'twas the only *Handle* which that People could be took hold of by, whose *Hardness* of *Heart* was the occasion of this, as well as of some other Indulgencies.

But now they that shall think themselves obliged to no higher measures of Perfection under the Christian State, know not what manner of Spirit they are of. Christ, as he has introduced a *Better Hope*, so has he annexed to it more excellent and more exalted *Precepts*; and as his Kingdom was not, so neither is his Religion of this World. The Christian Law is *Lex Ignea*, a Law of Fire, a Law that purifies and refines, that warms, actuates and enlightens, that separates also and dissolves those strong Ties whereby the Soul sticks glued to the Earth. And therefore the Apostle calls the Christian Institution *the Law of the Spirit of Life*; and in another place, *the administration of the Spirit*. And what our Saviour said of some words of his, may truly be applied to all, *The words that I speak unto you, they are Spirit and they are life.* Heb. 7.19. Rom.8.2. 2 Cor.3. Joh.6.63.

This

This therefore being the Design of the Christian Dispensation, to perfect Holiness, to advance the Interest of the Divine Life, to elevate us to the utmost degree of moral Perfection our Nature is here capable of, and as far as is possible to make us Partakers of the Divine, 'tis utterly inconsistent with the *End* of such a Law as this, to suffer us to lie groveling with our Faces on the Earth, to seek Rest and Happiness in things more ignoble than our selves, and to grow one as it were with the dirty Planet upon which we live. We ought rather, (as the Philosopher speaks) ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀποθανατίζειν, aspire to the measures of Immortality, shake off the Clogs of Earth that weigh us down, and make haste to be Angels as fast as we can. We are obliged by the *Design*, as well as by the *Rule* of our *Religion*, to be as loose from the Creature as may be, not to love the World, nor the things of the World, whether the Lust of the Flesh, or the Lust of the Eye, or the Pride of Life, but to be poor in Spirit, and empty of the Creature, that we may be rich towards God, and filled

led with the fulneſs of him that fills all in all.

And now that to be thus poor in Spirit is a *reaſonable* Duty, as well as a *Neceſſary* one, will ſufficiently appear upon theſe two grounds:

I. Becauſe theſe Worldly Enjoyments are not our True Good.

II. Becauſe they hinder and divert us from that which really is ſo.

That they are not our True Good is certain; for if they were, we ſhould then find *Reſt* and *Satisfaction* in them. But this we are ſo far from doing, that we are as diſſatisfied *under* our Enjoyments, as *without* them. For though by Fruition our Appetite be abated as to that particular Object which we proſecuted, yet ſtill we deſire on further, and our *general* Thirſt after Happineſs is as unſatisfied as ever: Which plainly argues, that our true good is not to be found in theſe things, but that they are altogether *Vanity* and *Vexation*. To place therefore our Happineſs in ſuch Objects is utterly abſurd and againſt Reaſon, and argues us to be groſſly ignorant

norant of one of the two things, either of *our selves*, or of the things of the *World*. We are either ignorant of the Dignity and Excellence of our Natures, of the Designs and Ends of our Creation, and of the Strengths and Capacities of our Appetites, which can be satisfied with nothing less than infinite. Or if we do know and consider all this, then are we so much the more grosly ignorant of the World about us, to think there is any thing to be had in this Circle of Vanity, that may satisfie the importunity of such craving and capacious Appetites. Poverty of Spirit therefore is reasonable, because the things of the World are not our *True Good*.

But this is the least part of their Charge. They are not only insufficient to be our true good themselves, but they also, Secondly, hinder and divert us from that which really is so. For not to mention the many Snares and Temptations of a great Fortune, and what a dangerous thing it is to be always furnished with all the Possibilities and Opportunities of Sin and Folly: I only observe, that the very *De-*

*sire*

*sire* of these Earthly things diverts us, and takes us off from the Love of God. When our Love is divided even among *Created* Objects, the force of it will be much abated in respect of each. But much more will the Love of the Creature diminish from the Love of God. For there is so vast a disproportion between the *Kinds* as well as the *Degrees* of the two Goods, that he that once comes to relish one, will find but little tast in the other. And therefore says St. *Austin*, *Monemus ne mundum ametis, ut eum qui fecit mundum libere ametis. Our advice is, that you love not the World, that so you may love its Maker freely.* The truth is, to love God *freely*, we should love him *intirely*; for every advance we make towards the Creature, so much we receede from God. For these are two contrary Terms of Motion; and there is so great a Contrariety between the Love of God and the Love of the World, that they do not only abase each other, but are in some degrees utterly inconsistent. For so St. *John*, *If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him.* And if this be the consequence of loving the World, I think the less we have to do with it,

John 2. 15.

the

the better, and that there is a great deal of reason to be *Poor in Spirit.*

Thus far have we consider'd the Duty and Reasonableness of Poverty of Spirit, as it signifies an Indifferency of Desire to the things of the World. I come now to consider it as it denotes Humility, and Lowliness of Mind; whereof I am also to shew,

I. The *Duty.*
II. The *Reasonableness.*

The Duty of Humility is plain in all the Scripture, but more frequently and earnestly inculcated in the New Testament, insomuch that it may be reckoned among the *distinguishing* Doctrins of the Christian Religion. The Heathen Morals almost overlook'd it, and in the Old Testament Writings 'tis but sparingly recommended; but in the Christian Institution we every where meet with it in Capital Characters, as a Precept of the first Magnitude. *God resisteth the proud,* saith St. *James*; and *be ye cloathed with humility,* says St. *Peter.* And our Lord himself, who was a perfect Example of all Moral and Divine Perfection,

Jam. 4. 6.
1 Pet. 5. 5.

fection, and in whom the fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily, seems yet to commend himself to our imitation chiefly upon the Account of his *Humility*, *Learn of me*, says he, *for I am meek and lowly in heart*. Mat. 11. 29

But there needs no multiplication of Scripture for the proof of this. I shall therefore only further observe, that the greatest Personages that ever were in the World were always most eminent and conspicuous for this Excellency. Out of many I shall select three Instances, which may well deserve our Consideration. The first shall be the great Fore-runner of our Blessed Saviour, the *Holy Baptist*. This Great and Holy Person, when the Jews sent Priests and Levites from *Jerusalem*, to demand of him who he was, not only disclaim'd the Titles of *Christ*, of *Elias*, and of *that* Prophet (this his Humble Spirit was not content with) but went further, and gave this strange and mortified account of himself, *I am*, says he, *the voice of one crying in the wilderness*. The Prophet *David* indeed had said before of himself, that he was a *Worm*, and *no Man*. And this one would think was a sufficient stretch of Joh. 1. 23. Psal. 22. 6.

Humility. But the Baptist speaks in a strain below him, allowing himself to be no more than a *Voice*. The same Holy Person thought himself unworthy to Baptize his Saviour; nay, what makes that less admirable, not worthy so much as to unloose the very Latchet of his Shoes.

The next Instance I shall mention, is the ever-blessed *Mother* of our *Lord*. She, if ever any Creature, had cause to be *Proud*. 'Tis impossible even to imagin a stronger Temptation. She was saluted by an Arch-Angel, said to be a Person highly favoured with God, and Blessed among Women. And in particular, That she should be Mother to the Son of the Highest, and that too by the Power of the most High. Was not here enough to betray a poor innocent Virgin into Pride and Vanity? Had the Angels half so much reason for their Pride and Haughtiness, when they fell from the Heights of Glory? Well, how did she behave her self under the *dangerous* Salutation? Why, she seem'd to make it rather matter of *Obedience* and *Resignation*, than of *Triumph* and *Boasting*. *Behold*, says she, *the*

*the handmaid of the Lord, be it unto me according to thy word.* Luke 1. 38.

But the most stupendous Instance of Humility that ever was or can be, was in the Person of our *Blessed Lord*, whether we consider him in the Mystery of his Incarnation, or in the mean Circumstances of his Birth, or in the humble method of his Life; whether we consider him as emptying himself of his Eternal Glories, and drawing a Cloud over his Brightness, or as forbidding the Devils to publish his Divinity, and Men to declare his Miracles, and his Disciples to tell of his Transfiguration; or as washing his Disciples Feet, or as riding upon an Ass, or as conversing among Sinners, and lastly, chooſing to die between Thieves. These, and many such other Instances of Condescension argue the most profound Humility that can be imagin'd, and withal, how concern'd our Lord was to commend and endear this most excellent Duty to the Practice of Men. Of all the Vertues and Excellencies in the World, one would have thought this of Humility least capable of being *practis'd* and *exemplify'd* by the Son of

God. *Command* it indeed he might by *Precept* as well as any other, but sure one would think not by *Example*. But see what rare Arts and Mysteries God has found out to teach us this Lesson. And therefore we may well conclude, that there is *Excellency* and *Necessity* in it as well as *Difficulty*, and how much it concerns us to *learn*, what God has been so peculiarly solicitous to *teach*.

It is then a Christian Duty to be thus Poor in Spirit. And the *Reasonableness* of it is as great as the *Obligation*. This I might shew from the Good Consequences and Happy Effects of this Disposition of Spirit; but this falling in more properly under the Third Partition of my Discourse, I shall for the present content my self with some other Considerations taken from the Condition of Man; whom I shall consider,

I. As a *Creature*.
II. As a *Sinner*.

First then, Man is a *Creature*, and this is a very reasonable Ground for Humility,

Humility, and Poverty of Spirit. We usually think it a very *Humbling* Consideration to remind a Person of the meanness of his Original. But now what Original can be so mean as to be from *Nothing*? It is enough to take down the Spirit of the brightest Intelligence, to consider, that nothing was his Original, a state more vile and dishonourable than the Chaos it self. Now this is the Condition of Man. He had his Rise from Nothing, and derives his Pedigree by his *Mother's side* from *Darkness* and *Emptiness*. And though now by the Omnipotency of his Creator he is something, yet still he holds his Being as precariously as he first received it, and depends as much for his Existence upon the Will of his Creator, as Light does upon the Sun, or the Image in the Glass upon the Presence of the Body. If God does but turn his Face from him, and cease to behold him, he will vanish into nothing. God spake the Word indeed before he was made, but to unmake him there needs no *contradictory Fiat*, he need only be *silent*, and not sustain him by the *Word of his Power*. And shall that Being be proud which was once nothing, and has still

such a *Natural Bent* towards *Annihilation*, as to need only a bare *Negative* to make him nothing again? No, says the Wise Man, *Pride was not made for man, nor furious anger for them that are born of a woman.* Man must forget his Extraction, to give the least admittance to Pride; and he need but study and consider that, to have the most *inward* and *feeling* sense of Humility.

This Consideration is yet further improveable, if we admit the Hypothesis of those who say, that to be a Creature involves a State of Nothing, as well as an *Origination* from Nothing; that there is nothing *Real* or *Positive* in any Creature but what is from God; and that though a Creature be something as of God, yet he is nothing as of himself, nor can exert any positive Act or Operation from himself as a distinct Principle of Action, being still as to *that*, as much a *Nothing* as before. If this be true, (and he that shall consider and well understand what is alledged by *M. Poiret* in defence of this Notion, will scarce find it in his Power to think otherwise) certainly Man has infinite reason to be poor in Spirit, and

Lib. 4. Cogitat. Ration. de Deo, p. 574.

to

to descend into the lowest Abyss of Humility and *Self-abdication*, as becomes a Being that not only *was once*, but *is still* a mere *Nothing*.

Man therefore as a *Creature* has sufficient reason to be Humble and Poor in Spirit. But if we consider him *duly*, as a *Sinner*, he has Cause not only to be Humble, but to lie down flat upon his Face, and look upon himself to be more base and vile than the very Dust whereof he was form'd, and whereon he treads. To be a Sinner is much more vile than to be the meanest Creature, and the Non-Entity of *Sin* is more dishonourable than that of *Nature*. This latter, tho it cannot actively conform, yet 'tis not disobedient to the Will of God. But the former *Nothing* contradicts and *resists* his Will. This is, as one of the *Fathers* call it, *Nihil Rebelle, & in Deum armatum*, an *Arm'd Nothing*. Indeed to be a Creature, involves Weakness and Imperfection in it, but then it also involves Good, because nothing can be but by partaking of the Perfection of God. But now to be a Sinner involves nothing but pure and unmixt Evil, and is withal a further Remove from Good

than to be nothing, since 'tis not only *negatively*, but *contrarily* opposed to it. 'Tis indeed the greatest Monstrosity and Deformity in the World, the greatest Contradiction to Order and Harmony, to Reason and Proportion, to Well-being and Happiness. In one word, 'tis the only thing which God hates. What great Reason then has Man to be Humble and Poor in Spirit, poor even to Emptiness and Self-Annihilation, who is not only a *Creature*, but a *sinful Creature!*

Having now shewn the Duty and Reasonableness of Poverty of Spirit in the full Latitude of the Word, I proceed to shew in the third place the Happiness of those who are so dispos'd. *Blessed are the poor in spirit*, says our Saviour, *for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.* That's the only Blessedness which is here expressly mentioned. But they are happy also in other regards. For in the first place, What an happy disposition of Soul must it be always, to carry about one such a strong and lively Conviction of the Vanity of all created Good, as not to run out into vehement desires after it? For

Desire

Desire it self, to go no further, is always a great Torment. 'Tis the same to the Soul that *Thirst* is to the Body, and *Hope deferr'd* (as the Wise Man tells us) *makes the heart sick*. But that's not all. For here will come in the Trouble of *Disappointment*, as well as of *Desire*. Not that which the World generally understands by Disappointment, the not compassing what you design'd, (tho' that also will often happen) but the not *enjoying* what you have compassed, the *Disappointment* of *Fruition*. Prov. 13.

But now to be poor in Spirit is the way to avoid all this. Such a Person expects no Happiness from the Creature, and consequently not to find it there will be to him no Disappointment. He does not lean upon any Created Good with any *Stress*, and therefore tho' it should fail under him, his Fall will be but slight and easie. And indeed 'tis not to be imagin'd what a deal of Anxiety, Care, Restlessness, Disappointment, Sorrow, fruitless Labour and Endeavour are saved by this Poverty of Spirit. And I think this is no small degree of Happiness.

Again,

Again, Is it not a great Happiness to be so moderately and indifferently affected towards the World, as to be contented with any Condition in it? To be of a Quiet, Sedate, Resign'd and Disinteressed Disposition? He that's thus disposed, is above, or rather below the reach of calamitous Accidents. The Storm flies over his Head, he has nothing for Fortune to take hold of. Nor will he be under the hazard of parting with his Religion to secure his Worldly Interest. No, he can do his Duty, tho at the expence of Martyrdom, and tho highly *deserving* of the *best* Times, may yet be *trusted* in the *worst*.

Then as to the Happiness attending upon Poverty of Spirit, as it stands for Humility, there is no one Vertue that is more her own Reward than this: Pride is the most *uneasie* thing in the World, and withal the most *odious*; uneasie to the *Patient*, and *Odious* to the *Observer*. And as 'tis uneasie in it self, so is it the Parent of many Troublesom and Uneasie Passions, such as Anger, Contention, Revenge, Envy, Impa-

Impatience, &c. So that 'tis hard to determin whether the Proud Man be more *Ridiculous* or *Miserable*.

But now to be Humble is to be Wise, to understand the true Proportion and Measure of a Creature, to be serene, to be contented, to be thankful, to be pleasant and chearful, to be calm and untroubled, to be dispassionate and unconcern'd. In short, no Man enjoys what he really is, so much as he that does not fancy himself what he is not. And besides, the Humble Man is sure to get that very Honour which he declines, and because he declines it. I end this with the Observation of *Plato*, That a Man that does not rightly know himself, can neither be *prudent*, *good*, nor *happy*, which is all that goes to the perfection of Man, and he that does, is sure to be all this.

Thus far of the Happiness belonging to the two Kinds of Poverty of Spirit *severally*. There remains yet one more belonging to them both in *common*, and that is the Kingdom of Heaven, which I suppose to comprehend both *Grace* and *Glory*. As to *Grace*,

*Grace*, we are told by the Apostle, that *God has chosen the poor in this world to be rich in Faith.* And in the same place where God is said to resist the Proud, he is said also to give *Grace* to the *Humble.* Indeed Humility is the proper Foundation of Grace, and the Theatre of all Divine Operations. This State of Nothingness and Self-emptiness is as much a Preparation to the *New*, as the *Void* and *Inform Space* was to the *Old* Creation; 'tis the true and proper *first matter* in the Spiritual World, into which the Form of the *New Creature* will be introduced; and if Man does but contain himself in this *Nothing*, God will not fail to work all, and to be all in him, having promised his Special Presence to the Man of an *Humble Spirit.*

Jam. 4.6.

Isa. 57.15.

Then as for *Glory*, 'tis highly equitable, that they who have humbled themselves here should be exalted hereafter, and that they who have renounc'd this World should have their Portion in the next. And to convince the slow-hearted and distrustful World that thus it shall be, God has already given a Specimen of it in the Example of his Son,

Son, who was particularly eminent for this double Poverty of Spirit, for *renouncing* the World, and for *debasing himself*, whom therefore God has *highly exalted, giving him a Name above every Name*, and has also placed him on his own right hand, *Angels, and Authorities and Powers being made subject unto him.* Phil. 2. 9. 1 Pet. 3. 22.

## I.

## Discourse

## Discourse the Second.

Matth. V. ver. iv.

*Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.*

THEY are the Words of him who was himself a Man of Sorrows, and acquainted with Grief; and who was also acquainted with *Happiness* too, with the Joys of Religion, with the Refreshments of Angels, with the Antepasts of Glory, and with that Peace of God which now passes all Understanding, and shall hereafter satisfie all Desire: He had tasted of both Cups, the *Cup* of *Trembling*, and the *Cup* of *Salvation*: He had tried both the Miseries of Human Nature, and the Glories of the Divine; and so well knew what proportion the Consolations of God have to the Infelicities of Man, and how little the Sufferings of this present time are, in comparison of the Glory

Glory that shall be reveal'd to them that with meekness bear them, and with fruitfulness improve under them. He therefore having tried both the *Worst* and the *Best*, must needs be a proper Judge in the Case, Whether Happiness may consist with Affliction or no. And he is so far from discouraging his Disciples from treading in the same thorny rugged way that he did, that he rather gives them all the Invitation in the World to do so, casts a *Glory* round the Head of the Sorrowful, and represents Grief as a very Lovely thing, by telling them, that *Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.*

But are *all* those blessed that Mourn; and does Grief intitle all that are under its Dominions, to Happiness and Consolation? This indeed would be good News to this our World, where there is so much of it, which is a Valley of Tears, and a Region of Sadness, where there are a thousand Sighs for one Smile, and where *the mourners go about the streets*, But 'tis not all mourning that comes within the Circle of this Beatitude; nor shall all that sow in Tears, reap with Joy. As there are Eccl. 12.5.

some

some that *Sorrow without Hope*, so is there some kind of Sorrow, concerning which we can hope nothing. There is a Sorrow that proceeds from no Human and Moral Principle, but from Natural and Necessary Causes, as from the Influence of external Impressions, from the grosness of the Spirits and Blood, from Melancholy, and the like. Again, there is a Sorrow, which tho' of an Human and Moral Extraction, yet springs from no Good or Laudable Principle, but is altogether of a Neutral and Indifferent Nature. Again, there is a Sorrow that proceeds from an ill Principle, as from Malice, Envy, Covetousness, Ambition, Servile Fear, and the like, and which tends also to an ill End, as to Revenge, Impatience, Despair, *&c.* Accordingly the
2 Cor. 7. Apostle tells us of a *Worldly Sorrow*, and of a Sorrow that worketh *Death*. So far is all Mourning from being Christian Mourning, or from giving us a just Title to this Beatitude.

Here therefore it will concern us to consider three things:

I. That

I. That there is such a thing as the Duty of Christian Mourning.

II. Who these Christian Mourners are?

III. Wherein consists their Blessedness.

And first, I say, that there is such a thing as *Christian Mourning*. This must needs seem a strange Paradox to the Philosophy of those, who make the Pleasures of the Animal Life the end of man, and think that now we have nothing to do but to enjoy them, and that God sent *Man* into the World to the same purpose as he placed the *Leviathan* in the Sea, only to take his pastime therein. 'Twould be but a cold Employment to go about to convince such men either of the *Necessity*, or of the *Blessedness* of Mourning; whose Answer would be in the Language of those Sinners in the Book of Wisdom, *Come on, let us enjoy the good things that are present, and let us speedily use the Creatures as in our youth. Let us fill our selves with costly Wine, and Ointment, and let no flower of the Spring pass by us. Let us crown our selves with*

*rose-buds before they be wither'd, let none of us go without his part of our Voluptuousness, let us leave tokens of our joyfulness in every place, for this is our portion, and our lot is this.*

This is the Style of the *Epicurean* School. And there are also some Christians, who tho they do not make the pleasure of the Animal Life their End, Lot and Portion, as do the other, yet they think they may allow themselves a great Scope and Compass in it, that they may indulge themselves to the full in all the Mirth and Jollity of the World, and that there is no need of any such thing as mourning in *Sion*. These men seem to have the same Notion of Christs *Religion*, that the Jews had of his *Person*: They look'd upon him under the Character of a great Temporal Prince, and dream't of nothing under his Reign but Victories and Triumphs, and Festivals, and Vineyards, and Olive-yards. And so some think of his Religion. They look upon it as a free, gay, secular, jolly Profession, as a State of Freedom and Emancipation, of Ease and Pleasantness; as if the Children of the Kingdom had nothing

nothing to do, but to eat, drink, and be merry, and that mourning had no more place in *this*, than it is to have in the *New Jerusalem*, wherein, as the Evangelical Prophet tells us, *All tears shall be wiped away from mens eyes, and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, nor any more pain.* Rev. 21. 4.

It is indeed most certain, that Religion has its Joys and Pleasures, and that the Christian Religion has the most of any, and that they are such too as by far transcend all others; that the Best Life is also the most Pleasant Life, and that 'tis worth while to live well, if 'twere only for the meer pleasure of doing so. And there is a great deal of Truth in that Noble Saying of *Hierocles*, μὴ μόνον τῷ καλῷ, &c. *The good man excels the wicked man not only in goodness, but also in pleasure it self, for whose sake only the other is wicked.* Nay further, the Pleasures of good men are not only greater than those of ill men, but such as they cannot enjoy or relish, and have no manner of Notion of. As there are some things of God, so there are Pleasures of Religion, which the Animal Man does not per- Comment. in Aurea Carmina, p. 177.

ceive. For the *Secret of the Lord is with them that fear him*, and the *Stranger does not intermeddle with their Joy*. Nay further yet, no man has any Ground or Pretence for rejoycing, but a good man. 'Tis the most usurping and daring piece of Impudence in the World for an ill man to laugh or be merry. What has he to do with Mirth, who has the Wrath of God abiding on him, and Hell open to receive him? It does not belong to him, 'tis none of his part. Mirth is the Reward of a good Conscience, the Prerogative of Innocence, and the peculiar Right of good Men. And they not only *may* be joyful and chearful, but are also *commanded* to be so. Thus in the Law, Deut. 16. 11. *Thou shalt rejoyce before the Lord thy God*, says *Moses* to the Jewish Votary. So again the Psalmist, Psal. 33. *Rejoyce in the Lord O ye righteous, for it becometh well the just to be thankful.* Again, Psal. 68. *Let the righteous be glad, and rejoyce before God, let them also be merry and joyful.* And again, Psal. 100. *Serve the Lord with gladness.* And says our Blessed Lord in his Farewel Discourse to his Disciples, Joh. 15. 11. *These things have I spoken unto you, that my joy might remain in you, and that your joy might be full.*

*full.* And we are exhorted to *rejoyce evermore* by the Apostle, who also reckons *Joy* among the *Fruits* of the *Holy Spirit.* 1 Thes. 5. Gal. 5. 22.

Now all this is true, and I not only confess, but also recommend the thing hitherto pleaded for. But then 'tis also to be consider'd what the Wise Man says, that *to every thing there is a Season*, and that there is a time to *weep* and *mourn*, as well as a time to *laugh* and *dance.* And this not only from *Natural*, but also from *Moral* Necessity. For the Circumstances of Human Life are such, as make it our *Duty* as well as *Fate*, to mourn and be sorrowful. Religion has its gloomy as well as bright side, and there are to be Days of Darkness as well as Days of Light in the Christian Kalendar. Eccles. 3.

This is intimated to us by several *Expressions*, and by several *Examples* in Holy Scripture. Thus the Church in general is in the Divine Song of *Solomon* compared to a Dove, which tho considerable for some other qualities, is yet for nothing so remarkable as for her continual mourning. So far was

that wise Man from the Opinion of those who make Temporal Prosperity a mark of the True Church. Again, says the same wise Preacher, *It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting.* And again, *Sorrow is better than laughter.* Where you see he not only inculcates the practice of Mourning, but also expresly prefers it before its Contrary. And he gives this reason for it, because *by the sadness of the Countenance the Heart is made better.* Eccles. 7. 3. And therefore he makes this the measure of Wisdom and Folly, by telling us in the next Verse, *That the heart of the wise is in the house of mourning, but the heart of Fools in the house of mirth.* This practice of Mourning is every where inculcated in the Writings of the Prophets, but especially of the Prophet *Jeremy*, who has writ a whole Book of *Lamentations.* But above all, 'tis remarkable what our Lord himself says of Mourning in the 16th of St. *John*, where he seems to make it the great mark of Difference between his Disciples and the Men of this World, *Verily, verily*, says he, *I say unto you, that ye shall weep and lament, but the world shall rejoice.*

Nor do there want *Examples* of this holy Mourning in Scripture. Thus the Devotion of *Hannah* is expressed by her being a Woman of a sorrowful Spirit. 1Sam.1.15 The Royal Prophet spent his whole time almost in Mourning and Sorrow, which he also indulged and fomented with Music and Divine Hymns. And yet he was a man wise and learned, and a man after God's own heart, and withal a man of great Business and publick Occupation. Thus again the Prophet *Jeremy* was a great Mourner, a man as unsatiable in his *Sorrow*, as some are in their *Luxury*. He was so full of Grief, as not to be satisfied with the Natural and Ordinary ways of expressing it, and therefore says he, *Oh, that my head were waters, and mine eyes a fountain of tears, that I might weep day and night.* Jer.9.1. More I might instance in, but I close all with the great Example of our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, who, as the Text says, was a *Man of Sorrows*, and acquainted with Grief: And that not only in his last Passion and Agony, when his Soul was exceeding sorrowful, even unto death; and when, as the Author to the *He-*

Heb. 5.7. *brews* says, *He offer'd up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears*, but also throughout the whole course of his Life. We oftentimes read of his weeping and sorrowing, as upon his Prospect of the City *Jerusalem*, at the Grave of *Lazarus*, and a little after his last Supper, when as the Text says, Mat. 26. he began to be *sorrowful* and *very heavy*, and in the Garden where he wept tears of Blood. But we never read that he ever Laught. Once indeed 'tis Luke 10. said that he rejoyc'd, but then 'twas not with an outward, sensitive and tumultuous Joy, but with an inward, spiritual and silent Exultation. *He rejoyc'd in spirit.* And what was it for? Not upon any Animal or Secular Account, but upon an Occasion altogether Spiritual and Divine. 'Twas for the abundant Grace of his Father bestowed upon his Disciples, and for their good use of it, and improvement under it.

I do not intend in all this, such rigid Measures as are practis'd and exacted by some of the Religious Orders of the Roman Church, where a Man is not allow'd so much as to Laugh,

or

or to say any thing but *Frater memento mori*, for several years together. This would be to turn Society into a *Dumb Shew*, to make Life a Burthen, and withal to bring an ill report upon the good Land of Promise, and to discourage Men from the Christian Religion. But that which I stand for is this, that we ought not so to give our selves over to secular Mirth and Jollity, but that we are still to remember that we are in the Vale of Tears, that there is a time for Mourning as well as for Rejoycing, and that this is that time; now we are in our Exile, and in the midst of Dangers and Fears, and that therefore Sorrow must sometimes have its turn as well as Joy, and that there is such a thing as Christian Mourning.

Nor need we be troubled that we have discover'd such an ungrateful Duty, since there is a *Beatitude* annexed to it. But because as was before remark'd, all manner of mourning will not come within its Compass, it will concern us in the second place to consider who these Christian Mourners are. This I think cannot be resolv'd by any better measure, than by considering what

what are the true and proper Causes why a Christian ought to mourn. Now to this I shall answer,

I. In *General.*
II. In *Particular.*

In General I say, that then a Christian mourns for a due and proper Cause, when the Principle of his Sorrow is either Zeal for the Honour and Glory of God, or a Concern for the Good of Mankind: Nothing less than this can either deserve his Sorrow, or derive any Vertue or Excellency upon it. So that in short, *Piety* and *Charity* will be the two Principles into which all true Christian Mourning must be at last resolv'd.

But because this may be exemplify'd in variety of Instances, 'twill not be amiss to consider some of the more remarkable of them. I answer therefore more particularly, That one very proper and reasonable Cause, why a Christian should mourn, is the *Consideration of Sin.* For a man to consider seriously what a great and strange kind of Evil Sin is, how contrary to God, to his Nature,

Nature, to his Will to his Commands, to his Goodneſs, to his Juſtice, to the wiſe Order of his Grace and Providence, and eſpecially to the great myſtery of Godlineſs: Then to conſider how contrary 'tis to Man, to his Nature, to his Reaſon, to his rational Inſtincts and Inclinations, to his inward Peace and Satisfaction, and laſtly, to his Intereſt, both Temporal and Spiritual, Private and Publick, Preſent and Future: Then again to conſider, how prone we are to commit it, and that we our ſelves are the Authors of this proneneſs: And laſtly, how much of this great ſtrange Evil there is in the World, how Iniquity abounds, and the Love of many waxes cold; that the whole World, as St. *John* ſays, *lies in wickedneſs*; that there are but few that pretend to any Strictneſs or Regularity of Living, and yet fewer that diſcharge their Pretenſions truly and ſincerely; I ſay, for a man to conſider all this, to conſider it ſeriouſly and thoroughly, muſt needs be a ſad Scene of Contemplation, and ſuch as will juſtly call for his Sorrow and Mourning. It was ſo to God himſelf, who is brought in by *Moſes* as griev'd at his very heart for

1 John 5.19.

for the abundance of wickedness which he beheld in the Old World. And I question not but that among the bitter Ingredients of our Lords Passion, this was none of the least, to foresee that there would be so many, who by their final Impenitence and persevering in Wickedness, would receive no Benefit from it. And if we may judge by proportion, the Angels in Heaven, who rejoyce at the Conversion of one Sinner, do also *mourn* and *lament* for the irreclaimable Wickedness of so many Millions as are in the World. 'Tis a thing worth our Considering, and worth our Lamenting. And therefore says the Psalmist, Psal. 119. *Rivers of waters run down mine eyes, because men keep not thy Law.* And again, *It grieveth me when I see the transgressours.* This is a vertuous and laudable Sorrow, as proceeding from a good and noble Principle, from Piety and Charity; and he that mourns upon this consideration, is a *true Christian Mourner.*

Again Secondly, Another very proper and reasonable Cause why a Christian should mourn, is the consideration of the *Miseries of Human Life.* 'Tis a most

most deplorable thing to consider what a deal, and what variety of misery there is in the World at once. *Many* things must concur to make us tolerably *Happy*, but *One* thing alone is oftentimes enough to make us very *Miserable*. And how unhappy then must Humane Life be among such a multitude of Evils as are incident to it? I shall not go about to recount or describe them. They are too many to be numbred, and too various to be reduced to any method. This only I say, That should a man by some compendious Device have an united Prospect of the miseries of the World, as our Saviour by the Devils Artifice had of the Glories of it, 'twould be the most dismal Landscape that ever was drawn, or can be imagin'd. 'Twas for this that some of the Ancients reckon'd an early Death among the greatest Blessings of Heaven. *Quem Dii diligunt, Adolescens moritur*, *The Favourite of the Gods dies young*, says the Comedian. But *Solomon* goes further, and prefers an *untimely Birth* before a man that has spent many years in this World. To be short, such is our Condition here, that we see God has not thought fit to Eccles. 6.

trust

trust us with the least fore-knowledge of what is coming upon us, lest like men upon a deep Precipice, we should be amazed, confounded, and fall down at the dreadful Prospect. And if the private Circumstances of each single man's Life be so black and disconsolate, that 'tis thought fit he should see no further than he goes, what shall we think of the miseries of all mankind put together? If any thing be worth our Sorrow, certainly this is. Our compassionate Saviour wept over the approaching Ruin of perishing *Jerusalem*; and shall not a Christian mourn for the miseries of the whole World? We suspect the good Nature of him that can endure to sit out a deep Tragedy with dry Eyes; and can we stand and look upon a miserable World without mourning? There are some men of Rocky Hearts, and impassible Tempers, that could stand by and see the whole World in Flames without any concern, were but their own little selves secure from the Ruin. And this some are pleas'd to call *Philosophy*. But certainly Christian Charity that obliges us to sympathize with the miseries of each particular man, to weep with those that

that weep, as the Apostle speaks, does much more require us to lament the common miseries of Human Life. This therefore is a very proper Cause of Christian Mourning.

As is also in the Third place, the Consideration of the *Vanity* and *Emptiness* of all Worldly and Created Good. The general Cause of most of the Discontent and Melancholy that is in the World, is because men can't get so much of Worldly Good as they desire, not at all questioning its *Vanity*; but on the contrary, supposing that if they could *compass* such and such things, they should be Happy; and their only trouble is, that they can't get 'em. Now this is properly Worldly Sorrow, and comes from an ill Principle, either from Covetousness, Lust, or Ambition. But now there may be a vertuous and laudable Discontent, as well as a vicious and sordid one. And that is, when a man mourns and is troubled, not because he can't *compass* such and such Created Goods: No, perhaps he would not eat of the Fruit if he could reach it; but purely because they are all *empty* and *vain*, and

cannot

cannot satisfie. He does not grieve because he *wants them*, for it may be he chooses to be without them, but because they are wanting in *themselves*, and have not that in them, which can ever make him Happy. And indeed it is enough to cast a Damp upon the Spirit of any considering man to think that what is substantial and satisfactory is out of his reach, and that all is Vanity and Vexation that lies within it; that the former he can't *enjoy*, and that the latter can't *satisfie*. To be throughly and inwardly convinc'd that all Fruition is a Cheat, and so to have nothing in expectation, no one Glimpse or Prospect of Enjoyment before one to invite one to live longer. This is a sad Reflection, and such as must needs cause Sorrow and Mourning. But then 'tis a very laudable one, and such as proceeds from an excellent Principle.

Eccle. i. 18 'Tis a Sorrow that arises from *Increase of Wisdom*, from a right Notion and Understanding of things, from Contempt of the World, from a due Consciousness of our own Powers and Capacities, and from the more than ordinary Aspirings of the Soul to God, who alone is able to satisfie her. And

to

to be ſorry upon ſuch Principles as theſe, is to ſorrow in a rational way, and after a godly ſort.

To inſtance one more, another very proper Cauſe why a Chriſtian ſhould mourn, is the conſideration of the *uncertainty* of our *Salvation*, and the infinite miſery of thoſe who ſhall miſcarry in ſo momentous a Concern. As to the certainty of our Salvation, 'tis not ſo great as ſome are apt to imagin. For tho I can be aſſured of this Propoſition with a certainty of Divine Faith, it being matter of expreſs Revelation, that the Faithful and the Penitent ſhall be ſaved; yet that I Believe and Repent, can be known to me only on the grounds of Experimental Knowledge, which is an Human, and therefore Fallible Teſtimony. And conſequently the Concluſion always following the weaker part, I cannot be aſſured of my Salvation with a certainty of Divine Faith, but only with an Human and Moral Aſſurance, which indeed, to call it by a right Name, is no more than an high Probability, a ſtrong Preſumption.

But yet if even this Moral Assurance were *Absolute* and *Irreversible*, and were to take in the *Future* as well as the *Present*, 'twere yet a considerable Stay and Security. But it is not so with us. That Assurance which we have is Absolute only for the Present, and reaches not the Future but only upon condition, supposing that we persevere in the present Disposition; which considering the mutability of our Wills, and the multitude of our Temptations, and the frequent Examples of Apostacy, is a thing not only of *uncertain*, but of *hazardous* consequence.

And as we are not, cannot be absolutely sure that we shall not miscarry, so on the other hand 'tis most certain, that we shall be unspeakably miserable if we do. For a Man to fall off from his last End and only true Good, without any hopes or possibility of recovery, is a thing that can hardly be thought of without Confusion and Amazement. Now let a Man put these two things together, that whether he shall be Saved or no, is a matter of a depending and uncertain issue; and that if he miscarry

carry, his caſe is intolerable; and then tell me whether this be not a juſt Cauſe for Trouble and Sadneſs? and whether this Salvation, this uncertain Salvation be not to be wrought out with *Sorrow* and *Mourning*, as well as with *Fear* and *Trembling*?

Certainly it is; and were it not for this, 'twould be no eaſie thing to give an account, why Gravity, Serioufneſs and Sobriety of Spirit ſhould be ſuch decent and commendable Qualities in Men. For otherwiſe, why ſhould not a Man give himſelf up to the utmoſt Gaity and Jollity, and expreſs it in all manner of odd Poſtures and Geſtures up to the height of an *Antick Diſſolute-neſs*? I ſay, why ſhould not a Man do this? but only becauſe this is not agreeable to the part he is to act, who being in a ſtate of Probation and Doubtfulneſs, and having ſo great an Intereſt depending, ought rather to temper and correct the Luxuriancy of his Spirit, with ſome Grains of Sadneſs and Penſiveneſs, and beware of laughing too much here, leſt it ſhould be his Turn to weep and mourn hereafter.

These are the principal Causes of mourning; and from hence we may gather, who the Christian Mourners are, who are concerned in this Beatitude; those namely, whose mourning proceeds upon these or such like grounds, which are at last reducible to either of these two Principles, Zeal for the Honour and Glory of God, or a Concern for the Good of Mankind. They who mourn upon the score of *Piety* or *Charity*, are true Christian Mourners.

It remains that we now consider in the last place, wherein consists their Blessedness. St. *Austin* in his Confessions and Meditations, very frequently speaks of the *Grace of Tears*, and as often *Prays* for it. And well he might, since 'tis attended with such happy Effects, and has such a Blessedness intail'd upon it. Its Blessedness is both Present and to Come. What the present Blessedness is, we may learn from the Wise Man, who tells us, that *by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better.* It is so, for by this it becomes more soft and tender for all Divine Impressions, for the Love of God, for Devotion,

Devotion, for Charity to our Neighbour, for Mercy and Compassion, for Repentance, and the like. It is also hereby made more serious, more considerative and reflecting, more recollected, more setled and composed, which is to be considerably *better*. For as Sorrow is the Principle of Consideration, so is Consideration the Principle of Repentance and well-living, according to that of the Psalmist, *I consider'd my own ways, and turn'd my feet to thy testimonies.* Psal. 119.

And of all this we have a very signal Example in the Nation of the Jews, who till the time of the *Babylonish* Captivity were very Gross and Carnal, notwithstanding so many Miracles of God, both in their Deliverance out of *Egypt*, and in their passage through the Wilderness. And when they were brought into the Land of *Canaan*, tho they had such open and clear Testimonies of the Divine Presence among them; so many Prophecies, so many Miracles, and so many Apparitions of Angels; yet we find them ever now and then relapsing into Idolatry. But after the Captivity, when they had

gon through a course of Sorrow and Affliction, they presently began to behave themselves more orderly, and seem'd like Gold, to *refine* upon the Trial of the Furnace. For we don't read that after that time they ever fell into *Idolatry*. And accordingly God began to deal with them now no longer as Children, but as Persons of some maturity, by withdrawing from them his *Visible Presence*, and the *Spirit* of *Prophecy*, thinking them to have learnt enough already in the School of Affliction to supersede all other methods of Instruction and Discipline. And from that time forwards the Minds of Men began to be more generally erected towards Heaven and the good things of a better Life, when they saw that the strictest Observers of the Law fell oftentimes into those Evils which were denounc'd against the Transgressors of it. By which means they were by degrees prepared for the reception of the Gospel.

This is the present Blessedness of those that mourn; What the future is, we are told by our Saviour, who says, they shall be *comforted*, that is, shall be

be received into a *State* or *Place* of Bliss and Happiness, Joy and Delight, and be infinitely rewarded in Heaven for all their Pious and Charitable Mourning upon Earth. According to that of the Psalmist, *He that now goes on his way sorrowing, and bringeth forth good seed, shall doubtless come again with joy, and bring his sheaves with him.* They shall be receiv'd into the City of God, the new *Jerusalem*, where there is no more Mourning, nor cause of Mourning; and where not only *all Sin*, but even those very *Vertues* which are founded upon the least *Imperfection*, shall be done away. Here therefore there will be no room left even for *Godly Sorrow*, but all shall be Joy and Gladness, Harmony and Thanksgiving. And Blessed are they who so mourn here, that they may enter into this Joy of their Lord hereafter. Psal. 126.

## Discourse the Third.

Matth. V. ver. v.

*Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.*

THE Judgment of God differs so very widely from that of Man, that his Thoughts are seldom as our Thoughts, nor his ways as our ways. But in nothing is the difference so signal, as in the Conclusions concerning *Good* and *Evil*, *Happiness* and *Misery*. Our Judgments are seldom conformable to the Divine in matters of meer Truth and Notion, but much seldomer in Practical Maxims, and Moral Resolutions. Here, if any where, is chiefly to be found that *Vain Philosophy*, which we are caution'd against by the Apostle, and that *Tradition of Men*, and those *Rudiments of the World* which are not after Christ. Herein 'tis that the Wisdom of God, and the Wisdom

Colos. 2. 8.

dom of the World which ſeldom meet in one point, ſtand yet moſt divided and oppoſed to each other; and tho the latter be always in ſome reſpect or other, Fooliſhneſs to the former; yet never ſo much as in her Reſolutions concerning Good and Evil, Happineſs and Miſery. The World for the moſt part calling that Evil which God calls Good, and thoſe miſerable whom God pronounces in an eſpecial manner Happy. This is very remarkably verify'd in the matter now before us: For tho there has been great diverſity of Sentiments in the Gentile Philoſophy about the Objects of Human Happineſs, ſome placing it in one thing, and ſome in another; yet among all their variety, we don't find any that placed it in *Humility* or *Meekneſs*. Theſe they ſcarce acknowledged as Vertues, much leſs to be ſuch as wherein the Happineſs of Man ſhould in great part conſiſt. Nay, they rather look't upon theſe as mean, ſervile Diſpoſitions, ſuch as were fit for Men of low Fortunes, and lower Minds, and which were ſo far from conducing to Happineſs, that they rather expoſed Men to misfortunes and miſeries. But now theſe are the Diſpoſitions of Mind

which

which our Lord and Saviour, who was the *Wisdom of his Father*, and the *Light* of the *World*, singles out and marks for a peculiar Excellency and Happiness.

Nor need we wonder overmuch at the singularity of this Christian Paradox, since the whole course of our Saviours Life and Doctrin was a direct Contradiction to the Maxims and Practice of the World. Thus Men hate to unsay or undo what they have either done or said, and to confess their former Folly by an after-retractation. But now this is the principal thing of our Saviours Institution, whose whole Gospel is a Doctrin of *Repentance*, which is a *Retractation* of Judgment and Choice. Thus again Men love Riches, but Christ chose to be Poor. They are altogether for Honours and Greatness, but he hid himself that he might not be made a King. They again greedily pursue after Pleasures, but both his Life and Doctrin was all over Rigour and Mortification. The World thinks Affronts intolerable; and 'tis reckon'd a piece of Gallantry and Honour to revenge them: but our wise and good Lord chose to be reviled and

and spit upon. They are impatient of Calumnies and Slanders, but he chose to be condemn'd being innocent. They lastly (as the Prophet complains,) *call the proud happy*, and despise the meek Man as a miserable Slave and Fool; whereas says our Lord in Opposition to the former, *Blessed are the poor in spirit*; and in Opposition to the later, *Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.* Mal. 3.15.

From the words I shall discourse of these two things in general, the *Duty*, and the *Blessedness* of Meekness. In treating of the first 'twill be requisite,

I. To consider what Meekness is.

II. To shew that it is a Christian Duty.

III. To state the Measures of its Obligation in its more general Cases.

IV. To inforce the practice of it as far as it Obliges.

First, Therefore as to the Notion of Meekness, *Aristotle* has long since defined it to be a *Mediocrity* about *Anger*: μεσότης περὶ ὀργὴν, are his Words in the Fourth of his Ethicks.

This

This Definition, tho it be true as far as it goes, yet like the rest of his, it runs in such general Terms, that a Man is little the wiser for it. And indeed it rather serves to tell us the meaning of the Word, than to discover the Nature of the thing. To do this therefore I should rather think fit to say, that 'tis such a Temper or Disposition of Mind, whereby a man so Moderates and commands the Passion of Anger, as not to be carried to any such degree of it, as may either discompose himself, or injure his Neighbour. Call this a Definition or Description, or what you please, I think 'tis such as may give a sufficient Idea of the thing we are discourfing about.

This therefore being setled, our next business is to shew, That to be thus meek is a Christian Duty. That it is so, might sufficiently appear from this General Consideration, that 'tis an Instance of *Charity*, which as we well know is the Life and Substance of the Christian Law. And 'tis a very considerable Instance too: For since Charity obliges us to promote both our own and our Neighbour's Happiness, it must by Con-

Consequence oblige us to moderate and govern those Passions which have any influence upon either of them. Now among all the Passions, there is none in the Exercise of which either our own, or our Neighbours Happiness is so often and so much concerned, as in this of Anger. So *often*, it being a thing of daily incursion. So *much*, because upon this depends all the Strength and Stability both of Private and Publick Peace. And consequently, such a due Moderation of this Passion as may secure both (which is what we call Meekness) is a very considerable instance of Charity, and therefore also of the Christian Law, which is so much a Law of Charity, that as the Apostle tells us, 'tis *fulfilled* by it. And accordingly we may observe, that among the several Excellencies and Properties of Charity reckon'd up by the Apostle, these are particularly insisted upon, that it suffers long and is kind, that it is not easily provoked; and that it bears all things, which are also some of the chief Properties of Meekness. Gal. 5. 14. 1 Cor. 13.

But that Meekness is a Christian Duty, and one of the first Order too, may

may be more particularly shewn from the express Doctrin and Example of our Divine Law-giver. As to his *Doctrin*, he not only commands it, but seems to resolve all that Moral Excellency which he either had in himself, or would have in us, to these two, *Humility* and *Meekness*. *Come unto me*, says he, *and learn of me*. But what? Not to make Worlds, not to cure the sick, not to restore Light to the Blind, or Life to the Dead, (to use the Remark of the excellent Cardinal *Bona*) but learn of me, for I am *meek and lowly in heart*.

Manuductio ad Cœlum, c. 32. pag. 40.

What! was it that our Lord had no other Vertues? Or that he excelled in these two more than in any of the rest, that when he bids us learn of him, he proposes no other to our imitation? Neither of these can be said. Not the former, because in him dwelt the Fulness of the Godhead, which is not consistent with the absence of any one Grace or Vertue. Not the Latter, because he was uniformly as well as intirely good, and had every Vertue in its utmost perfection, having (as the Scripture says of him) received the Spirit of God

God without measure. 'Tis true indeed, he might be, and was more remarkable for the outward exercise of one Vertue than another, according as Opportunities and Circumstances might require; but as to the inward Habits and Dispositions themselves, he was equally perfect in them all, and did not excel in one more than in another. Why then does he recommend only these two to be learnt by his Disciples? It must be partly because he was the only Master that could teach such Divine Dispositions, and partly because of some special Excellency in the Vertues themselves above any other of the Christian Law. And therefore also our Lord puts them for the *whole* of it, by calling them his *Yoke*, *Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart.* Mat. 11. 29

Nor are we less obliged to this by the *Example*, than by the *Precept* of our Lord. For as his Example was a Living Law, so was the Practice of his Vertue a very eminent part of his Example. This he himself intimates to us, by assigning this for the reason why we should learn of him. And of this we may

may be further informed from the whole Story and Process of his Life. Never was any mans Meekness so much tried as his was: For as the *real* Excellency and Dignity of his Person heightned every Affront and rude Treatment that was offer'd him, to an incomparable pitch, so the *outward* Lowness and Meanness of it exposed him to a great many of them. And yet notwithstanding the number and heinousness of his Provocations, we don't find that he was ever in the least discomposed, or put into a Passion by them.

*Moses* indeed was a Man very Eminent for this Vertue, insomuch that the Scripture gives this Character of
Numb. 12. him, *That he was very meek above all the men which were upon the face of the earth.* And yet we find that with all his Meekness he could not bear with the Crossness and Perverseness of that untractable People the Jews, who (as the
Psal. 106. Psalmists Observation is) *so provoked his spirit, that he spake unadvisedly with his lips.* Now our Lord had to deal with the very same stubborn and cross-grain'd Generation of Men, only now under infinitely greater Prejudices and Dissatis-

Disaffections, and suffer'd more Indignities from them than either were or could be offer'd to *Moses*. And yet none of all their ill Usages could ever raise such a thing as Anger or Resentment in him, though they did so in those who stood by, and beheld his Abuses. Thus the unkindness of the rude *Samaritans* could not so much as strike a Spark into his Divine Breast, when at the same time it made his two zealous Disciples *James* and *John*, kin- Luke 9.54
dle to that Degree, as to desire Fire from Heaven to consume them. And so again, the rough Seizure of his Sacred Person by the Soldiers, could not extort from him so much as an angry Look, when yet the very sight of it made his warm Disciple draw his Sword.

And with the same Meekness he went on with his Sufferings with which he begun them, as may appear from that mild Answer which he return'd to the Officer that struck him, *If I have* John 18.
*spoken evil, bear witness of the evil, but if well, why smitest thou me?* What could have been said more mildly and dispassionately, or that could argue a

more ſedate and well-govern'd Spirit? His greateſt Apoſtle could not be half ſo moderate under a far leſs urging occaſion. For when not actually ſmitten, but only commanded to be ſo by the order of *Ananias* the High Prieſt, he return'd him this ſharp and warm Anſwer, *God ſhall ſmite thee thou whited wall. For ſitteſt thou to judge me after the Law, and commandeſt me to be ſmitten contrary to the Law?* There was indeed nothing in his Anſwer, but what perhaps might have been juſtified by the oddneſs of the Provocation; but yet you can't but obſerve a great difference between the behaviour of the *Diſciple*, and of the *Maſter*.

But if you would ſee a perfect Example of Meekneſs, look upon him under the Shame, and Diſhonour, and Pains of the Croſs, encountring at once with the Agonies of Death, the Contradictions and Revilings of Sinners, and the Vengeance of an Almighty God; and all this without any the leaſt ſhew of Impatience or Diſcompoſure of Spirit. So that I think I may well inlarge the Queſtion of the Prophet, and to that, *Is there any ſorrow like*

*to*

*to my ſorrow*, add this alſo, *Is there any meekneſs like to my meekneſs?*

And here I cannot but make a ſtand, and with Sorrow reflect upon a certain Order of Men, how little they have of the true *Spirit* of *Chriſtianity*, how little they have learnt either by the Precept or by the Example of him whoſe Religion and Imitation too they profeſs, and by whoſe venerable Name they have thought fit to diſtinguiſh themſelves; who inſtead of this Meekneſs and Gentleneſs, are all made up of Paſſion and Violence, Fury and Outragiouſneſs, meer *Firebrands* in Society, that kindle and lay waſt where-ever they come, and ſeem more like *Granada's* ſhot into a Town, than *Inhabitants* of it, by thus raging where they light, by thus burning, deſtroying and tearing all about them. How unlike are theſe Men to the Temper of the meek Lamb of God! As unlike certainly as Wolves and Tygers. And yet 'tis an unlikeneſs they are ſo little ſenſible of, that they will yet pretend to the Name and Practice of Chriſtians; yea to the very Name of *Jeſus*; and he had need be a bold Man, or at a

good distance from them, that shall dare to contradict them.

But certainly, as *Wrath worketh not* Jam. 1.20. *the righteousness of God*, so neither is such an allowed course of it consistent with it. And as he cannot be a good Man who is so inordinate in the use of a Passion, wherein both his own and his Neighbours Peace and Quiet is so much concern'd; so much less can he be a good Christian, who is of a Frame of Spirit so directly contrary to that of the Holy Jesus, and who wants this great Christian Qualification, the Spirit of Gentleness and Meekness, which is so considerable an Instance of Charity, and so strictly enjoyn'd by the Precept, and so strongly recommended by the Example of Christ.

But because the *Limits* of this Duty are not so plain as the *Obligation* of it, I proceed in the Third place, to state the Measures of its Obligation in its more General Cases. And here in the first place it may be demanded, Whether all Anger be contrary to Meekness, and consequently unlawful? The Affirmative is stiffly contended for by the *Stoic*; but I think the Negative suffi-

ſufficiently warranted by that Apoſtolical Caution, *Be angry and ſin not.* Eph. 4.26. Which plainly implies, that there may be anger without Sin. And 'tis alſo plain from the nature of the thing that there may. For Anger is a natural Affection, implanted in us by God, from whom nothing can proceed that is ſimply and as ſuch Evil. And beſides, the Office of Meekneſs is not utterly to deſtroy this Paſſion, but only to regulate it, whereby 'tis ſuppoſed that 'tis not in its whole kind evil; for what is ſo cannot be regulated, and muſt be deſtroyed.

Since then Anger is ſuppoſed not wholly to be deſtroy'd by Meekneſs, as being Evil, but only to be regulated leſt it become ſo, the next thing to be conſider'd is, by what *Meaſures*. Now theſe Meaſures may either reſpect Anger as to the inward Paſſion, as within a Man's own Breaſt; or as to the outward Acts, Effects, and Expreſſions of it.

And firſt, As to thoſe Meaſures which reſpect Anger as to the inward Paſſion, as lodg'd within a Man's own Breaſt. Theſe I think will be ſufficiently

ently comprized within these Four Circumstances, the Cause or Occasion, the Object, the Degree, or the Time. As to the Cause, to render that justifiable, 'twill be requisite, First, That it be something weighty and considerable, something wherein either the Glory of God; or the publick Good, or else some very great private Interest is concern'd. 'Tis not every little impertinent Trifle that can warrant our Anger. Secondly, 'Twill be requisite that our Anger owe its Birth to some competent measure of previous Counsel and Deliberation: For if all our Actions are to be govern'd by Reason, certainly our *Passions* ought not to be wholly exempted from it. I'm sure they need it most of all; and if a Man thinks not before he gives himself leave to be angry, though the ground of it should prove never so just and proper in it self, yet as to him his Anger was brutish and unreasonable. As it will also be, if Thirdly, it be not conceived for a due end, such as either the Vindication of the Divine Honour and Glory, the procurement of good to our Neighbour, or the prevention and suppression of sin. And so much to qualifie our Anger with respect to the *Cause*. But

But Secondly, to the further Regulation of it, 'twill be requisite that it have a due *Object*. For all are not so. There are some things that cannot, some that ought not to be the Objects of Anger. That cannot with Reason, and that ought not for Religion. Thus we ought not to be angry with *God*, as 'tis said *Caligula* was, who being vext at the Thunder for disturbing his Banquet, rose up from the Table and provoked *Jupiter* to fight with him. Neither ought we to be angry with *inanimate* senseless things, as *Cyrus* was with the River for drowning one of his Sacred Horses. It argues a Mind overcome and blinded with Passion to be so prodigal of it where it can signifie nothing. Nor ought we to be angry with those, who either by Chance or Necessity, or probable Ignorance, or common Frailty, have offended us. Nor are we to be angry with those, who though they have none of these excuses to qualifie their Trespass, yet acknowledg their Fault, beg our Pardon, and promise Amendment. Repentance is the measure of God's Forgiveness, and so it ought to be of ours. Nor lastly, should we

let loose our Anger against *Brute* Creatures, Children, Fools or Mad-men, or any other that are under any great defect or disorder of Understanding. But we are to be angry with such only as are impious and wicked, and that are neither ashamed nor repent of their wickedness. And even here also we ought rather to be angry with the *Fault*, than with the *Person*. For so *Moses* was exceeding angry at the *Idolatry* of the *Israelites*, when at the same time he prayed for the *Idolaters*.

And thus far of the *Object*. The two last circumstances whereby our Anger is to be qualify'd, are *Degree* and *Time*. As to Degree, this may receive a double Measure, one from the Person who is the *Object* of Anger, and another from the Person who is the *Subject* of it. That with reference to the Object is this, That our Anger should not exceed the quality of the Offence committed. That with reference to the Subject will be this, That it should not be so great, let the Offence be what it will, as to discompose the mind of him who conceives it, and thereby unfit him for the Discharge of such Offices

as

as he ows either to God, his Neighbour, or Himself.

Then as to the time of our Anger, this we find already stated by the Apostle, who limits it within the Compass of a *Day*. 'Tis a Passion that ought to be so short lived, that the Sun must not go down upon it. For indeed 'tis not safe trusting our selves with such a dangerous Guide in the *Dark*, nor to nourish a Passion, which tho in its own Nature innocent, borders so nicely upon Hatred, that with a little keeping 'twill grow so stale, sower and inveterate, as to commence Malice. Eph. 4. 26.

And thus far of those Measures which respect Anger as to the *inward Passion*. Proceed we now to those who respect it as to the outward Acts, Effects and Expressions of it. And here among other things too obvious to be insisted on, two Enquiries offer themselves more principally to be consider'd. One is concerning the Propulsation or repelling of Injuries, the other is concerning the revenging of Injuries already done. Of both these it may be demanded, how far they are consistent with

with the Vertue and Duty of Christian Meekness.

As to the Former, 'tis to be consider'd that Injuries are either Public, as when the Magistrate oppresses his Subjects; or Private, when one Subject injures another; or lastly, such as are on both sides Public, as when one King or State injures another. This premised, I answer, First, That an Injury offer'd from one Kingdom or State to another, may and ought to be repell'd by that other, this being one of the main Ends and Uses of the Civil Sword to protect those who are subjected to it, which when it does, 'tis duly employed. To which it may be added, that distinct Kingdoms, being under no common Jurisdiction, have no other expedient whereby to right themselves. Either therefore they must always suffer, which would be intolerable to Society, or they must right themselves by the Sword. Secondly, That in Case the Supreme Magistrate oppress his Subjects, 'tis by no means consistent with Christian Meekness for them by force to repel the Injury. We are indeed to *Obey* him only in *some* Cases, but

but to *Resist* him in *none*. This is certainly a True, tho to some an Hard Saying. *Wherefore ye must needs be subject, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation*, are as plain Words as any in the Bible. But Men are very slow to understand what they have no mind to practise; otherwise one would think there should need no other Decision in the case, than the Example of our Meek Lord and Master, who patiently submitted himself to an ordinary Magistrate, commanded his rash Disciple to *sheath his Sword*, and would not suffer his Angelical Legions to *draw theirs*. Mat. 26. 53

But Thirdly, as to private Injuries between Man and Man, I answer, First, That these are never to be forcibly repell'd by a private Defence, when a publick one may be had; in defect of which a private one may be used. But then we are to consider Secondly, That either this private Injury reaches only to our Goods and Possessions, *&c.* without hazard of Life; and here a good Man would go very far in yielding from his right, and in patiently undergoing Injuries: Or else 'tis with extream Danger

Danger of Life, and then indeed he not only may, but perhaps is oblig'd by the Law of Self-preservation by the utmost Force to repel the Injury. And thus much to be observ'd in *repelling* of Injuries.

I come now in the Second place, to consider the *Vindication* of Injuries already done. And here I take notice of a two-fold Extreme. One is of those who stand for the highest Vindication of Injuries without any measure or moderation; which seems to have been the Fault of the *Jews* of old, who by the Law of Retaliation, thought they might exact any thing, an Eye for an Eye, or a Tooth for a Tooth. The other is of the *Anabaptists* and *Socinians*, who so extol the Law of Charity, as not to allow any place for the Vindication of Injuries, not permitting it either to private Persons or publick, and so taking from the Magistrate both the Right and the Use of the Civil Sword.

These I take to be Extremes; and that the Truth lies between them, which I suppose is, That publick Vindication of

of Injuries is not only Lawful but Neceſſary; ſo far from being againſt Charity, that 'tis a great inſtance of it, and required by it. For without this there would be no living, and Human Society could never ſtand. But as to private Vindication of Injuries, that which we more eſpecially call *Revenge*, this I ſhall readily allow to be utterly unlawful, and ſo make appear upon theſe Grounds. Firſt, Becauſe Vengeance is proper to God, and therefore to be committed either to him, or elſe to thoſe whom he has empowr'd, who are therefore ſtyled Gods. Secondly, Becauſe Vengeance is an Act of Judgment, and conſequently a Publick Act, and therefore not to be exerciſed by a private Perſon, who alſo muſt not be allow'd to be a Judge in his own Cauſe. Laſtly, becauſe Vengeance cannot belong to them by whom the ends of it cannot be obtain'd. But now by a private Hand they cannot, as may appear by conſidering what theſe Ends are, which I ſuppoſe to be chiefly theſe Three; To amend him that is puniſh'd; To better others by his Example; and to procure to the injur'd Party and others Security for the future. But now private

vate Revenge reaches none of these Ends. For First, It does not amend or reform the Adversary, but rather provokes him further. Nor Secondly, Does it tend to the bettering of others, but rather corrupts and scandalizes them by an ill Example. Nor Lastly, Does the private Avenger procure safety either to himself or others, but rather danger to both, and to himself Vexation and Trouble for the present, and Fear for the future, lest his Enemy should revenge himself again. Private Revenge therefore is universally to be condemn'd, as utterly unlawful, and altogether inconsistent with the Duty of *Christian Meekness*.

And thus have we stated the Measures of this Vertue in its more General Cases. But this is a thing that needs to be *inforc'd*, as well as *explain'd*. Consider therefore, First, That God has expresly forbidden us all undue Anger, and has prescribed the contrary Offices of Charity and Meekness. Consider again, that all Injuries befall us by Gods special Providence, and may, if we hinder not its course, turn to our greater Good. Consider again, that God uses

uſes an incredible Patience and Long-ſuffering toward the worſt of Men, and particularly towards our ſelves; by the former ſetting us an Example of Lenity, and by the latter making it very reaſonable for us to follow it. Conſider again, that all Vengeance belongs to God, who has ſaid, *Vengeance is mine.* And that therefore he that avenges himſelf, aſſumes the part of *God*, yea withal of a *Judge*, of an *Accuſer*, of a *Witneſs*, and of an *Executioner* all at once, againſt all Senſe and Reaſon, Equity and Juſtice. This may be conſider'd with reference to God.

Then again as to our Neighbour, Conſider that he is nearly related both to God, and to our ſelves. To God, as made after his Image; and to our ſelves, as caſt in the ſame Mould with us, and partaking of the ſame common Nature. Conſider again, what we would have done by our Neighbour to our ſelves, and how reaſonable 'tis that we ſhould do the ſame to him. Laſtly, Conſider what we *have* already done to him, whether we have not been guilty of the ſame or greater Injuries *towards* him, than thoſe which

which we so warmly resent *from* him.

Then lastly with reference to our selves, consider First, how much by our unjust Anger we expose our selves
Mat. 5. 22. to the just Displeasure of God, who by his Son has told us, that *Whosoever is angry with his Brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgment.* Consider again, that we may easily, and do often mis-interpret Mens Minds and Intentions by their outward Demeanour, and think our selves affronted by them when there is no such thing intended; and that therefore even upon this account 'tis very reasonable we should be *slow to wrath.* Consider again, how much causless and intemperate Anger unfits us for all the Parts of Divine Worship, which can neither be well perform'd by, nor will be accepted from a Heart flaming with this strange Fire. And therefore says the Apostle, speaking of
1 Tim. 2. Prayer, *Lifting up holy Hands without wrath*, implying, that a vacancy from Wrath is a necessary Qualification for Prayer. To which purpose 'tis very considerable, that when King *David* would have erected a Temple for the Public

Public Worship of God, tho a Man otherwise of a sweet and gentle Disposition, and only accidentally and innocently too engaged in Circumstances of Anger and Contention; yet he was refused, and the Work imposed upon one not of a more meek Spirit, but only of a calmer and more serene Life. And if God would not accept an *House of Prayer* from a Man of a Military way and Character, much less will he accept those *Prayers* which proceed from a Soul disturb'd with Anger. Consider again, how it unfits us for the business of our Calling, how it hinders the free Exercise of our Thoughts, how it prejudices our Health, disturbs the Tranquility of our Minds, renders us odious and uneasie to all about us; in one word, how utterly it unfits us both for enjoying our selves, and from being delighted in by others. Consider lastly, to what mean and sordid Principles within us this Passion owes its rise, such as Pride, Self-love, vain Curiosity, and Suspicion, rash Credulity, Negligence and Inadvertency, Ambition, Lust, Envy, and the like. So that besides its own proper illness,

'tis further to be detested upon the Scandal of its Parentage.

Having thus far discours'd of the Duty of Meekness, First, By shewing what it is. Secondly, By shewing that 'tis a Christian Duty. Thirdly, By stating the general Measures of its Obligation. And lastly, By proposing such Considerations as may recommend its Practice. I come now briefly to discourse of its *Blessedness*, which may also serve as another distinct Consideration to enforce the Practice of it. *Blessed are the meek*, says our Saviour, *for they shall inherit the earth.* The only Beatitude which has a Temporal Promise annex'd to it; wherein our Lord seems to imitate *Moses*, who in his Law had also one Commandment with a Temporal Promise. And there seems to be great resemblance between them. One is, that thy *Days may be long in the Earth*, and the other, *They shall inherit the Earth.* Here therefore We are to do two things. First, We must enquire into the Sense and Meaning of the Beatitude. Secondly, Into the Truth of it. That is, We must first enquire, What is meant by the Meek's in-

inheriting the Earth; and secondly shew, that they do so inherit it.

And first, by their inheriting the Earth, I suppose cannot be meant, that they shall have large Portions of it; that they shall raise great Estates, that they shall take root and spread, and as the Prophet expresses it, *joyn House to House*, and *lay Field to Field*. This I suppose cannot be meant. Isa. 5.

I. Because this is not true, the Meek do not inherit the Earth according to this Sense.

II. Because if they did, this would not be a proper Ground for their being pronounc'd Blessed.

And first, this Sense is not true, the Meek do not *thus* inherit the Earth. We rather find that the World is made for the Bold and the Violent, for the rough-spirited and turbulent, for the furious and boisterous; and that they have commonly the greatest share of it who deserve the least. And therefore we commonly urge this as one Argument against the goodness of Riches, that they frequently fall to the Lot of

the worst Men. And therefore says
Psal. 74. the Psalmist, *Lo, these are the ungodly, these prosper in the World, and these have riches in possession.* While in the mean time the Meek are oppressed and devoured by these Beasts of Prey, and are so far from inheriting the Earth, that 'tis as much as many of them can do to *Live* upon it, and more than some of them can do to find room *under* it.

But Secondly, Suppose they did thus inherit the Earth, by having great Portions of it, yet this would not be a proper Ground for their being pronounc'd Blessed. For are Clods of Earth a suitable Good for Man? Or is Happiness to be measur'd by the Acre? Do we find that rich Men are so very much Happier than others? Or do we think that the Earth has Mines of Happiness, as it has of Gold? But whatever *we* think, is it at all probable that our Blessed Lord, who himself made choice of Poverty, who but in a Line or two before pronounc'd the Poor Blessed, who tells us that his own Kingdom was not of this World, who bids us beware of Covetousness, and warns

us

us of the great danger of Riches, by telling us how hard it is for one that has them to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; who dehorts us from laying up Treasures on Earth; and who lastly recommends to his Disciples nothing more than the contempt of the World, by assuring them, that the Life of Man does not consist in the abundance of things which he possesses: I say, is it imaginable that our Lord after all this, should therefore pronounce the meek Man blessed for having great Possessions?

This therefore cannot be the thing meant by the Meek's inheriting the Earth; which I take rather to signifie the *manner* of Possessing, than the *greatness* of their Possessions; and to import thus much, That the Meek shall enjoy what they have, be it little or great, with comfort, and satisfaction, and tranquility of Mind; whereas those of a contrary Disposition, tho they may *possess* a great deal, can yet be truly said to *enjoy* little or nothing. And this seems to be the Sense of the Psalmist, when in words directly parallel to these of our Lord, he says,

Psal. 34. 11. *The meek-spirited shall possess the earth, and shall be refreshed in the multitude of Peace.* That is, they shall have Comfort and Pleasure, Peace and Content with whatever they have, which how little soever, shall yet carry a true Relish, and yield more real satisfaction to them, than the otherwise affected can reap from their ample Revenues. According to what the Psalmist in the same place immediately subjoyns, *A small thing that the righteous has, is better than great riches of the ungodly.* Vers. 16.

This I take to be the *Sense* and Meaning of this Beatitude. As to the *Truth* and Reality of it, there is this Double Security for it, the natural tendency of the Vertue of Meekness, and the Blessing of God upon it. As to its natural tendency, Meekness is a very decent, amiable, and winning thing; and accordingly the Apostle calls it, *the Ornament of a meek and quiet Spirit.* And by this in all probability the Meek Man will sweeten and endear even his very Enemies to him, and so gain himself Peace *without*, by his quiet and inoffensive Behaviour,

haviour. But however this be, yet he is ſure to have Peace *within*, with himſelf, and with God. And having this, he is in a very fit condition of Mind to enjoy himſelf, and to take comfort in what he poſſeſſes.

Which he will be farther enabled to do, Secondly, by the Bleſſing of God. And this again the Pſalmiſt takes notice of ſome few Verſes after the forecited ones. *Such as are bleſſed of the Lord* Ver. 22. *ſhall poſſeſs the Land*, ſays he, implying, that as the Meek, whom he juſt before ſpoke of, ſhould poſſeſs the Earth, ſo 'tis through a ſpecial Bleſſing of God that they ſhould do ſo. And theſe are two great Securities for a Life of Comfort and Self-enjoyment, the Peace of a ſedate Spirit within, and the Bleſſing of God without. And both theſe the meek Man has, whom therefore we may venture to pronounce Bleſſed, and therefore Bleſſed becauſe he ſhall *thus* inherit the Earth: Which yet ſhall be but a Type and Pledge of his Future Inheritance with the Saints in Light.

## Discourse the Fourth.

Matth. V. *ver.* vi.

*Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be fill'd.*

THO God has provided *Entertainment* for all the Appetites which he has made; yet there are but two Appetites of Man which he intends to gratifie to the *Height*, and to bless with a full and lasting satisfaction. And those are the desire of being Happy, and the desire of being Good. There are some Appetites of Man which are never satisfied; for, says the Wise Man, Eccles. 1. 8. *The eye is not satisfied with seeing, nor the ear fill'd with hearing.* *Seeing* and *Hearing* are the most refined of all the Senses, and those Appetites which are most spiritual and refined, and come neareſt to the Elevations of the Intellectual Nature, are always hardest to be

be satisfied. And the Intellectual Nature it self, when 'tis more raised and elevated, as in the state of Separation, will have a more inlarg'd Appetite, and a sharper edge of Desire, and so will be harder to be satisfied than 'tis now. Which by the way I take to be the Reason why those Sensual Spirits which now feel no great uneasiness from the Absence of the Supreme Good, will notwithstanding hereafter be extreamly miserable in being exiled from his Beatific Presence. As for the *Grosser* Appetites of the Animal Nature, such as Hunger, Thirst, and the like; these indeed have this advantage above the *Finer*, that they may be satisfied for some time, (and such is the brutishness of Man) are too often overcharg'd, But then they will return again in certain Periods like the Tide, and be as importunate as ever for new Supplies; and, as our Saviour told the Woman of *Samaria*, *Whosoever drinks of this Water shall thirst again.* The Appetite may be laid asleep for a while, but it will infallibly awake again into its former eagerness. John 4. 13.

But

But 'tis not the unhappiness of Man to have *all* his Appetites like these, such as will either *never*, or not *finally* be satisfy'd. There are two that are design'd for a full and lasting Satisfaction, The Desire of being Happy, and the Desire of being Good and Vertuous. But still with this material difference between them, That the Desire of Happiness is not absolutely secure of Satisfaction, but only upon Condition. The Satisfaction of this Desire is suspended upon the Quality of our Moral Conduct. But now the Desire of Goodness and Vertue has by the Grace and Indulgence of God an absolute Title to Satisfaction, and is sure to be throughly gratified. For, says our Saviour, *Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be fill'd. Shall be fill'd*, without any further Condition or Reserve.

That we may the better comprehend the *Sense* and *Truth* of this Beatitude, it will be necessary

I. To inquire what Righteousness that is, which if we hunger and thirst after, we shall be fill'd.

II. What

II. What kind of Hunger and Thirst that is, to which this Promise of Repletion is made.

III. To make good the Proposition it self, that those who do hunger and thirst after Righteousness shall be fill'd.

To satisfie the first Inquiry, I shall not critically weigh all the acceptations of the Word *Righteousness* in Scripture, thinking it sufficient to the business in hand, to consider the general *Kinds* and *Degrees* of Righteousness. This therefore may be consider'd either in a *Judicial*, or in a *Moral* Sense. Righteousness in a Judicial Sense imports as much as a Legal Discharge, whereby the Person impleaded becomes Right in the Court, or Righteous. Which Legal Discharge may be again two ways, either by remitting a Criminal, or by acquitting suspected or accused Innocence. These are the two ways of a Legal Discharge, and then is a Person judicially Righteous, when he is discharg'd either of these two ways, either by the remission of his Guilt, or by the Declaration of his Innocence.

The

The latter of these is properly Justification, tho the former be *that* Justification whereby Christians must expect to stand in the Judgment of God, since in the other Sense no Man living shall be Justify'd. For we are not Justify'd as *Innocent* Persons, but as *Sinners*, and accordingly are not *Acquitted*, but *Pardon'd*.

Righteousness in a *Moral* Sense may be supposed to import all those Divine and Moral Vertues which are required by the Christian Law, consisting of the whole Duty of Man, to God, Himself, and his Neighbour. This latter kind of Righteousness may again be consider'd either *Materially* and *Abstractedly* for the bare Vertues themselves, as they are certain supposed Actions which naturally tend to the good and perfection both of Human Nature, and of Human Society. Or else *Formally* and *Concretely* for such and such Vertues as subjected in Man; or for the Habitual Will of doing such supposed Actions, which is formal Vertue, and whereby the Man is denominated Vertuous or Righteous.

This

This is not one of those Distinctions which are without any *Difference*. For the Difference is very clear and great: As for instance, when 'tis said, *I love or practise vertue*, and, *I am proud of my vertue*; 'tis plain that the word Vertue does not bear the same Notion in both Propositions. For when 'tis said, *I love and practise Vertue*, there 'tis plain that Vertue is taken Materially, for the Abstract Idea of Vertue, which is supposed to be the Object of my Love. But when 'tis said, I am proud of my Vertue, here 'tis as plain that Vertue is taken Formally, for my Habit of willing it, whereby I am denominated vertuous. For I cannot be supposed to be proud of Vertue in its abstract Idea, but only of the Love I have towards it. To be short, Moral Vertue may be taken either for the things which are fit to be done, or for the Habitual Will of doing them. The former is the righteousness of the Law, prescribing what ought to be done; the latter is the righteousness of the *Man* willing to do what is so prescribed. These are the general kinds of Righteousness.

Now

Now to the Question, What kind of Righteousness that is, which if we hunger and thirst after, we shall be fill'd? I answer, First, That the Righteousness here intended cannot be Judicial Righteousness, since the mere desire of Pardon or Justification is not of it self sufficient to procure it, or to avert the Sentence of Condemnation. It must therefore be *Moral* righteousness.

If you ask in what Sense? Whether as materially, or as formally taken? I think either Sense may be admitted. But then there will be difference in the Proposition according to the Sense presumed. For if Righteousness be here taken *materially*, then the hungring and thirsting after it will be a *Simple* and *Direct* Act of the Will; but if *Formally*, for that Righteousness whereby a Man is formally good and vertuous, then the hungring and thirsting after it will be a *Reflex* Act of the Will, that is, a Desire not of material Righteousness, but of the Love of material Righteousness, which is a Man's formal Righteousness. And this Sense of Righteousness I take to be most agreeable

agreeable to the exigence of this place, because the desiring material Righteousness by a direct act of the Will actually makes a Man formally Righteous, and so prevents and anticipates that Repletion which our Lord promises as a future Reward and Blessing. Whereas the desiring formal Righteousness, or the Love of material Righteousness by a Reflex Act, supposes the Man not yet actually Righteous, as he is also supposed in the Beatitude, and so leaves him capable of having the Promise made good to him, that he shall be filled.

Now as to the *Degrees* of Christian Righteousness, the Masters of Spiritual Life usually assign Three. By Degrees I suppose, meaning not all those Advances in Righteousness, whereby a Man may exceed either another, or Himself; for then they might as well have reckon'd 3000, there being an infinite Latitude in Goodness; but only such Advances as imply different *Periods*, and distinct *States* of the Divine Life. These they assign to be Three, grounding this their Division upon the Authority of St. *John*, who, they

they say, represents Christians as under a threefold State, by bespeaking them
Joh. 2. 12. under the several Titles of *Little Children*, *Young Men*, and *Fathers*. By little Children, meaning young or new Converts, who must be fed with the Milk of the Word, with the plain Doctrins and Principles of Christianity. By young Men those who are grown up to some strength in Holiness, and have made some progress in the Mortification of the inferiour Life. By Fathers, those who are arrived to a perfect habit of Goodness, and as far as Human Nature will admit, are fully regenerated into the Divine Life.

But I think this Computation must be retrench'd. For with all the Invention which I have I can find but three States or Degrees for the whole Moral Condition of Mankind. For all the Men in the World, and every particular Man in several Periods of his Life, may be reduced to one of these three Orders: Either he is one of those who do not apprehend Sin as an Evil, who either through want of understanding and reflection, have not attain'd to any sense of its Malignity, or through De-

Debauchery and habitual Viciouſneſs have loſt it, and ſo will and chuſe Sin *purely* and *intirely*, with Unity of Conſent, and without any mixture of reluctancy, which is the moſt exalted pitch of Wickedneſs that a Creature is capable of. Or elſe one of thoſe who indeed do look upon Sin as Evil, and as ſuch nill and are averſe to it; but not looking upon it always as the *greateſt* Evil, do oftentimes nill it only imperfectly, and abſolutely ſpeaking do will and chuſe it, to avoid (as they then think) ſome greater Evil. Or elſe laſtly, one of thoſe who looking upon Sin not only under the Notion of Evil, but as the greateſt of all Evils, nill and refuſe it, not only in ſome certain reſpect, but abſolutely and thoroughly, ſo as not by any means to be perſuaded to commit it.

Theſe Three Degrees will comprize the whole Moral State of Mankind. And accordingly I obſerve that St. *Paul* makes mention of a three-fold Law. The firſt is, νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι, *The Law of Sin which is in the Members*. The Second is, νόμος τοῦ νοός, *The Law of the Mind*, or Conſcience. Rom. 7. 23. Ver. 25.

Rom.8.2. The Third is, νόμος πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς; *The Law of the Spirit of Life.*

These three Laws answer exactly to the three Moral States of Human Nature. Under the first Law, the Law of Sin, are those who will and embrace Sin purely and entirely. Under the Second Law, the Law of the Mind, are those who nill and stand averse to Sin in some certain respect, as Evil, but yet will and chuse it absolutely and effectually. Under the third Law, the Law of the Spirit of Life, are those who absolutely and thoroughly nill the Commission of Sin.

The first of these States is a state of meer Sin and Death, and those of this Order are they who are said to be Eph.2.1. *Dead in Trespasses and Sins.* The Second is a state of Imperfect Life. The Third is a state of Health and Vigour. The first is a state of Rest and Acquiescence in Sin. The second is a state of Contention. The third is a state of Victory. In the first state the Mind is laid fast in a deep sleep. In the second she is between sleeping and waking. In the third she is broad awake, and well

well come to her self. He that is in the first state, is born only of the Flesh, and has no higher Principle in him: He is that *Animal Man* that perceives not the things of God. He that is in the second, has indeed some quickning Motions, some ineffective Stirrings and Endeavours of the Divine Life. But he that is in the third, is born of the Spirit and of God, and doth not commit Sin, because his *Seed remains in him*. 1 Cor. 2. 14. Joh. 3. 9.

From this Distribution of the Moral State of Man, 'tis evident that there can be but two distinct Degrees of Righteousness, or states of the Divine Life. For the first of the three (as was before remark'd) is a state of meer Death and Sin. Righteousness and Life belong only to the two latter, but with this great difference, that the first of these two Degrees, tho it has something of Life and Righteousness in it, yet 'tis such as is consistent with the final and absolute Prevalency and Dominion of sin, and consequently such as cannot qualifie a Man for Pardon, or put him into a state of Grace and Salvation. Whereas in the last, the

Principle of the Divine Life is ſuppoſed to be ſo ſtrong, as not only to reſiſt, but to overcome ſin. And he that is thus ſpiritually alive, is alive indeed, alive unto himſelf, and alive unto God, and if he abide in this Life, ſhall live for ever.

There are therefore but two ſuch Degrees of Spiritual Life and Righteouſneſs as imply different ſtates. And therefore to the Diſtribution of St. *John* my Anſwer is, That it muſt neceſſarily be underſtood not of three diſtinct ſtates of Righteouſneſs (there being no more for the whole Moral condition of Man) but of three Degrees in one and the ſame general State. If it be demanded which of the two ſtates of Righteouſneſs that is? I anſwer, That St. *John* muſt be ſuppoſed to intend the laſt and beſt ſtate, becauſe he addreſſes himſelf to his little Children, young Men and Fathers, as thoſe who had their *Sins forgiven them*, who had *overcome the wicked one*, and who had *known the Father*. All which Expreſſions argue one ſtate of Grace in common between them, tho differing in Meaſures and Proportions. The reaſonableneſs of which three-

Joh. 2. 12, 13.

threefold Gradation I do not think my ſelf concern'd at preſent to enquire into or juſtifie, it being ſufficient to my preſent purpoſe to have ſhewn that it cannot be meant of three different ſtates of Righteouſneſs, but only of three different degrees in the ſame ſtate. The ſtates themſelves are but two.

Now to the Queſtion, What degree or ſtate of Righteouſneſs that is, which if we hunger and thirſt after we ſhall be fill'd: I anſwer, That it muſt be no other than that which puts a Man in favour with God, and qualifies him for the Mercies of the New Covenant. For if the *Righteouſneſs it ſelf* be not ſuch as will render a Man acceptable with God, how can the *Deſire* of it intitle him to his Promiſes? 'Tis a much leſs Worthineſs to deſire any Righteouſneſs than 'tis to have it; and how then can it be an acceptable thing to deſire an unacceptable Righteouſneſs! The Righteouſneſs therefore here intended muſt be ſuch as makes him that has it, acceptable to God; and conſequently it can be no other but the laſt degree or ſtate of Righteouſneſs: Since nothing ſhort of that can either

reconcile God to Man, or make Man fit for God. And this I take to be the constant Voice of Scripture, and the Doctrin of our Holy Church, which every where represents an absolute and effectual Love of Holiness, and the like Hatred of Sin as necessary to the state of Grace and real Regeneration.

There are, I know, some among us, who notwithstanding their usual and popular Pretence, That they differ from our Church not in any Doctrinal Points of Religion, but only about some few Ritual Observances, do yet teach very differently in this Article, setting the state of Regeneration and Sanctification so low, that a bare ineffective striving against sin is reckon'd a very sufficient mark of it: Wherein they conspire with those of the Roman Church, who make the slightest Repentance by the Accession of Sacerdotal Absolution to be full and valid; only with this Difference, That what the one make sufficient in a certain case, and on a certain supposition, the other make sufficient universally and absolutely, requiring nothing further as of necessity to Sanctification than a bare

bare ineffective ſtrife againſt ſin. A ſtate which a Man may be ſoon *in*, tho, according to the ſame Gentlemen, not ſo ſoon *out*. For whoever has the leaſt ſenſe of ſin as an Evil (and certainly there are but few who have not ſo much) muſt needs be ſo far averſe to it, and cannot poſſibly commit it but with ſome reluctance: Which yet according to theſe Men, is ſufficient to intitle a Man to the ſtate and reward of Sanctification, tho at the ſame time he be the *Servant of Sin*.

This I confeſs is a good way to counterballance the Severity of their Reprobating Decrees, and to ſtock Heaven as much by one Doctrin, as they depopulate it by another. But certainly the Gate of Heaven is much too ſtrait both for this Doctrin, and for thoſe (I will not ſay that hold it, but) that live by it. It is a Doctrin too little according to Godlineſs to be according to Truth, and ſuch as makes neither for the Honour of God, nor for the Safety of Man. But I need reprove it no further, it being ſufficiently expoſed by our moſt excellent Biſhop *Taylor* in his Preface to the Clergy of

*England* before his *Unum Neceſſarium.*

All therefore that I further remark is, That ſince the Righteouſneſs of the firſt Degree is that which theſe Men make ſufficient for Acceptance with God, the ſame degree of Righteouſneſs would I ſuppoſe according to theſe Men be a ſufficient Title to this Beatitude. But if the laſt degree of Righteouſneſs be only that which can procure us acceptance with God (as moſt certainly it is) then that is the only Righteouſneſs, which if we duly hunger and thirſt after, we ſhall be fill'd. I ſay, which if we duly hunger and thirſt after. Which leads me in the ſecond place to enquire what kind of Hunger and Thirſt that is to which this Promiſe of Repletion is made.

And firſt, 'tis plain that Hunger and Thirſt here muſt be taken in a figurative and metaphorical ſenſe; ſince Righteouſneſs is not the Object of a *Natural*, but of a *Spiritual* Appetite. Hunger and Thirſt therefore is the ſame with willing or deſiring. This as to the *Kind*. But then as to the *Degree*, 'tis to be conſider'd, That every Good does

does as such necessarily move the Will, as every the least possible Weight moves the Scale. But it does not always move *effectually*, as every Weight in the Scale does not weigh it *down*. But however something it does towards it, since otherwise as much Weight would be necessary to turn the Scale as if it had been quite empty. I shall therefore distinguish of Willing as a very contemplative Theorist does of Physical Motion, into that which is *impotent*, and that which is *prevalent*. By impotent willing meaning that natural Inclination or *Velleity* we have to every Good as such, which indeed would be prevalent, if not out-weighed by Reasons of stronger moment on the other side; but being overcome by them becomes impotent, not as to the Endeavour (for that is inseparable) but as to actual Determination. By prevalent willing, I mean such a Degree of willing as is not a meer endeavour, but passes into actual and effectual choice: When the Moral Scale not only *gravitates* and presses, but weighs down.

Dr. Glisson de Vita Naturæ, c. 19. p. 254.

Now

Now to the Question, Which of these Degrees of willing or desiring is here intended: I answer, the last and highest, that which is peremptory and effectual, that which passes into act, and ends in a thorough Determination of the Will. Since nothing less can either be signify'd by such strong Metaphors as these of *Hungring* and *Thirsting*, or consist with the sincerity of a Christian Spirit. 'Tis not enough therefore to have ones face set towards *Jerusalem*, and to cast some amorous Glances upon the Beauty of Holiness. 'Tis not enough to have some faint ineffective Wishes, some kind resentments towards Righteousness, there being but few so wretchedly wicked and unmoraliz'd as not to have some such little *Velleities* of being Good; and no question *Balaam* that desired the *Death*, did also at *this* rate desire the *Life* of the *Righteous*. But the Desire must be strong and active, vehement and importunate, absolute and peremptory, without any Reserves or Conditions. It must bear the same proportion to the Soul, that the Keenest Hunger and Thirst does to the Body, that is, it must be

be a great deal ſharper, as much as the Appetites of the Spirit are more quick and exquiſite than thoſe of the Body. It muſt be ſuch a deſire as our Saviour had to celebrate the Paſſover, and inſtitute his laſt Supper, when he ſays, *With deſire have I deſired to eat this Paſſover with you before I ſuffer.* Briefly, it muſt be ſuch a Deſire as carries in it the full bent and ſtreſs of the Soul, ſuch as is accompanied with the moſt earneſt and hearty Endeavours, and with the moſt paſſionate and Devout Prayers and Aſpirations to God. Such as that of the Pſalmiſt, *O that my ways were made ſo direct, that I might keep thy Statutes!* With many more ſuch throughout the whole 119 Pſalm, which I commend to the Meditation of the Pious. Luk. 22. 15

This is that Hungring and Thirſting after Righteouſneſs intended in this Beatitude. And accordingly 'tis obſervable what *Solomon* in a place almoſt parallel to this of our Lord, ſays concerning the Love of *Wiſdom*, which generally in Scripture, eſpecially in *Solomon*'s Writings, ſignifies the ſame with *Righteouſneſs*. *My Son, if thou wilt receive my words,*

Prov. 2. *words, and hide my commandments with thee; so that thou incline thine ear unto wisdom, and apply thine heart to understanding; yea, if thou criest after knowledge, and liftest up thy voice for understanding; if thou seekest her as silver, and searchest for her as for hid treasures. Then shalt thou understand the fear of the Lord, and find the knowledge of thy God.* Here the Wise Man makes the most searching Diligence, and the most vigorous exertion of Soul necessary to the finding of Wisdom. And he that so seeks her shall find her. Which brings me in the last place to make good the Proposition it self, That those who do thus hunger and thirst after Righteousness shall be fill'd.

But before I proceed to this, I beg leave by way of Digression to speak something of another sort of Hunger and Thirst which all Christians are concerned to have. Our Saviour tells us,

Joh. 6. 53. that *Except a man eat the flesh of the son of man, and drink his blood he has no life in him.* Now if the Flesh and Blood of our Lord be necessary to the *Life*, then certainly the Hungring and Thirsting after it is necessary to the Health

Health and good Habit of a Chriſtian. There is not a more open ſign of a diſtemper'd Conſtitution either in the *Natural*, or in the *Spiritual* Man, than either to long for what is not his proper Food, or not to have an Appetite for that which is. And therefore ſince the Body and Blood of Chriſt is the proper Food and Aliment of a Chriſtian, it concerns him as he values the Health and proſperous ſtate of the Divine Life, not only to feed upon it, but to keep up in himſelf a due *Hunger* and *Thirſt* after it.

More eſpecially this he ought to do, when-ever he approaches the Holy Altar to partake of this Divine and Heavenly Feaſt. He ought then by all the Arts of the Spirit, and by all the Methods of Grace, to quicken and raiſe this Hunger, and ſet an edge upon this Thirſt. St. *Auſtin* diſcourſing of the Diſpoſitions of a worthy Communicant, reckons this *Hunger* and *Thirſt* among them, and makes them as neceſſary Qualifications as any. And there is a great deal of reaſon for it. This Holy Sacrament is generally ſet out in Scripture by Meat and Drink. 'Tis call'd

call'd expressly by the Name of the *Lord's Supper*. And, says our Saviour to the Jews, *My flesh is meat indeed, and my Blood is drink indeed.* And as 'tis *expressed*, so also was it *prefigur'd* by Types of the like Nature, such as the Tree of Life in the midst of Paradise, the Bread and Wine of *Melchisedeck*, the Manna, the Paschal Lamb, the Shew-bread, the Bread wherewith the Angel fed the Prophet, and particularly by the Waters springing out of the Rock, whereof the Fathers drank in the Wilderness.

John 6.

Now I consider that as these Figures represent the Nature and Efficacy of the Holy Sacrament, that 'tis the Food of the Soul, and the Life and Strength of the *Spiritual Man*, so they do also represent to us our *Duty*, and the proper Measure and Argument of Preparation: For if Meat and Drink be the Entertainment, what more convenient Preparation than *Hunger* and *Thirst*? We ought indeed to come to these Springs of Salvation, as the Hart is represented to do by the Psalmist to the Water-brooks, panting and thirsty, longing and impatient. Or rather, to use

uſe a nearer Emblem, as thoſe thirſty *Iſraelites* did to the Waters that iſſued out of that Myſtic Rock in the Wilderneſs. 'Tis impoſſible to give a juſt Deſcription of this *Sacramental Thirſt*; but if we could but ſo far advance our Fancy, as to repreſent to our ſelves with what eagerneſs and greedineſs thoſe thirſty and ſcorch'd Travellers in the Wilderneſs did apply their Mouths to the ſpringing Stone that was now more indear'd to them by the *Benefit* than by the *Miracle*, then and then only may we have ſome Notion of that Hunger and Thirſt wherewith we are to approach and receive theſe Divine Myſteries. For if that Rock and Miraculous Water was a Type of our Sacrament (as the Apoſtle aſſures us it was, telling us expreſly, that that Rock was Chriſt) then by the like proportion that *Thirſt* was alſo a Symbol of our Duty, a ſignification of our *Sacramental Thirſt*. 1 Cor. 10. 4.

And as he that will come to this Divine Feaſt, muſt come Hungry and Thirſty; ſo he that is truly Hungry and Thirſty as he ought, will be ſure to come, and not (as too many do) ſtudy

study to find out Pretences to excuse his Absence. But why do I say *Study* to find Excuses? There are some Men that will be hinder'd by *any* thing; nay, by *every* thing. There *is* nothing, there *can* be nothing so little and inconsiderable, but what will hinder some Men from the Holy Sacrament: That which would not hinder them from any thing else, things of much lighter Weight than what were pretended by those in the Parable, the buying of a Farm, or the Trying of a Yoke of Oxen, or the Marrying of a Wife. If the Heavens do but frown, or if they themselves are never so little out of humour; if a Visit be intended a day after, or if a Domestick Jar happen'd a day before, then presently keep off from the Sacrament. Nay, some are so very absurd, that tho they themselves are in perfect Charity with all the World, and have not the least Tincture of the old Leven remaining in them, yet if *another* Person happen to be out with *them*, they shall think this a sufficient Warrant to stay away from the Sacrament; which amounts to as much as if a Man should say, Because another Person has sinn'd against

against me, therefore I will sin against God and my self, and so be sure to out-do him.

But there is a degree of Folly beyond this. There are some that cover over this gross Neglect, which comes the nearest of any thing to what the Apostle calls *Trampling upon the blood of the Covenant, and doing despite to the Spirit of Grace*, with the specious Pretence of *Reverence*. They have forsooth so profound a Reverence for the Holy Sacrament, that they can't find in their Hearts to come to it. A very odd way of expressing Reverence to any Divine Institution, by turning ones Back upon it. This is such a Reverence as the Jews pretend towards the *Tetragrammaton*, or Name *Jehovah*, which consists in their never using it. Such a Reverence (if so much) as the Papists shew to the Host when they carry it in Procession to be gazed upon and stared at. But do these Men indeed Reverence the Sacrament? Then one would expect at least, that whenever they *do* come, they should behave themselves there with more Devotion and Reverence, than others that are more constant. But there is nothing

like this to be observ'd. Nor do I at all wonder at it, since the way to Communicate well, is to Communicate often. And I further remark, That those who behave themselves most *irreverently* at all other parts of Divine Worship, are the very Men that stay most away from the Holy Altar upon the pretence of Reverence.

But how comes it to pass that *this* is the only part of Religion that must be neglected upon the account of Reverence? Do they do so by any *other* part of Religion? 'Tis true indeed that all the other parts of Divine Worship are too much neglected as well as this; but I do not find that ever any were so absurd as to pretend *Reverence* for the neglecting of *them*, and why then should they do it here?

But do these Men indeed Reverence the Holy Sacrament? Why then do they not pay some regard to the *Command* it self, as well as to the *Matter* of it? *Do this*, says our Saviour, *in remembrance of me.* Why should all the Reverence be fixed upon *This*, and none upon *Do?* Or if they do Reverence

rence the *Command*, how are they not affraid of breaking it? Or how can a Command be reverenc'd by not observing it? *Do this in remembrance of me.* If the doing this be in Remembrance of our Saviour, then the not doing it is to forget him. And how can he pretend Reverence to the *Institution*, that forgets the *Author* of it?

And here I cannot but take notice of another gross Notion that I find passes very current among common People. They think all the danger lies in coming unprepared. If they eat and drink unworthily, then nothing but Death and Damnation. But if they stay away, all is safe and well. As if a Man might not destroy himself with *Fasting*, as well as by taking *Poison*. These Men ought to consider that there is such a thing as an *Unworthy Non-Communicant*, as well as an *Unworthy Communicant*. And I wish they would read a certain Book that bears that Title, *The Unworthy Non-Communicant*. They would then perhaps be sensible of some other Danger, besides that of coming without sufficient Preparation. In the mean time all

that I shall further say to those Men, is, That what-ever Pretences they make to Christianity, 'tis certain they have not that *Hunger* and *Thirst* which is so necessary to the Life of a Christian, and which, if they had it, would bring them oftner to this Spiritual Banquet, and procure them the Blessing of being *fill'd* and Replenish'd. To the consideration of which I now return.

Now there are two ways of being fill'd. Either *Absolutely* and *Simply*, so as not to be any more in Desires. Or with respect to some *certain* Object, so as not to desire any more of the *same*, tho simply speaking you do *desire* still. The first of these is *Satisfaction*, the second is *Satiety*. And those that duely Hunger and Thirst after Righteousness, shall be fill'd both ways. That is, they shall be fill'd with *Righteousness*, and they shall be fill'd with *Happiness*.

First, They shall be filled with
Rom. 5.5. *Righteousness*. For since the Spirit of God, which sheds his Love abroad in our Hearts, is a good and loving Spirit, and knows no other Bounds in his Communications than what are set him by

by the Capacity of the Subject, it follows, that he will not fail to replenish all those with his Graces, who are duly qualify'd to receive them. But now nothing can be supposed to be a greater Qualification, than such Hungring and Thirsting as I have described. This is the utmost Man can do to dispose himself for the reception of the Divinest Impressions. This therefore is that Sacred Lure, that powerful Charm, which draws down the Holy Spirit into the Hearts of Men, as the *Platonists* say of aptly disposed matter, that it *sucks* a Soul into it by a kind of Natural *Magick* from the World of Life. This Hunger and Thirst after Righteousness is the very same to the Life of the Soul, as that *Organical Aptness* is to the Life of the Body. 'Tis the *Congruity* of the Soul in order to Spiritual Life. That Soul therefore that is so qualify'd for Righteousness, cannot miss according to the Order of Grace of being fill'd with it.

The short is, God desires the Righteousness of Man more than Man himself does or can do; he delights to see his own Image reflect from him, and

ſtands ready to ſow the Seeds of the Divine Life in every capable Soil; and therefore we need not doubt but that the truly Hungry and Thirſty Soul ſhall
Pſal. 23. be fill'd with the *Bread* of *Life*, and with the *Waters of Comfort*. Not that he ſhall be ſo fill'd with Righteouſneſs in this Life, as not to deſire any more of it, (for we are now in a ſtate of Proficiency, not of Perfection) but in the next he ſhall. He ſhall then be ſo repleniſh'd with it, as not to deſire any one further degree of it, and ſhall be perfectly poſſeſſed of that Divine Life and Nature, whereof he is now only Partaker.

Secondly, Theſe hungry and thirſty Souls ſhall be fill'd with *Happineſs*. This is a certain Conſequent of the other, there being both a *Natural* and an *Eſtabliſh'd* Connexion between Righteouſneſs and Happineſs. Some indeed have gone ſo far as to make them one and the ſame as to *Kind*, and diſtinguiſhable only as to *Degree*. Hence that common Theological Eſſate, *Grace is Glory begun, and Glory is only Grace finiſh'd*. But I think there is more pretineſs in the Expreſſion, than truth

truth in the Notion; nay, there is one Instance which plainly demonstrates it to be false: For 'tis most certain that the Human Soul of our Saviour was always in a state of *perfect Grace*, having, as the Scripture says, received the Spirit of God without measure; and yet 'tis as certain that he was not while on Earth in the *State* of *Glory*, being then a Man of Sorrows, and acquainted with Grief. Much less was he in the state of Glory at the Hour of his Passion, and during his dreadful Derelictiion: Which yet could never be, if perfect Grace and Glory were as some contend, one and the same thing.

But our Proposition will stand well enough without the help of this Notion. For tho Righteousness be not the same thing with Happiness, yet there is such a Connexion between them, that they who are fill'd with the former, shall certainly be so with the latter. And this depends upon the nature of things, as well as upon the Order of God. For a righteous Frame of Spirit not only gives us Admission to the Supreme Good, but also disposes us for the Enjoyment of it, without which all the

other Materials of Happiness would signifie nothing. 'Tis the disposition of the Soul that makes the Vision of God truly *Beatific*, and when we *awake up after his likeness, and behold his presence in righteousness*, then and then only, we shall be *satisfy'd* with his Glory.

Psal. 117. 16.

And here we may stand still a little, and reflect what a great Privileg those that Hunger and Thirst after Righteousness, have beyond all those who make secular and carnal things the Objects of their Desire. These things can never fill them *Absolutely*, so as to extinguish all Desire, being neither themselves the Good of Man, nor leading to that which is. Nor can they always satisfie that *particular* Appetite which is conversant about them. Sometimes because the things themselves cannot be had, Nature having not provided enough for the Covetousness and Luxury, tho she has for the Necessities of Men. And sometimes because they are too deficient when we have them, by reason of their disproportion to the inlargement of the Faculty, as in the Objects of *Sight* and *Hearing*, where-

with

with neither the *Eye* nor *Ear* is satisfy'd, as was remark'd before. And when these things *do* fill any particular Appetite, 'tis only for a time, till the next Fit of Longing comes, as the ground is for the present refresh'd with a transient Shower. But for those that Hunger and Thirst after *Righteousness*, as their Desires are more Noble, so their Satisfaction shall be more Abundant. 'Tis their great and peculiar Blessedness to be fill'd in all Senses, and in all Capacities, and to all Eternity.

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## Diſcourſe the Fifth.

Matth. V. *ver.* vii.

*Bleſſed are the merciful, for they ſhall obtain mercy.*

OF all the Paſſions which God has planted in Human Nature, there is none which at once carries ſo bright a reſemblance of *God*, and is ſo fitted to the preſent Condition of *Man*, as that of Pitifulneſs and Compaſſion. And if when God made Man, he conſulted his own Eternal Eſſence, certainly when he drew this part of him, we may ſuppoſe him to have reflected upon the Divineſt of all his Ideas, and to have ſtamp'd upon him the moſt lovely Feature of the Divinity.

All the other Paſſions are in their own ſimple Natures indifferent, neither good nor evil in themſelves, but equally determinable to either, and for the moſt part

part are actually determin'd to the wrong. They are generally irregular, either in the Degree, or in the Object, are either miſ-govern'd or miſ-plac'd; and when moſt orderly manag'd, the higheſt Character they can pretend to, is only to be Inſtruments and Servants to Vertue. They are as a guſty Wind and Sail to a Ship; if ſhe ſteer right, they proſper and further her courſe; but if wrong, they ſerve only to ſtrike her againſt the Rocks with more ſpeed and force.

But now this Affection of Pity and Compaſſion riſes higher than Indifferency, and is not content with a bare ſtate of Innocence. It is of it ſelf a vertuous Diſpoſition, and needs only actual exertion to make it a direct Vertue, and then its own Native Excellency will place it among the Higheſt Orders. And therefore tho our Saviour by aſſuming our entire Nature, juſtify'd the innocency of *all* our Natural Paſſions, yet as *Mercy* was that Attribute of God which he came chiefly to diſplay, ſo is *that* the Affection which he chiefly commends to Man, by his Practice, and by his Diſcourſes, by open Commands

mands, and by Parabolical Insinuations; but chiefly by selecting and adopting this alone of all the Passions into the Sacred Number of his *few* Beatitudes, by telling us, that *Blessed are the Merciful, for they shall obtain Mercy.*

This great and peculiar Honour done by our Lord to this Affection will invite us to consider,

First, The Nobleness and Excellency of it.

Secondly, Its great Reasonableness and Usefulness.

Thirdly, The particular Blessedness assign'd to it.

But before we can well enter upon these Considerations, we must first premise something concerning the Notion of Mercy or Compassion. By which I suppose is commonly understood a trouble or uneasiness of Spirit, conceiv'd at some Evil that has befall'n another, with a desire to help him out of it; whereby it may be perceiv'd that this is a mixt Passion, compounded of *Sorrow* and *Desire*. Sorrow for the Evil

Evil of the Patient, and Deſire of Delivering him from it.

If it be askt, What kind of Evil that muſt be, which is the Object of this Sorrow, or which may recommend a Man to our Pity, I know no reaſon why we ſhould except againſt any. There are I know ſome conſiderable Divines and Moraliſts (among whom is *Curcellæus*) who will allow no other Evil to be capable of Pity, but only Evil of *Pain*, nor that neither if it be *deſerv'd*. But for my part, I do not underſtand why *Sin* may not fall under our Pity, as well as any other Evil. Nay, I think that the greateſt Object of Pity in the World is an irreclaimable Sinner. And as for *Affliction*, tho the thing it ſelf be moſt pitiable when joyn'd with Innocence: Yet I think upon the *whole*, the Guilty Sufferer is more to be pitied than the Innocent, ſince I can pity him for his Demerit, and for his Miſery too; whereas the latter is pitiable only for his Miſery. Indeed the guilty Patient is not to be pitied ſo much for his direct Miſery, becauſe he deſerves it, but then he is more to be pitied for his Deſert Pag. 999.

Desert and Misery together, than the other is for his Misery only. And I question not but that our compassionate Saviour when he wept over *Jerusalem*, relented as much for the *Sins*, as for the *Vengeance* that was hanging over that unhappy City. And that had those two great Tragick Scenes been at once presented before him, the *Slaughter* of the *Innocents*, and the *Destruction* of that *Guilty People*, he would have found more to be pitied in the latter, than in the former Tragedy.

I know that by the Roman and Jewish Laws, 'twas forbidden to shew any Signs of Compassion in the behalf of those that suffer'd as *Criminals*, and in consequence to this they were not to *Sit*, (that being the Manner and Posture of the Hebrew and Roman Mourning) but to *Stand* at their Execution. Which was the Reason (as a Learned Critic of our Church observes) why the Blessed Virgin, tho deeply affected for the severe Usages of her Son, yet in compliance with the Law, chose rather to *Stand*, than to *Sit* near the Cross; and tho full of inward Grief, refused

Mr. *Gregory* in his Notes and Observ. p. 25.

refused to make any *Solemn* shew of Lamentation.

But I suppose that the signification of these Laws in forbidding open Compassion to convicted Malefactors, was not, that they were not Objects capable of it, and that therefore to pity them would argue a sense of their Innocence, but only to procure the greater Reverence to Judicial Sentences, and to shew their great satisfaction and acquiescence in the administration of Justice. This therefore will not exclude Criminals from the Sphere of our Compassion. Of which I see nothing that should make them uncapable. And I would fain know what would have become of all Mankind, if *Suffering Innocence* had been the only Object of Commiseration.

These few things being premised concerning the Notion of Mercy and Compassion, let us now consider the things that recommend it. The first whereof is, The Nobleness and Excellency of it. This has suffer'd much under the misrepresentation of two sorts of Adversaries, the *Stoic*, and the

the *Aristotelean*. In the Stoic Morality it is so far from having any Reputation for Excellence, that it passes for a down-right Vice, for an instance of weakness and littleness of Soul, for such a piece of Softness and Effeminacy as does not comport with the Character of their *Wise Man*; who indeed is allowed to *Relieve*, but not to be *Troubled* for the Afflicted, and to add, if he can, to the Tranquility of *their* Minds, but not to lose any thing of his *own*; *Non miserebitur, sed succurret*, says *Seneca*. He may help the Miserable, but he must not share in the Misery. This the Gravity of *Zeno*'s School will at no hand permit, which indeed should make us the more beholden to them for granting what they do. But 'tis no wonder that they who will not allow a Man to be sensible of his *own* Evils, should forbid all Pity to those of *other* Men.

On the other side the *Aristotelean*, tho he does not strike this Affection out of the List of the Vertues, as does the other, yet he very much cheapens and depreciates the worth and excellency of it, by deriving it only from selfish

selfish Principles, by making this the only ground of pitying others, that we upon the account of common Nature and Chance, are obnoxious to the same Evils our selves.

In opposition therefore to this Double Reproach I shall maintain and illustrate the Nobleness and Excellency of this Disposition upon this Double Ground.

I. Because 'tis found always in the Best of Natures.

II. Because it proceeds from the best of Principles.

And first, 'Tis always found in the Best of Natures. God as he is the Best, so is he also the most merciful and compassionate of all Beings. 'Twas the very Name whereby he proclaim'd himself to *Moses*, *The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, &c.* And our Saviour commends this Attribute of God in particular to our Imitation, *Be ye merciful as your Father is merciful.* We read in Scripture of the *Tender Mercies* of God, or as it may be more strictly render'd, The *Bowels* of the

Exod. 34. 6

Luk. 6. 36.

Luk. 1. 78.

Mercy of God. There is a strange Emphasis and Strength in the Expression. And indeed there is nothing in Scripture so pathetically expressed as the Tenderness and Mercy of God. 'Twould be endless to alledge Particulars, but there is one place which may go for all. 'Tis that famous Expostulation of God with himself upon the disingenuous Behaviour of his People Israel, *How*
Hos. 11. 8. *shall I give thee up* Ephraim? *How shall I deliver thee* Israel? *How shall I make thee as* Admah? *How shall I set thee as* Zeboim? *Mine Heart is turned within me, and my repentings are kindled together.* What moving, melting strains are these! What a lively, breathing Image of Mercy and Pity! And yet 'tis but an *Image* still, vastly short of the Original, as will always be, whatever is said or thought of the infinite Mercy of God.

The *Doctors* of the *Talmud* speaking concerning the Employment of God before the making of the World, say, not as St. *Austin*, that he was preparing an Hell for the Inquisitive, but that he was contriving how to be *merciful* to Mankind. And 'tis true indeed God did

did from all Eternity contrive to shew Mercy to Man, tho not by way of study or employment of Mind, as they grosly fancy.

But the Hebrews further Note (what indeed is more considerable) that God to shew his great Honour and Love for this dear Attribute, in all his kind and merciful Transactions with Men, chose always to be call'd by that his great and incommunicable Name, *Jehovah*, as to *Moses* in the Clift of the Rock, *Jehovah, Jehovah, the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious*, &c. But in any Process of Justice and Judgment, he always styles himself *Eloah*, or *Elohim*, a Name importing Force and Power, and that is not proper to God as the other, but common to him with the Creatures, being sometimes given to the Angels, sometimes to Magistrates, and sometimes even to False Gods. The Name *Jehovah* was more Sacred, and of higher import than that of *Elohim*; and therefore God to shew his special regard to Mercy above his other *Strange Work*, chose in his Milder Addresses to be call'd by the former, and in his severer Proceedings

by the latter. Which was the reason, (as the forementioned Learned Critick remarks,) why our Saviour at the point of his Dereliction cried out, not, *Jehovah, Jehovah*, but *Eli, Eli, my God, my God*, as not presuming at that time and in that Capacity, to call God by his Titles of Paternal Love and Indearment, but as *Naming the Judge of the World doing the extreamest right upon his own Son, treading the Wine-press alone in the Person of all Mankind*, as that Learned Author expresses it. Pag. 7.

But the greatest and most convincing Demonstration of the Mercy of God, is seen in the mysterious and costly Redemption of Laps'd Man. The greatest Exaltation of which, is to say nothing of it, but, as the Angels are represented to do in Heaven, to stoop down and look near into it with silence and wonder. *Which things the Angels desire to look into.* An Allusion no doubt to the Propitiatory or Mercy-lid upon the Ark, whereupon two Angels, *Cherubins*, (who are the Angels of *Knowledge*) did abide with their Faces one toward another, and their Eyes bent down to the Ark. Which by the way 1 Pet. 1. 12.

way is also a sufficient Argument of the Unfathomableness of this great Dispensation of Mercy, which can still find further Employment for the Study and Curiosity even of Angels.

But perhaps 'twill be said, that Mercy in *God* is of another kind than what is call'd by that Name in *Man*, that it comes nearer the Stoical Notion of Mercy, importing only a bare Will to help the Miserable, without any compassionate Resentment for his Misery. It may be so, I wont dispute that now, tho I can hardly believe but that such strong and flaming Expressions of the Divine Mercy in Scripture must needs signifie something more than what such *cold* Interpreters affix to them.

But however to be more convincing, I further instance in the Human Soul of our Saviour Jesus Christ. 'Tis most certain that of all Human Spirits his was the most excellent. *Adam* in his Innocence was not comparable to him. He was excellent only by way of Nature, but our Saviour's Human Spirit to the same or greater Excellence of Nature had also superadded the Ex-

cellency of Grace, not common Grace, but that great and transcendent Grace of the Hypostatick Union. And 'tis as certain that as he had the *Best*, so he had the *Best-natured* and most tenderly compassionate Soul in the World. I need not produce Instances, his whole Life is but one Argument of it. Only one Passage, when he saw the multitude scattered abroad like Sheep that have no Shepherd, 'tis said, σπλαγχνίσθη ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, *He was moved with compassion on them*, so we render it; but indeed the Expression is too high and pregnant to be verbally translated. It would require a long copious Paraphrase to drain the Sense of that one Word, which signifies all that inward Feeling and Yerning of the Heart and Soul at a pitiful Object, that melts and turns the very Bowels of the Good-natured Spectator.

Mat. 9. 36.

And the same Tenderness of Spirit which he had on Earth, he retains still in Heaven, tho in all other respects *Impassible*, and incircled with Divine Glories. Whereupon he is call'd in Scripture our *merciful High-Priest*; and to convince any Opposer that this is not meant

meant of Mercy improperly so called, a bare Will to help without any Compassionate resentment, says the Author to the *Hebrews*, *We have not an High-Priest which cannot be touch'd with feeling of our Infirmities.* Heb. 4. 15.

And these two Considerations by the way give a clear defeat to the Pretences of both the forementioned Adversaries. For whereas the *Stoic* traduces this noble Vertue for a piece of Weakness and Infirmity, fit only for soft and effeminate Persons; to him I oppose the instance of our Saviour's Human Soul while on *Earth*. And whereas the *Aristotelian* makes the only ground of Pity to be a fear of falling into the like Calamity; to him I oppose the same Instance of our Saviour, but in *another Capacity*, when he was altogether Impassible in his glorify'd state, and above the possibility of partaking with us in our Miseries any other way, than by *Sympathy* and Compassion.

To this I may add, that among *meer* Men the most generous and brave Spirits, those whom *Paganism* has Deify'd, and Christianity has Sainted; those Heroes

whom History has mark'd with Honour, and whom Envy it self is asham'd to calumniate, have all along been signal for their *Mercy* and *Good Nature*. As on the contrary, the most base, timorous and low-spirited Breasts are always observ'd to be the Seats of *Cruelty* and Hard-heartedness.

But 'tis no wonder that this Disposition is found in the Best of Natures, since in the Second Place it proceeds from the Best of Principles. For it proceeds from *Charity*, with which the least thing a Man can think or do is excellent, and
Rom. 13. without which the greatest, even *Martyrdom* it self, is nothing worth. It has that for its Parent, which is the Mother of all Vertues, and which is of it self the fulfilling of the most perfect, that is, of the *Christian* Law. And that it proceeds from Charity is plain. For the more we desire the Happiness and well-being of Mankind, the more we shall be troubled to see any of them in Misery, and be the more willing to procure them Ease and Deliverance. And this tho we do not apprehend our selves in danger of the like Calamity, there being no necessity

of

of making that the ground of Pity, as appears from the instance of our Saviour's Human Soul in its Glorified State. I deny not but that the generality of Men *are* moved to Pity upon the consideration of common Danger, and that it may be their own turn next to suffer and stand in need of help; but it is not necessary that they *should*, and 'tis their imperfection that they *are*. I say *their* Imperfection, not that of the *Affection* it self, whose Idea involves no such selfish Principle, and which may really be separated from it, as by the fore-alledged Example is certain and evident.

And now if to be found in the Best of Natures, and to proceed from the Best of Principles, be any Argument of Excellence, we may hence conclude what a Noble and Excellent Disposition of Mind this is, and that when the *Roman Orator* told *Cæsar*, That of all his many Vertues, none was either more acceptable, or more wonderful than his Mercy and Clemency; he might perhaps Complement the *Emperour*, but said nothing extraordinary of the Vertue.

As

As will further appear by considering Secondly the great Reasonableness and Usefulness of it. As to the Former, besides that all that which may be said in the behalf of Charity and Universal Love, may be alledged as well for this, there are these two more proper and peculiar Grounds to prove and inforce it.

I. To consider what Man has Receiv'd.

II. To consider what he Expects.

And First, If we consider what Man has already *receiv'd*, this Vertue of Mercy will appear to be highly reasonable. Man has receiv'd innumerable Mercies of God, some of which are so great, so surprizing and incredible, that 'tis made one of the greatest Trials and Commendations of his Faith to *believe* them. Such as the Honour of the Hypostatick Union, the Redemption from Sin and Misery by the Death of the Son of God, the Grace of Repentance, and the like. All which are yet improv'd and heightned by this further Consideration, that they are

are proper and peculiar to him, no other Creatures, not so much as the Angels themselves being Partakers with him. The Angels indeed as all other Creatures, partake of the Goodness of God; but Man alone among all the Creatures has the Priviledge to be the Object of his Mercy. Since therefore Man and Man only has receiv'd so much Mercy of God, it appears very reasonable that he of all Creatures should shew Mercy.

As it will Secondly, if we consider what he *expects*. Man has not yet received so much mercy, but that he expects more. The Mercy that he has receiv'd is by the Redemption of Christ to be put into a *Capacity* of Salvation, but the Mercy that he expects is to be *actually* saved. The Court of Mercy is the only Court where Man dares appear, or can abide a Trial. Briefly, Man expects Mercy both from God and from Man, in this Life, and in the next, in Death and after Death, and therefore there is great reason to conclude, that he of all Creatures should be merciful, and that *Cruelty* was as little *made for Man* as *Pride*.

Nor

Nor is this Affection less Useful than Reasonable. The condition of Man in this World is such, as makes it as necessary for him to be *pitiful*, as to be a *sociable* Creature. Man cannot subsist without the Guardianship and Protection of Society; nor is Society any Security without this Affection. For what signifies Strength and Ability (and Society as such infers no more) without Inclination to assist? The Wise Man tells us that *Wisdom is better than Strength*, and 'tis very true; but neither of them, nor both of them signifie any thing without a tender and compassionate Temper. Then only may we expect Happiness and Defence from Society, when there is the same Sympathy in the Politick as there is in the Natural Body, when there is a mutual Correspondency and Communication of Parts, like the Sympathetick Answer of one Lute to another. When the *Heaven hears the Earth* in the Prophets Phrase; or as the Apostle more fully expresses it, when *If one Member suffer, all the Members suffer with it; or if one Member be honour'd, all the Members rejoyce with it.* This would make a

Eccl. 9.16.

1 Cor. 12. 26.

*Millennium*

*Millennium* indeed; nor is any thing further wanting, but only that Men would agree together to make the Experiment.

And because this is a Passion of so great use and necessity to the present Condition of Man, God has been pleas'd to take an early and an effectual Care for the Security of it, not only by giving the Soul of Man an Original Bent and Inclination that way, but also by disposing him to it by the very Make and Figuration of his Body, that so the whole Man might stand inclined to shew Mercy and Compassion. For we are to consider that there are some natural Dispositions in the Brain, whereby we are mov'd and admonish'd to be pitiful and compassionate, since the course of the Animal Spirits is (by I know not what Principle) directed to those parts whereby we are stirr'd up to the sense of others Pain or Misery. For, as experience witnesses, when-ever we happen to cast our Eyes upon a Man that is wounded, we find a sudden Tide of Spirits thronging towards those Parts of our Body, which answer to the Parts affected of the wounded

wounded Man, unless by some Accidental Cause their Course be diverted some other way. And these Motions by which the Parts of our own Body are affected by the occasion of those Motions which are excited in others, do raise that Sentiment within us, which we call *Pity* or *Compassion*, which by an Order of God's Establishment, we can no more help being affected with, than we can that our Animal Spirits should flow to and affect those parts of our Body which correspond to those of another which we see wounded. So that you see the Ground and Foundation of this Affection is laid in Nature. God has bound it upon us by a *Natural* as well as by a *Moral* Law, by the very Figure and Contexture of our Bodies, which certainly he would not have done, but that he knew how useful and necessary it was for the interest of Mankind in their present Posture, which is a state of Want and mutual Dependence upon each other, whereby we stand in need of one anothers Pity and Compassion.

And now if this Divine Affection (for so we may now venture to call it) be

be not yet sufficiently recommended from its Nobleness and Excellency, and from its great Reasonableness and Usefulness, let us further add the particular Blessedness here assigned to it. *Blessed are the merciful*, says our Saviour, *for they shall obtain mercy*. This they shall obtain from Men and from God, here and hereafter.

First, They shall obtain Mercy from Men here. Not that this is to pass for an absolute Rule, without any Exception, since as long as Men are but Men, Mercy is capable of being abused and ill-requited, as well as any other Vertue; otherwise our Saviour would have been more kindly treated than he was by the Jews. But the meaning is, that nothing does more naturally recommend a Man to the good Will and Compassion of others, than a Merciful and Benign Temper, and that generally speaking, if Men be but tolerably well disposed, and have any Sense of Justice and Gratitude, the merciful Man will actually find mercy among them. However if not, he has the greater stock of mercy to come. For,

Secondly,

Secondly, The Merciful shall obtain Mercy from God hereafter. And this does not depend upon so many Casualties, and such uncertain Suppositions as the other. Here 'tis only required that *Mercy and Truth meet together*, and that the Man be sincere and upright in all other moral respects. And so much indeed is necessary. For 'tis not to be thought that Mercy alone, any more than any other Solitary Vertue can qualifie a Man for Mercy. No, the Man must be τέλειος καὶ ὁλόκληρος, Perfect and Intire, and wanting nothing as to all the Integral Parts of Duty, to be accepted in the Judgment of God. Only there may I think be allow'd this further Sense in the Proposition, that no *one* Vertue shall go so far towards the obtaining of full Mercy from God, as this of Mercifulness. And that if the Merciful Man for want of other necessary parts of Christian Perfection, should not be able to *stand* in the last Judgment, yet however his Fall shall be much the milder, and he shall have great Abatements of Punishment made him for the sake of this one Excellency. To

Jam. 1. 4.

which

which purpose, 'tis very considerable that our Saviour in the Description of the last Judgment, makes all the Favour and all the Severity of that day to proceed according to the Practice or Omission of this Duty. Mat. 25.

One way or other therefore the merciful shall be sure to obtain Mercy, nor will God forget this *Labour of Love.* Pray God we may not forget it our selves, but may so love, study and practise Mercy here, that we may hereafter not only receive a milder Sentence, but find such a Degree of Mercy, as may finally *rejoyce against Judgment.* Amen.

## Discourse the Sixth.

Matth. V. ver. viii.

*Blessed are the pure in Heart, for they shall see God.*

ONE of the most distinguishing Perfections of the Christian Institution above any other either Divine or Human, is, that it requires an inward Rectitude of Mind and Spirit, and makes the *Heart* the Principle and Seat of Spiritual, as it is of Natural Life. The *Heathen Morality* went little further than the regulation of the outward Behaviour, not much regarding the Sanctity of the *Interiour*. And tho some few raised Spirits among them, moved by a Diviner Impulse, would now and then, like Men in Extasies, talk above the World and themselves too, recommending certain *Purgations* and *Purifications* of Soul, as the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, yet this was

was not taught or known in the common Schools of Nature, nor was it any where made the Ordinary Standard of Morality.

The *Jewiſh Religion*, as it preſented to the World a ſecond and more correct Edition of the Law of Nature, ſo was it in this particular reſpect more perfect than the Gentile Morality, there being in the Moral Law *one* ſpecial Precept which directly concerns *Purity* of Heart. But yet there was a great deſect even here too, becauſe tho there was a Prohibition of *inward Concupiſcence*, yet it had no penal Sanction annex'd to it. Every other Precept was ſo guarded as to be able to revenge it ſelf upon thoſe who tranſgreſſed it. Idolatry was puniſh'd, Perjury was puniſh'd, Profanation of the Sabbath, Diſobedience to Parents, Murther, Adultery, Theft, and bearing falſe Witneſs were all puniſh'd; only Concupiſcence had no Puniſhment allotted to it. Which (as a Learned Perſon Conjectures) gave ſome occaſion to think that they might ſecurely indulge their Concupiſcence, ſo it did not break forth into the outward and groſſer Act.

Philippus a Limborch Theolog. Chriſtiana, p. 217.

Certain it is, that many among the Jews so thought and practis'd, contenting themselves with external Conformity to the Law, without any regard to the inward Purity and Holiness, as may appear from our Saviours frequent reprehensions of the Pharisees upon this very account. And 'tis very probable that this their Fancy was occasion'd by there being no Punishment assign'd to the Breach of the *Tenth* Commandment, as that Learned Person conjectures. However 'tis certain that it was a great Defect in the Law not to bind so perfect a Precept with a Penal Sanction. Tho indeed the true reason was, because 'twas too perfect to be severely exacted in that Infant Age and State of the Church. The Law therefore did not rigidly *exact* it, tho it did plainly *command* it. Which tho no defect with relation to that Time and State, (the Law being as perfect as the Gospel, as to all the ends and purposes intended by it, and every way accommodated to the Condition of those on whom it was imposed) yet absolutely speaking it was a great Defect and Imperfection of the Law. Then

Then as to the *Mahumetan* Religion (which indeed is only Heatheniſm pretending to Revelation) this, tho the laſt, and aſſuming to it ſelf the improvement of all that went before, is yet really ſhort even of Heatheniſm it ſelf. This is ſo far from requiring internal Purity, that it does not require ſo much as external, but allows and *recommends* too the groſſeſt Impurities; which has often made me wonder why the *Turk* ſhould write upon the outſide of his Alcoran, *Let no Man touch this Book, but he that is pure.* I'm ſure the Book it ſelf requires no ſuch thing, nor can I juſtifie the Reaſon of the *Motto* in any other ſenſe but this, That none but he that is pure is fit to be truſted with ſuch a corrupt Inſtitution.

But the Chriſtian Law is *pure* indeed, and none but ſuch as are ſo are worthy to unlooſe the Seals of this Book. This requires the utmoſt Purity that is conſiſtent with the Meaſures of Mortality, Purity without, and Purity within, pure Hands and pure Hearts. It requires it more expreſly, and in a grea-

er degree, than either the Heathen or Jewish Religion, and (what was wanting in the other) under the Sanction of Rewards and Punishments, and those the greatest imaginable. It does not only command inward Purity, but incourage it too by the strongest Proposals that can affect either the *Sense* or the *Reason* of Man. One of the greatest of which Encouragements is, that our Saviour inserts it into the order of his Beatitudes, and gives it a special Title to the Beatifick Vision in these Words, *Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.*

The Subject to be here discours'd of is *Christian Purity*, or Purity of *Heart*. Whereof I shall represent

I. The Nature, by a Character or Description.
II. The Necessity.
III. The Blessedness.

By Purity of Heart in general, is to be understood an inward Conformity of all the Thoughts and Desires of the Soul to the Will and Law of God. When not only the external Actions are

are according to the Rule, but the whole inward Frame and *Poſition* of the Mind ſtands right and well order'd, and (as the Apoſtle deſcribes it) not only the Body, but the *whole Spirit and Soul is blameleſs*. Theſ. 5. 23.

And to make it ſo, theſe two things are particularly requiſite, Firſt, That we do not conſent to any unlawful Deſires, no not ſo much as to the firſt Motions of Sin, whether proceeding from the corruptneſs of our own Nature, or from Diabolical Suggeſtion. Secondly, That we do not entertain with any delight the remembrances of our paſt Sins.

But more particularly yet, Purity of Heart may be doubly conſider'd, either in oppoſition to *Pollution*, or in oppoſition to *Mixture*. In the firſt Senſe it removes Senſuality, in the Second Hypocriſie. This diſtinction of the Word Pure is acknowledg'd and withal applied to this place by our Learned Dr. *Hammond*, illuſtrated by the Inſtances of Water and Wine, the former of which is ſaid to be pure, Pract. Cat. P. 107.

when not muddied or defiled; the latter when not mixt.

But tho the Word be equally capable of this latter Sense, yet I do not think it to be at all intended by our Saviour in this place, there being no such particular Congruity between this sort of Purity and the nature of the Reward here assign'd. Confining therefore our Discourse to the former Sense of the Word, as more suitable to the Circumstance of this place, from what has been premised, we may collect this Idea or Character of the Pure in Heart, 'That they are such as regulate not only 'the external Conduct of their Lives, 'but also the inward Frame and Habi-'tude of their Minds, and conform 'not only their Actions, but their Wills 'and Desires, Thoughts and Designs to 'the Rule of the Law, and to the 'Dictates of the *Internal Light* of God 'in the Soul. Such as sanctifie the Lord God in their Hearts, compose the in-'most recesses of their minds into an 'Holy Awe and Reverence of the Di-'vine Presence, set a Law to all their 'Intellectual Powers, and suffer not 'the least Thought or Passion to violate

'the

'the Order either of Reason or Grace. 'Such lastly, as yield no consent either 'to the Being or Stay of irregular Mo'tions, nor give any entertainment 'to the Allurements of the World, the 'Flesh, or the Devil, nor delight them'selves with any pleasing recollections, 'any imaginary Scenes of their past 'Immoralities, but set themselves at 'the greatest distance from Sin, resist 'the very first Beginnings, and, as near 'as they can, abstain from the least 'Appearances of Evil.

This is the most resembling Idea that I can frame to my self of the Pure in Heart. And now lest this should be taken for a meer Idea, a thing of Notion rather than Practice, I proceed in the next place to represent the Necessity of such a Disposition of Soul.

The Necessity of it is Double, in order to a double End, *Holiness* and *Happiness*.

And First, This Purity of Heart is necessary in order to Holiness, that is, There can be no true Christian Holiness without it. This will appear by considering, First,

First, That the Christian Law expresly requires it. For this I need appeal no further than to the progress of this same Discourse of our Saviour upon the Mount. Where among several other *improving* Expositions of the *Mo-*
Mat. 5.27. *saic Law*, we find this, *Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit Adultery. But I say unto you, that whosoever looketh on a Woman to lust after her, hath committed Adultery with her already in his Heart.* By which *Lusting* here I conceive must not be understood the bare natural Appetite of Concupiscence (that being as such indifferent) but the Appetite irregularly determin'd; nor that neither as 'tis a pure Natural and Mechanick Motion, (for so it has nothing Moral in it, and can only be materially Evil) but as it has the consent of the Will going along with it. Which consent may be either to the very *Desire* it self, or to the *Acting* of it. If to the Act, then the Man is in all Moral Accounts a compleat Adulterer, and will be so esteem'd by God, who as he *Sees*, so he *Judges* by the Heart, and will not think a Man the more innocent only for wanting an Opportunity of committing what he fully

fully intended. But if the Conſent be only to the Deſire, then tho the Man be not a compleat Adulterer, yet he may be truly ſaid in the Style of the Pſalmiſt, to be a *Partaker with the Adulterer*, to have enter'd within ſome degrees of Unchaſtity, and to have tranſgreſſed againſt that Chriſtian Purity, which forbids all Conſent not only to the compleat Acts, but alſo to the firſt Motions of Sin. Pſal. 50.

Secondly, The neceſſity of this Purity of Heart in order to true Holineſs, will appear by conſidering the Nature of God, who is both a *Spirit*, and a *Diſcerner* of Spirits, and ought therefore for a double Reaſon to be worſhip'd in *Spirit and in Truth*. Our Saviour thought the former ſufficient, but the latter adds a further degree of ſtrength to it. God as a Spirit cannot be worthily ſerved by any thing leſs than the Sacrifice of the Spirit, which perhaps was one of the Reaſons why our Saviour, when he was to become a Sacrifice to his Father, took upon him not only Human Fleſh, as ſome of the Ancient Hereticks would have believ'd, but alſo an Human Soul. And as a Diſcerner Joh. 4. 24.

of

of Spirits he cannot be put off with a Bodily instead of a Spiritual Service, or accept of a polluted and unsanctified Spirit. The Psalmist had a due sense of this, when he said, *Thou requirest truth in the inward parts, and shalt make me to understand wisdom secretly.* And when he pray'd, *Make me a clean Heart, O God, and renew a right Spirit within me.*

Psal. 51. 6, 10.

Thirdly, This Purity of Heart may be further concluded necessary to true Holiness from the Nature of Man himself, in whom as the Soul is in all respects the *Principal*, so in all Moral respects is it the *only* part concern'd. This *Inner Man* is that Man who is the Immediate and proper Subject of all Good and Evil, Vertue and Vice, and accordingly this is the part to which our Sanctification and Regeneration is always ascribed, and from which the Man receives his whole Moral Distinction. And therefore says the Apostle, *To be carnally minded is Death, but to be spiritually minded is Life and Peace.* Where you see 'tis the inward Disposition of the *Mind* that makes all the difference. If this be Pure and Holy, the

Rom. 8. 6.

the whole Man is so; but if this stand not right to God and Goodness, 'tis not all the external Conformity in the World that can supply the Defect.

'Twas the Conceit of the Antient Jews (as we are told by Mr. *Selden*) that every Proselyte of *Justice* at the very instant when he became so, had a new Soul infused into him, to which Opinion our Saviour is supposed to allude in his Discourse with *Nicodemus*. Now tho Christianity does not acknowledge a New, that is, *another* Soul in its Converts, yet it requires that the same Soul become new, it requires a new Frame and Temper of Spirit. The *Christian Man* is to be Born again, and to become a New Creature, a Creature of another Rank and Order. And 'tis the *Mind* and *Spirit* upon which this great Transaction is to pass, and which is to be the immediate Subject of this extraordinary Change. And accordingly our Regeneration is expressed in Scripture by our being *renew'd in the Spirit of our minds*. We must be renew'd; and where? Not in our Body or outward Man, but in our Minds. And in what

De Jure Nat. & Gent. pag. 159.

Eph. 4. 23.

part

part of the Mind? Not in the Inferior part, whether *Sensitive* or *Plastic*, that which is exercis'd about Objects of Sense, or that which *moves* and *forms* the Body, but in the highest and noblest part, in the *Spirit* of our Minds, which answers to the Platonical Νοῦς, the very *Flower* and *Essence* of the Soul. Here 'tis we are to be renew'd, as indeed we must if we be renew'd at all, this being in all regards the Principal, and the only *moral* part of Man.

To this purpose it may be further consider'd, that this Intellectual Heart, the Spirit and Soul of Man is the Fountain and Source of all Action. This is that which sees in the Eyes, and hears in the Ears. This is that which understands and wills, loves and hates. Here are all the Springs and Powers of Life and Motion, here is the last resort of all outward Impressions, and from this *Central Point* are derived all the Lines of Action and Motion, even as all the Arteries and Veins are from the Natural Heart, which it diffuses and disperses throughout the Body, and has its Pulses in every part. If therefore this general Head-Spring be not kept pure and clean, how can the Streams run clear?

And

And upon this was grounded that signal Advice of the Wise Man, *Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of Life.* Parallel to which I find a passage in the Meditations of the Royal Philosopher *Marcus Antoninus*, Ἔνδον βλέπε, ἔνδον ἡ πηγὴ τῦ ἀγαθῦ, *Look within, for within is the Fountain of Good.* Prov. 4. 23. Oxford Edition, p. 224.

Further yet, this Intellectual Heart is not only the Fountain of Action and Motion, but the most active and most rapidly moving thing in the World. This Heart is always *Beating*, the Pulses of it never rest, Thought rises upon Thought, and Desire succeed Desire. The Motion is perpetual, constant and vehement; so vehement, that the swiftest Bodily Motion, no not that of the Starry Orb is comparable to it; so vehement that it cannot be discern'd or number'd, and comes nearer to a *Rest* than a Motion, as the swiftest turnings round of a Globe look like standing still. Now what a dangerous thing is such a Motion as this, if not rightly determin'd? Of what vast heights in goodness is it capable! And to what vast heights of wickedness may it rise,

if

if not well-govern'd! There is therefore great neceſſity that this *Heart* of Man ſhould be kept with all Diligence, and that it ſhould be kept pure and undefiled.

Fourthly and Laſtly, The Neceſſity of Purity of Heart in order to Holineſs will appear as from the Chriſtian Law, the Nature of God, and the Nature of Man, ſo alſo from the *intimate Union* that is between the Divine and Human Nature. All things are full of God, who is therefore call'd in the Sacred Tongue המקום or the *Place*. But there is nothing ſo intimately united to him as the Spiritual part of the Creation. God is the immediate *Place* of *Spirits* and *Souls*, who all live, move, and have their being in him, and are joyn'd to him by a *Central Touch*, as the great *Plotinus* ſpeaks. The Apoſtle ſays, that even our Bodies are the Temples of the Holy Ghoſt, our Souls then muſt be at leaſt his Sanctuary, and moſt Sacred Receſs. But what? was not God juſt now ſuppoſed the Place of Spirits, and are Spirits now made the Place of God? Yes, and without any Abſurdity. For ſo St. *John* deſcribes our Union with God, by our dwelling

dwelling in God, and by God's dwelling in us. The Union is Double, on God's part, and on Ours. God dwells in us by his special Presence, by the Spirit of Grace and Benediction. But we dwell in God Essentially and Totally. God dwells only in some certain Spirits, such as are of a Disposition fit to receive and entertain him; those who (as the Jews love to speak) are worthy to have the *Shechinah* rest upon them. But all Spirits good and bad, however qualified, dwell in him. For where else should they dwell, since he is all, and fills all? Now both these Unions infer the Necessity of Purity of Heart in Order to Holiness. John 4.16.

For First, if we consider the Soul of Man as dwelling in God, what infinite reason is there that that part of him especially should be kept pure which is essentially joyn'd to, touches and inhabits so pure and so awful an Excellence! *Put off thy Shoes from off thy Feet*, said God to *Moses*, *for the place wherein thou standest is holy Ground.* And if so much Reverence be due to the Dwelling-place of God, what Reverence is there then due when God Exod. 3.5.

himself is the Dwelling-place! How dares any Man lodge an impure Soul in the Bosom of so pure a Majesty! Or how can he in any measure be esteemed Holy, tho in all other respects never so unblamable, who is polluted in *that* part which is so inwardly united to the Beauty of Holiness!

Then Secondly, if we consider God dwelling in the Soul and Body of Man, there is great necessity of Purity of Heart. And that upon a double Account:

I. Because the Spirit of God which is the Principle of all Grace and Holiness will not enter but into a pure and clean Heart.

II. Because no other is worthy of so Divine a Presence.

And first, the Holy Spirit will not enter but into a pure and clean Heart. For this special and gracious Presence of God is not like his General and Essential Presence, universal and unlimited, but fixt and confined to certain Laws

Laws, and depending upon certain Conditions and Qualifications. And tho the firſt Addreſſes, influential Viſits, and diſtant Overtures of the Holy Spirit prevent all previous diſpoſitions of Man, who (as our Church expreſſes it in her 10*th* Article) *cannot turn and prepare himſelf by his own natural ſtrength*, yet to his fix'd Dwelling and reſidential Abode in us, 'tis neceſſary that there be an antecedent Preparation of Heart. Which I conceive to be the reaſon that tho *all* Men are at ſome time or other Partakers of the common and ordinary Motions of the Spirit, (who is ſaid to have ſtriven even with the old World) yet none but very *good* Men have the Priviledge to be the Temples of his Reſidence. And this whole matter I take to be diſtinctly repreſented in thoſe Words of St. *John*, *Behold I ſtand at the door and knock: If any Man hear my voice, and open the door, I will come in to him and ſup with him.* Where by ſtanding at the Door and knocking, is meant common and preventing Grace. And this indeed is uſed to all, without any previous Qualifications. But he does not come in and ſup, that is, take up his Reſidence

Gen. 6. 3.

Rev. 3. 20.

sidence and be a familiar Ghest, till his Voice be hear'd, and the Door open'd, that is, till the Man has well attended to, and complied with those his antecedent Motions and Suggestions, till he has swept and made clean the inner Room of his Heart: So that Purity of Heart is absolutely necessary, tho not for the first preventing Influences, yet for the residence and in-dwelling of the Holy Spirit, who tho he visit those that sit in Darkness, and in the Shadow of Death, yet he will not *Lodge* but in a pure and bright Soul.

Nor Secondly, Is any other than such worthy of so Divine a Presence. Indeed the purest Soul has reason to say with the Centurion, *Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldst come under my Roof*, if we consider the disproportion that is between the Purity of God, and that of the purest Temple we can prepare for him. For *he putteth no trust in his Saints, nor are the Heavens clean in his sight.* How much more unworthy then is the impure and polluted Soul of so pure a Presence! Suppose the Spirit of God *would* enter into a Polluted Spirit, yet what Soul that has

Mat. 8. 8.

Job 15. 15.

any

any ſenſe of Decency would dare to continue any longer ſo, when once poſſeſs'd by ſo Divine an Inhabitant! *Holineſs becomes thine House for ever,* Pſal. 93. ſays the Pſalmiſt, that is, it is very meet and right, decent and proportionable that the place of the Divine Reſidence ſhould be kept holy and Undefiled. The Divine Preſence is the greateſt and moſt ſolemn Conſecration of any place that can be, and wherever he fixes his Manſion, there the Inſcription ought to be, *Holineſs to the Lord.* And the reaſon of all this is by the Pſalmiſt render'd elſewhere, *For thou art a God that haſt no pleaſure in* Pſal. 5. 4. *wickedneſs, neither ſhall any evil dwell with thee.*

Having thus far ſhewn the Neceſſity of Purity of Heart in Order to Holineſs, to complete this part it remains that we further repreſent its neceſſity in order to *Happineſs.* Now this Neceſſity may reſpect either our Admiſſion into Happineſs or our Enjoyment of it when admitted. That Purity of Heart is neceſſary to our Admiſſion into Happineſs is already ſufficiently deducible from what has been premi-

sed concerning its necessity to Holiness, without which we are expressly told, Heb. 12. 14. *No man shall see God.* We are therefore further concern'd only to shew that 'tis necessary to the *enjoyment* of Happiness.

And here not to feign a long Hypothesis of a Sinners being admitted into Heaven, with a particular Description of his Condition and Behaviour there, we need only consider that the Supreme Good is of a *Relative* Nature, as well as any other Good, and consequently the enjoyment of it must necessarily require some Qualification in the Faculty, as well as the enjoyment of any other Good does, something that may render that Good a Good to that particular Faculty. Otherwise tho it may be *possess'd*, yet it can never be *injoy'd*. This again must be something that must produce some Likeness or Agreeableness between the Faculty and the Good to be enjoy'd. Which because the Purest of all Beings leaves no room to doubt but that Purity of Heart must be that Agreeableness, without which as a Man cannot *resemble*, so neither can he *enjoy* God.

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We see that even in this Life 'tis very tedious to be in the Company of a Person whose Humour is disagreeable to ours, tho perhaps in other respects of sufficient Worth and Excellency. And how then can we imagin that an ill-disposed Soul should take any Pleasure in God, who is to her infinitely more unlike, and therefore disagreeable, than one Man can be supposed to be to another? For my part, I rather think that should an impure Soul be afforded a Mansion in Heaven, she would be so far from being happy in it, that she would do *Pennance* there to all Eternity. For besides that a sensualized Soul would carry such Appetites with her thither for which she could find no suitable Objects, which would be a constant Torment; those that she *does* find there would be so disproportionate, that they would rather vex and upbraid, than satisfie her Indigence. So that this in short would be her case, That which she desires and could relish, that she has not; and that which she has, that she neither desires nor can relish; the result of which must needs be a very high degree of Misery

and Dissatisfaction. So absolutely necessary is Purity of Heart both to the *Acquisition* and *Enjoyment* of Happiness.

And yet there is something that recommends it further yet, and that is the *Blessedness* that attends it, the third and last thing to be consider'd. *Blessed are the pure in Heart, for they shall see God.* But before we come so far as this, there is a Present Blessedness belonging to it in this Life, which I shall briefly touch upon. And here besides that inward Peace of Mind, that Satisfaction of Conscience, and Spiritual Joy and Complacency which are the common advantages of a good and well-order'd Life, there are these three more peculiar Advantages of Purity of Heart.

I. That 'tis more *Innocent.*
II. That 'tis more *Easie.*
III. That 'tis more *Safe.*

More *Innocent*, because 'tis supposed to put a Bar against the very first Beginnings of Sin, and consequently to be removed at a greater distance from it.

More

More *Easie*, because 'tis easier to abstain from the first Beginnings of Sin, than from a further Progress in it after you have once begun. Nor is there so much pains required not to admit, as to eject a Temptation. Which made an ingenious Person say, That the Prohibition of *Concupiscence* was not so much a new or distinct Commandment, as an Instrument of Security for the keeping all the rest.

Lastly, More *Safe*, because more Easie; there being not so much danger of yielding to what a Man can easily forbear, as to that which he must abstain from with pain and uneasiness.

But the greatest Blessedness of all is the *Vision of God*. Which I suppose may be extended beyond that *Beatifie* Vision of him, which is the Happiness of Angels and Saints in Heaven, and may signifie some peculiar advantage belonging to the Pure in Heart even in this Life, namely, the clearer Perception of all *Necessary* and *Ideal* Truths (which may well be call'd seeing of God, they being one and the same

same with the Divine Essence) especially such Ideal Truths as are of a Moral and Spiritual Nature, to the Discovery of which, Purity of Heart is an excellent Preparative. According to that of the Angel to *Daniel*, *Many shall be purify'd and made white, and none of the Wicked shall understand, but the Wise shall understand.* But having professedly discours'd of this * elsewhere, I shall stay no longer upon this part, but proceed to that other Vision of God which is called *Beatific*.

Dan. 12. 10.

* Reflect. on the Conduct of Human Life.

Here I remark, that this is the only Beatitude to which the express Promise of the Vision of God is annex'd. This indeed is implicitly contain'd in some others, but there only openly expressed. And because 'tis reasonable to think that our Lord does suit his Rewards to the Natures of the Excellencies here specify'd, We may well conclude that he intended some peculiar Honour and Priviledge to this holy disposition of Soul, and to signifie that it has a more than ordinary Title to the Happiness of the Beatific Vision. This will include two things,

I. That

I. That the Pure in Heart shall have a clearer and more inlarged sight of God.

II. That they shall take a greater delight in what they do see of him.

And First, They shall have a clearer and more enlarged sight of God. This will depend upon two Suppositions.

I. Upon the peculiar Aptness of this Disposition for the Vision of God.

II. Upon the Will of God to afford a greater and clearer manifestation of himself to a Soul so disposed.

That Purity of Heart has a peculiar aptness in order to the Vision of God, we need not doubt, if we consider that the only reason why we see not God now, is the grosness of this Tabernacle wherein the Soul is incased. This is that *Glass* through which we now see so Darkly, and which makes us do so. This is that black Skreen that parts the *Material* from the *Intelligible* World. The more abstract therefore we

1 Cor. 13. 12.

we are from the Body, and from the Bodily Life, the more fit we shall be both to *behold*, and to indure the Rays of the Divine Light. We find that even now the purer and finer our Blood and Spirits are, the freer and clearer are our Thoughts. The more bright and transparent this Glass is, the more the Ideal Light will dart in upon our Souls. And the same will hold in proportion hereafter. The purer the Soul is, the purer will all its Faculties and Operations be, the less it will retain of corporeal Gusts and Relishes, the more recollected and undivided will be its Powers; for Unity of Thought follows Unity of Desire; and the fewer things a Man desires, the fewer will be his Thoughts, and consequently the more strong and vigorous upon the Object where they fix. To which we may add, that the purer the Soul is, the purer will also be her *Resurrection Body*, which is of great moment to the Vision of God, as well as to other *Spiritual* Operations. For we must then see through a Glass as well as now; only the Glass will be clearer, according to the different Purity of the Soul, which even in this Life gives a particular

lar Brightness of Air to the Countenance, and makes the Face to shine with an unimitable Lustre. Purity of Heart therefore even upon this single account has a peculiar aptness in order the Vision of God. But to this may be added Secondly the *Will* of God to afford a greater and clearer manifestation of himself to a Soul so disposed. For 'tis highly rational to believe, that God who is so great a Lover, will also be a liberal Rewarder of inward Purity; and that he who delights to dwell in pure Hearts now, will reveal himself in a very plentiful measure to such hereafter. So that both from the aptness of the Disposition and from the Will of God we may conclude, That the Pure in Heart shall have a *larger* share of the Beatific Vision.

Nor shall they only see more of God, but Secondly, take a greater Delight in what they do see of him. And this is the principal Ingredient of their Happiness: For 'tis not the meer *having*, but the *delighting* in a thing that makes a Man happy. And this is the Condition of Pure Souls. The same Purity which procures them a more in-

larged

larged sight of God, will also make them to delight in the Vision of him,
Psal. 34. so that they shall *Taste* as well as *See* how *good* God is. For the purer the Soul is, the liker it is to God who is Essential Purity; and the more it resembles God, the more it must needs love and delight in him.

Likeness is the greatest indearment of Love, and the most natural Foundation of Delight and Complacency. We see this in all the Orders of Being, and in all the Degrees of Life. In the Sympathetic Associations of Vegetables, in the Voluntary Consortings of Animals, and in the chosen Friendships of Men. But most of all may this be seen in God himself. What is it but the most perfect Likeness and Conformity of Essences, Understandings and Wills that renders the Sacred Persons of the mysterious and adorable Trinity so infinitely lovely and agreeable to each other! This was that which made the Father say of the Son, *This is my beloved Son in whom I am well-*
Heb. 1. 3. *pleased*, because he saw there the *Brightness of his Glory, and the express image of his Person.* And upon this is found-

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ed that mutual Delight which the other Sacred Persons enjoy from each other. That therefore which makes the Persons of the Holy Trinity delight in one another, must needs make the pure Soul delight in the Holy Trinity. A pure Soul cannot but delight in a pure God, and the purer she is, the more she will love and delight in him. Purity of Heart does even here *Anticipate*, much more then will it hereafter *increase* the Joys of Heaven.

It remains therefore, that having this excellent Hope, we study to purifie our selves even as God is pure, and so endeavour to resemble and transcribe the Divine Perfections here, that we may contemplate them with the greater Complacency and Delight hereafter. To which purpose, let us now and always Pray in the Words of our Holy and Devout Church,

*O God, make clean our Hearts within us, And take not thy Holy Spirit from us.*

Amen.

Discourse

## Discourse the Seventh.

### Matth. V. ver. ix.

*Blessed are the Peace-makers, for they shall be call'd the Children of God.*

THE Words very well become the Mouth of him that spake them; who was himself the greatest *Peace-maker* in the World. He made Peace in Heaven by the Blood of his Cross, and endeavoured to promote it on Earth. He first reconciled God to Man, and then tried to reconcile Men to one another. He chose to be born in the most quiet and peaceful state of the Roman Empire, when *Augustus* in token of an Universal Peace had shut up the *Mystical* Gates of *Janus* his Temple. And when he came into the World his Proclamation by the Angels was Peace; and when he was to leave the World, the same was his Legacy. *Peace I leave with you, my peace*

John 14.

*peace I give unto you.* The Order of his whole Life was a constant Compliance with the Peace of the State, whereof he gave two signal Instances, in Paying Tribute when not obliged, and in forbidding resistance of the Officer that seized him, and his Last Prayer was for the Peace and Unity of the Church. And now since by this great Love and Study of Peace he shew'd himself to be the Genuine Son of God, who is styled the *God of Peace*, he might with the better *Decorum* make the same Disposition of Mind the Measure and Argument of *our* filial relation to him, as he does when he tells us, *Blessed are the Peace-makers, for they shall be called the Children of God.* 1 Cor. 14. 33.

By *Peace-Makers* here I suppose is meant not only those that interpose as Moderators to compose Feuds and Quarrels (tho' that be the more immediate Sense of the Word) but more generally those that are peaceably affected, and that shew this their Peaceable Disposition, either by living quietly and inoffensively, or by endeavouring to maintain Peace where it is, or to restore it where it is interrupted.

The first of these Degrees of Peaceableness consists in a meer Negative; the two last are of a positive Nature, and consequently of a greater Excellence. But the most excellent of all is the last, it being for the most part not only a *thankless*, but an odious, difficult and hazardous Undertaking to bring *them* nearer together whom Anger has set at a distance. 'Tis like the business of a *Fire-quencher*, who tho' he may with plying of Engins and great adoe rescue the Pile of building from the devouring Flames, yet his Eyes will be sure to smart with the *Smoke*.

Now this Peace, in the not violating, preserving, or restoring of which this peaceable-mindedness is concern'd, may be either private Peace between man and man, or public Peace between Societies of Men. Again, public Peace is distinguishable according to the general Distribution of Human Society, into Civil and Ecclesiastic, that of the State, and that of the Church. The former concerns Men not only as subjected to Government, or as under this or that particular Form of Government, but also as Men, and consequently

quently all Men. For even the ſtate of Nature antecedently to all Human Conventions and Conſtitutions (as has been abundantly proved againſt the Author of the *Leviathan*) is not a ſtate of War, but of Peace. The later reſpects only thoſe who are Members of the Chriſtian Church whereof Chriſt Jeſus is the Head, and ſubject to that Spiritual Government whereof he is the Author. The former kind of publick Peace is oppoſed to War and ſeditious Practices, the later to Schiſms and Diviſions.

The way being thus far clear'd by pointing out the general Degrees of Peaceableneſs, and the general kinds of Peace, we may now with the leſs intanglement proceed to fix the Subject and Order of the following Diſcourſe. And here I do not intend a *Caſuiſtical* Tract, by entring upon that long *beaten* Common-place concerning our Obligation to Peace, and the Meaſures of obſerving it with reference either to Church or State. For beſides that this has been the conſtant Theme of almoſt every Caſuiſt; and that 'tis impoſſible to ſay any thing *more* than

*All*, or *better* than *Some* have already said upon it: I further think that the thing is of it self plain enough, and that were it not for the perverseness of some Men rather than for any obscurity in the Duty, there needed not have been any other Measure given in this matter than that *General* one of the Apostle, *If it be possible, as much as lies in you, live peaceably with all men.* For when 'tis inquired, How far we are obliged to Peace in the State, or Peace in the Church? The Answer is plain and ready from hence, That we are obliged to both as far as is *Possible*, and as much as in us lies; and that Nothing less than *Absolute* and *Evident* Necessity can justifie either War in the State, or Separation in the Church. Which one Rule if well heeded and practised, the Condition of the World would be much more peaceable and quiet than it is, or is like to be.

Instead therefore of treating of this Beatitude in a *Casuistical* way by describing the Measures of our Obligation to Peace, I shall rather chuse this Order of Discourse.

First,

Firſt, To ſet forth the general Excellency of a peaceble Diſpoſition.

Secondly, To conſider that More particular Prerogative of it in making thoſe that have it Children of God.

Thirdly, To conclude all with ſome Reflections upon the preſent Diſturbers of the Peace of Chriſtendom.

And firſt, The general Excellency of a peaceable Diſpoſition may be derived from theſe two Principles:

Firſt, From what it *Argues*.

Secondly, From what it *Cauſes*.

And firſt, It Argues a well-ordered Frame and good Habit of Mind: Good by natural Diſpoſition, good by Deliberation and Choice, and good by Gracious and Divine Operation. It argues a Soul not only lightly tinctured, but deeply ſeaſon'd, and throughly imbued with Goodneſs. ----- *Incoctum generoſo pectus honeſto.* The ſame may be ſaid of the peaceable Man that St. *James* ſays of him that offends not in his Tongue, that he is a *Perfect Man*. Not that the due Government Jam. 3.2.

of the Tongue alone does make a Man Perfect; for there is a Body of Righteousness as well as a Body of Sin; and to make it perfect the Members must have both a just number and Size; but that considering the many requisites to so great and excellent a piece of Temperance, it argues and supposes him to be so; and, as it there follows, *able also to bridle the whole Body*. And so here, the peaceable Man may be said to be a perfect Man; not that he is so made by this single Excellence, but that this Disposition argues him to be so, considering what a various Accomplishment of Soul is required before a Man can be capable of exercising so noble a Virtue.

There are some Degrees in Wickedness that necessarily suppose others; the Man must first walk in the Counsel of the Ungodly, and stand in the Way of Sinners, before he can have the *Forehead* to sit down in the Chair of the Scornful. And so there are some Degrees in Goodness, that do also necessarily suppose others. For there is a Scale of Perfection in both, and we can neither be Good nor Bad

by

by ſtrides and jumps. And this is ſuch a Degree of Goodneſs as ſuppoſes many others to have gon before it, being one of the *Top-ſtone* of the *Spiritual Building*, and one of the laſt finiſhing ſtrokes of the Divine Image of that Chriſt which is *form'd* in us. For the Holy Spirit of God (as was ſhewn in the preceding Diſcourſe) requires a Conſecrated Abode, a Chaſt Body and a Pure Soul; and will not enter into us till the former be made a Temple, and the later a Sanctuary. And yet this Excellence is reckon'd by the Apoſtle among the ſpecial *Fruits* of the Spirit, and conſequently muſt preſuppoſe all that Moral Preparation at leaſt that the Entrance of the Holy Spirit does, and muſt therefore argue a well-order'd Frame and good Habit of Mind. Gal. 4. 19. Gal. 5. 22.

But this being only a general (tho to one that attends the force of it, ſufficiently Concluſive) Argument, I will more diſtinctly ſhew that it does ſo, by conſidering what particular Qualifications of Soul are required in order to a peaceable diſpoſition; whoſe preſence muſt needs *Argue* whatever it

*Requires.* Now these Requisites are either Negative, or Positive. The Negative are

First, That the Man be free from all inordinate *Self-Love*, it being impossible that he who prefers his own little private Concerns before the publick interest, should be at peace with the Publick when that tender part comes once to be toucht. No, Such a one will ballance *Self* against all the World, will not care what becomes of the Publick when it stands in competition with that; but will embroil all the World in War and Mischief if he can, for the least Self-advantage.

Secondly, That the Man be free from Covetousness, which tho the Root of all Evil, is yet more so of strife and Dissention than of any other. Covetousness and Peace can't dwell long together. 'Tis indeed a very *Litigious Principle*, and one of the greatest Make-bates and Incendiaries in the World. 'Tis this that fills the Court with Brawls and Wranglings, and the Field with Blood and Slaughter. And 'tis a known Obser-

Observation, That in all Wars whether justly or unjustly undertaken, the greatest part fight only for *Plunder*.

Thirdly, That he be free from *Ambition*, which is as great an Enemy to Peace without, as it is to inward Tranquility. The Ambitious Man is always advancing his aim at some higher mark of Honour; and if Peace will not serve to raise him, War shall. Take an Instance of this from the Court of *Rome*. What a World of Schisms and Disturbances in the Church, and Factions, Seditions, Plots, Massacres, and Wars in the State have been from time to time occasioned by the Ambition of that See! But there's an higher instance than this, for 'twas *Ambition* that made War in *Heaven*.

Fourthly, That he be free from *Envy*, which indeed spites every thing that is excellent, but is of all things the most direct and sworn Enemy to Peace. 'Twas the Envy of the Devil that first disturb'd the peace and order of the World, and set the whole Creation in Battail Array against Man. And 'tis the same Envious Being that still

still raises and foments all the Enmities and Dissentions that divide both the Church and State; and may therefore be called the *Father* of *Discords*, as well as the *Father* of *Lies*. Envy is the greatest Enmity in the World, and the Envious Man is the most universal Enemy. There is no Man but whom by the very Principles of his Disposition he is obliged either to *Hate* or to *Despise*. All his Superiors and Equals he hates, and despises all his Inferiours, which comprise the whole body of Mankind. And both ways is Envy an Enemy to Peace, and very destructive to Kingdoms and States. Whereof there is a signal Instance in the Case of *Hanno* and *Bomilcar*, who through Envy to the growing Glories of *Hannibal*, deny'd him a Supply of Forces to carry on his *Italian* Conquests, and so ruin'd *him*, their *Country* and *themselves* too.

Fifthly, That he be free from *Revenge*, which is another great Trespasser against Peace, and without which the rest would not be so mischievous as they are. For this continues and foments those Enmities to which the other

other give Birth, rivet and fastens Animosities in the Minds of Men, and by fresh returns of provocation brings in (what has in vain been attempted in *Nature*) a kind of *Perpetual Motion* in Malice, and immortalizes Quarrels and Contentions.

Sixthly and Lastly, to comprize all at once, 'tis requisite that the peaceable Man be free from all manner of *Lusts* and *Irregular Passions*, whether of the Sensual or Intellectual Part, and from all Disaffection and Disorder of Soul. This being the Spring and First Mover to all the Discords and Disorders that are without. According to that of St. *James*, *From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your Lusts, that war in your members?* Where these reign, there can be no Peace, and therefore the peaceable Man must be free from these.

These are the *Negative* Qualifications in order to a Peaceable Disposition. The *Positive* I need but just name, the Proof of them being virtually contain'd in the other. They are therefore,

First,

First, Charity or universal Love, that seeketh not her own, but the Common Good. Secondly, Generosity and a noble inlargement of Soul, that sets a Man above the little petty Occasions of Quarrel and Contention. Thirdly, Humility and Modesty, that makes a Man possess himself and his station with Contentedness and Thankfulness. Fourthly, A candid, sweet and benign Temper that thinks no evil, but is well pleased in the Prosperity of every Man, and every State or Community. Fifthly, A mild, meek and forgiving Spirit, that does not keep up the *Circulation* of Injuries, but lets the Quarrel fall and dye. Sixthly and Lastly, a serene and well-composed Soul, one that rules well her own *inward Charge*, having her Passions in Subjection with all Gravity, Peace and Tranquility of Mind.

All these excellent Qualifications are required to furnish out a peaceable Disposition, which will not come into the Soul, as the Soul will not into the Body, till after it be duly tempered and prepared for it. Whence the Proposition to be made out is sufficiently concluded,

concluded, that it argues a well-order'd Frame and good Habit of Mind: Which is the firſt Ground of its Excellency.

The ſecond is taken from the conſideration of what it *Cauſes*. The Effects of it are as great and noble as its Principles and Prerequiſites. Its great and general effect is *Happineſs*, upon which no one Virtue has ſo large an influence as this. Some Happineſs it cauſes immediately and directly, and contributes to ſecure whatever Happineſs it does not cauſe. Some Bleſſings it originally procures and preſerves the poſſeſſion of all. So that ſome way or other all our Bleſſings are *Bleſſings of Peace*, ſince to this we owe either the Bleſſings themſelves, or at leaſt the ſecure enjoyment of them. And all this it does by giving Strength, Beauty and Pleaſure to Society.

Firſt *Strength*. Peace is as much the *Sinew* of Society, as Mony is of War, and without it Society is ſo far from obtaining any of its juſt and natural Ends, that 'tis a far leſs eligible State than that of perfect Solitude. For in perfect Solitude Men only want the mutual aſ-

ſiſtance

sistance of one another; but in a divided and inraged Society, Every Man is in the condition of *Cain*, in fear lest the next that meets him should do him a mischief. 'Tis Peace that makes Society a defence, and that distinguishes the Congresses of Men from the Herds of Beasts, or which is worse, from the Confusions of the Rabble. And as it strengthens Society *within*, so it strengthens it without too; nor would War be any Security abroad without Peace at home. Briefly, 'tis Union and Coherence that makes every thing strong, and Peace is the Cement that holds all fast together. And what Society is there that can subsist without it, when even a *Kingdom divided against it self*, tho it be that of the Devil himself, *cannot stand?*

Mark 3. 24.

Secondly *Beauty*. There is indeed a certain Beauty in Strength, and every thing that is strong is so far beautiful. But besides this, Peace gives a more proper and peculiar Beauty to Society, the Beauty of Order and Proportion, of Decency and Agreeableness. For a peaceable Disposition inclines every Man to mind his own proper

proper Business, and to contain himself within that place and station wherein God and his Superiours have fix'd him, and not to *aspire* to what is *above* him, or *invade* what does not *belong* to him. For indeed Peace it self cannot subsist without this, any more than Society can without Peace. Wherever therefore there is Peace, there will also be this Order and Proportion. The Hand will not affect the Office of the Eye, nor the Foot the place of the Head, but every Member will be contented with, and intent upon his own Office and Place in the Body. The result of which must needs be the greatest Beauty and Harmony.

Thirdly *Pleasure*. This indeed is necessarily consequent to the two former, since it cannot but be a great pleasure to every particular well-affected Member of Society to reflect upon the strength and Beauty of the whole. But besides this, a peaceable Disposition derives a more immediate and direct Pleasure upon Society. For who can express the Pleasure that is in Love and Joy; Sweetness and Dearness in mutual kindness and Confi-

dences,

dences, in Union of Minds and Universal Friendship! They that have had the Happyness to taste of this pleasure, know they cannot express it, which made the Psalmist break forth into that abrupt Extasie, *Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for Brethren to dwell together in Unity!* Psal. 133.

Having thus far set forth the general Excellency of a peaceable Disposition from what it *Argues*, and from what it *Causes*, I now proceed in the second place to consider that more particular Prerogative of it in making those that have it, Children of God.

To be Children of God is indeed common to all good Men, who being begotten anew by the immortal Seed of the Word, do bear Gods image in Holiness, endeavouring in all things to do their Father's Will. But there are some Dispositions that give a more peculiar Right to this Title than others, as they are nearer Resemblances of the Divine Excellencies. Among which is the Disposition now under our Consideration, whereby a Man becomes in a special Degree and Manner

ther like God, and ſo evidences himſelf to be his Child, and may upon the conſideration of that likeneſs fitly be ſo called. And this is the conſtant uſe of this Phraſe in Scripture, *Ye are of your Father the Devil* (ſays our Lord to the unbelieving Jews) *and the Luſts of your Father ye will do.* And ſo again, *Love your Enemies, and do good,* &c. *and ye ſhall be the Children of the Higheſt, for he is kind to the unthankful and to the evil.* And ſays the Apoſtle, *Be ye followers of God as dear Children.* They are the Children of God, who are Followers of God, who purifie themſelves as he is pure, and who are perfect as he is perfect. So that to be the Child of God, or the Child of the Devil, ſignifies as much as to carry a particular reſemblance of either. When therefore 'tis ſaid, that the Peacemakers ſhall be call'd the Children of God, it comes to as much as that they carry a particular Character of the Divine Likeneſs, whereby it may be known to whoſe Family they retain, and that they are the *True* Sons of God.

Joh. 8. 44.

Luke 6. 35.

Eph. 5. 1.

And so indeed they are. For God is the God of Peace; and the greatest Peace, that which passes all Understanding, is called the *Peace of God*. For God is the greatest Lover of Peace, the Author and Giver of Peace, and the Rewarder of all such as live in Peace. Indeed under the Jewish State, (which as in other things, so in this was very peculiar, that 'twas a State of *Theocracy*) God was known by the Name of the *Lord of Hosts*, not as expressing his true natural liking and approbation, but only his relation to that particular People, whose immediate King and Leader he was. But now under the State of the Gospel, which exhibits a more genuin Idea of
John. 1. 18. God (for the only Begotten Son, which is in the Bosom of the Father, he has declared him) he has changed his Title from the style of *War* to the style of *Peace*.

This indeed was ever his *Delight*, but now 'tis his *Glory*, and inserted among the brightest Ornaments of his Crown. He is now manifested to be what he ever really was. God from all

all Eternity to all Eternity enjoys a profound Peace within himſelf, and the Sacred Perſons of the Trinity are not more one in Eſſence and Nature, than in Will and Inclination. Their *Moral* is as great as their *Natural* Unity. The Kingdom of God is a Kingdom of Peace, and Heaven the Throne of his Majeſty is a peaceful Region. We never read but once that there was any War there, and thoſe that Rev. 12. 7. cauſed it were quickly baniſh'd thence. To be ſhort, God both enjoys and eſtabliſhes Peace above, he *maketh peace in his High-places*, and he has ſent his Son to procure it below, to reconcile Men to him, and to one another, that ſo both Worlds might conſpire in Unity, and that this Will of God might be done in Earth as it is in Heaven. And therefore ſince God has ſhewn himſelf to be ſo great a Lover of Peace, there is ſufficient ground for this particular Prerogative of a peaceable Diſpoſition, that it makes thoſe that have it Children of God. From which I paſs in the third and laſt place, to conclude all with ſome Reflections on the preſent Diſturbers of the Peace of Chriſtendom.

*Pufendorf de Officio Hom. & Civ. p. 154.*

'Tis the Observation of a Great Civilian and Moralist, that *Peace is a state peculiar to Man as he is distinguish'd from Brutes.* And so indeed it *should* be. But could we suppose a Stranger from one of the other Planetary Worlds to come and take a View of this our little Spot, and of the Manners of those that live upon it, he would not sure think *this* of all the things in the World to be the Character of Man. For he could not but observe, and perhaps it would be one of the first Remarks he would make, that there are more Wars and Fightings among Men, than among any other sort of Creatures, and more among *Christians* than among any other sort of Men. For at the very first opening of the Scene, what a miserable face of things would appear both in Church and State! What Wars and Desolations in the one! and what *Debates, Envyings, Wraths, Strifes, Backbitings, Whisperings, Swellings* and *Tumults* in the other!

2 Cor. 12. 20.

But because most of the Disturbances in the State proceed from those

thoſe of the Church, I ſhall confine my Reflections to thoſe that diſturb the Peace and Order of the Chriſtian Church. Where I ſhall Firſt, Point out who theſe Diſturbers are. And Secondly, Set ſome ſuch Conſiderations before them, as may make them ſenſible of their Crime.

There are I conceive theſe two general ways of diſturbing the Peace of the Church; either by impoſing unlawful or unreaſonable Terms of Communion, or by refuſing to comply with ſuch as are Lawful and Reaſonable. That the firſt of theſe is a Breach of the Church's Peace there can be no doubt, becauſe it introduces a neceſſity of Separation. And that the latter is ſo is as plain, becauſe 'tis a Separation without any Neceſſity for it. Either of theſe is *Schiſm*, whoſe Notion (as all agree) conſiſts either in making a neceſſity of Separation, or in ſeparating without neceſſity.

The Firſt of theſe will fall heavy upon the *Church* of *Rome*, who, (as it has been ſufficiently made good againſt her) has brought in an Abſolute Ne-

ceſſity of Separation, by impoſing ſuch notoriouſly unlawful and unreaſonable Terms of Communion. The latter will light upon all thoſe who ſeparate from ſuch parts of the *Reformation*, where they may lawfully Communicate. More eſpecially it will light heavier than ordinary upon all thoſe *Sectaries* among us, who now divide from the Church of *England*, the Terms of whoſe Communion, (as has been undeniably prov'd and maintain'd) are not only Lawful, but highly reaſonable, and of an excellent Conſtitution.

I need not here, nor is it my Deſign to ſet my ſelf profeſſedly to make out the Charge of Schiſm againſt the Diſſenters and Separatiſts from the Church of *England*. It has been done over and over, to the utmoſt Degree of Evidence, and the whole Circle of the Reformed Churches cry out upon them for their unreaſonable Separation. Only I would deſire them to try themſelves and their Cauſe by that one plain Apoſtolical Canon before mentioned, and ſee whether they can juſtifie themſelves by that ſingle Meaſure. It is this,

*If*

*If it be possible, as much as lies in you, live peaceably with all Men.* If with all Men, then certainly much more with Bodies and Societies of Men; much more with our Governors and Superiors; much more yet with the *Church*, the most Sacred and most Eminent of all Societies. And if as far as is *possible*, then certainly as far as is *lawful*. Rom. 12. 18.

But now I would ask our Dissenters and Separatists this one Question, and appeal to their *Consciences* as well as to their *Practices* for an Answer. Do they live peaceably with the *Church* of *England* as by lawful Authority establish'd, as far as is *possible*, and as much as *in them lies*? So far from this, that I *Might* say (were I minded to aggravate things) that they do the quite contrary, and *Divide* from us as far as is possible, and as much as in them lies, it being very notorious that they run from us as far as they can, measure their Purity and Sanctity by their distance from us; and condemn and disuse many things meerly because we approve and use them.

But I need not take advantage of this, tho it be too notorious to be denied, as well as too scandalous to be defended. I only demand, Do they live peaceably with the Church as far as is possible, and as much as in them lies? They cannot with any Modesty say that they do. For if they did, not to say that they might come much nearer to us than they do, they must of necessity conform with us. Since as they were never able to shew any thing unlawful in our Communion; so they now generally allow it to be lawful, and accordingly will afford us their company now and then upon occasion, as often as they think fit to do us that Honour. Well then, if our Communion be lawful, then 'tis *Possible* for them to communicate with us, and if they do not, then 'tis plain that they do not live peaceably with us as far as is *Possible*, and as much as in them lies, and consequently by vertue of this plain Apostolical Canon stand fully convicted of *Schism*, and let them bring themselves off if they can. I am satisfi'd they will be able to answer it but ill here, and I am afraid worse hereafter.

I have now in general pointed out the Diſturbers of the Chriſtian Peace, and I wiſh I could now as eaſily make theſe Troublers of our *Iſrael* ſenſible of this their Crime, as prove them guilty of it. In order to which not to inſiſt upon the Heinouſneſs of the Sin of Schiſm which is as expreſly forbidden in Scripture as Murder or Adultery, and the great Obligation that lies upon all Chriſtians to preſerve the Unity and Peace of the Church, which the Scripture every where ſo earneſtly preſſes and inculcates, and which the Example of the Primitive Chriſtians ſo ſtrongly recommends; and for which both our Reaſon and our Intereſt (eſpecially at this time) would ſuggeſt to us a Thouſand Arguments; I ſay not to inſiſt upon theſe and ſuch like conſiderations (for a combination of which I refer to an excellent Diſcourſe of Dr. *Barrow*'s concerning the Unity of the Church) I would only deſire the Perſons concern'd to conſider how much by their Schiſms and Diviſions they prejudice the *Chriſtian Religion*. I do not mean as to the Life and Power of Godlineſs,

(tho

(tho that be very true and worthy to be serioúsly consider'd) but as to the Propagation of the Christian Faith. And that with respect to the three great Enemies of it, The *Heathen*, the *Jew*, and the *Mahumetan*.

First, With respect to the *Heathen*, to whom as the Unity and Agreement of the *First* Christians was a great indearment, and a very prevalent Invitation, so as to occasion that common Speech among them, *See how the Christians love one another*! So the Schisms and Divisions of the *Present* Christians must needs be a great Scandal and Objection. For indeed how can any considering Heathen be perswaded to think such a Broken and Divided Religion to be of Divine Revelation, when that which *he* takes to by the Light of Nature has more of Unity and Consent!

Secondly, With respect to the *Jew*, who may certainly number the Dissentions of Christians among the greatest Hindrances of his Conversion. For when in the Prophetick Writings among other Characters of the times of the

the Messias he shall find this to be one, and one of the chiefest, that it shall be a Reign of Charity and Peace, that *they shall beat their Swords into Plow-shares, and their Spears into Pruning-hooks*; That *Nation shall not lift up Sword against Nation, neither shall they learn War any more.* That *The Wolf shall also dwell with the Lamb, and the Leopard shall lie down with the Kid*, &c. Isa. 2. 4. I say the Jew finding this to be one of the Characteristics of the Messias his Reign, and observing withal nothing like it in the Christian State, but rather a perfect *Reverse* of all this, and not being able to distinguish with some between the Design and Natural Genius of the Christian Religion, and the accidental Event of things, or with others to have recourse to the other more glorious Reign of Christ in the Millennial State of the Church, wherein these great and strong Figures shall have a proportionable Accomplishment, he must needs be shrewdly tempted to think that the time of the promised Messias is not yet come, and that the Religion which now goes for his, is as false, as its Professors are evil and wicked.

Thirdly

Thirdly and Lastly, With respect to the *Mahumetan*, who indeed allows Christ to have been a true Prophet, and his Religion to have been once a true Religion, only he says it has had its Time as well as that of the Jews, and is now, as *superannuated*, to give place to a more perfect Institution, that is, to *Mahumet*'s, who as he came after Christ, so was he to fill up his Defects, and to deliver the last and standing Will of God. And will he not find pretence to be confirmed in this his Opinion, and to prefer his Master *Mahumet* as much before Christ as we do Christ before *Moses*; when he shall perceive (as quickly he may) that there is not half so much Unity and Agreement among Christians, even concerning their very Religion which is to be the Bond of their Unity, as there is among *Mahumetans*? Certainly he will, and tho he perish in his Error, yet I fear his Blood will be upon those who administer the occasion of it. These are great Scandals and Objections both to the Heathen, Jew and Mahumetan, and woe be to them by whom this great Offence comes. Our Saviour pro-

pronounces a ſevere Woe againſt them that ſhall offend even one of his little ones, and what then ſhall be the doom of thoſe that ſcandalize ſo great a part of the World! I heartily wiſh that the preſent Diſturbers and Dividers of the Chriſtian State and Church would ſeriouſly conſider theſe things, and how they act the part of *Antichriſt* in thus letting and hindring the Courſe of the Chriſtian Religion. Mat. 18.6.

In the mean time I ſhut up all with this Prayer, That God would give Light to thoſe *Heathens*, *Jews* and *Mahumetans* that ſit in Darkneſs and in the Shadow of Death, and that in order to this, he would firſt guide the Feet of us *Chriſtians* into the Way of *Peace*, *Amen.*

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Diſcourſe

## Discourse the Eighth.

Matth. V. *ver.* x, xi, xij.

*Blessed are they which are persecuted for Righteousness sake, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.* Or, as it may be read from the Close, *Great is their Reward in Heaven.*

IT has been ever a great occasion of Dissatisfaction to some Men that there should be any such thing as evil in the World. A greater yet, that this Evil should often fall upon good, and sometimes upon the best of Men. But the greatest of all is, that not only good Men should meet with Evil, but that their very Goodness should betray them into it; that suffering should not only be the Portion of the Righteous, but that Men should suffer for the Sake of their Righteousness. It seems hard indeed that a Righteous Man should suffer, but much more that he should suffer for his being Righteous, and that

that Affliction should not only be the *Lot*, but also the *Effect* and *Consequence* of his Virtue. For if Honesty and Integrity cannot be a Defence and Priviledge against Evil, yet one would expect it should not be a Procurer of it, and that if the Man were not the better for his Virtue, yet at least he should not be the Worse.

These have been always as perplext *Appearances* in the Moral, as any that arise in the Natural System of the World; a frequent Trouble and Discouragement to the Good and Pious, and a more frequent Occasion of Triumph to the Atheistical and Profane, who hath raised from hence their most plausible Objections both against the *Being* and the *Order* of Divine Providence, which by these greatest Difficulties of it they have been incouraged either to *Deny* or to *Condemn*.

With the two first of these Difficulties I am not at present concern'd. Nor shall I determin of what force the last and greatest might be, were this the last state of things, and the *All-concluding Scene* of the World. Perhaps

haps it might then be strong enough to conclude what some are now so weak as to wish and believe. But certainly with the supposition of an After-state the Objection is so far from being *Desperate*, that I can see nothing *Difficult* in it: And I think 'tis here sufficiently answer'd by that ample Compensation promis'd by our Saviour to all those whose faithful adherence to a good Cause, shall at any time engage them in Sufferings and Afflictions. For says he, *Blessed are they which are persecuted for Righteousness sake, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven.*

Which last Words (as our Saviour afterwards explains them) contain not only a Promise of Heavenly Happiness in general, but of a greater Degree and Measure of it, and intitle the Sufferers for Religion, those who undergo Persecution for Righteousness sake, to a more than ordinary weight of Glory. So that hence arise two Propositions to be distinctly consider'd:

First, That there are Degrees in that Glory which shall be the Reward of Saints in Heaven.

Secondly,

Secondly, That one of the Highest Degrees of it shall be the Reward of those who suffer Persecution for the sake of Righteousness.

That there are Degrees of Glory, tho by some much contested, is yet I think a most certain and unquestionable Truth. The certainty of which I shall endeavour to establish upon these few evident Principles.

First, I consider that this must needs be the natural and necessary result of things. And here I desire only it may be granted me, That there are some certain Dispositions of Soul necessary to relish and enjoy the Happiness of Heaven. This I think is a Supposition that need not be disputed, since even to the enjoyment of sensible good there is requisite a proportion of sense. The Ear must be tunably set to relish the Charms of Music, and the Palate must be rightly disposed to find any pleasure in the sweetest Delicacies. And if these grosser Objects that have a more natural Affinity with the Organs of Sense, and strike hard upon them,

will not yet affect them without some more *particular inward* Preparation; there is greater reason to think that the Delights of Heaven that are so far above the Level of our Natures, so pure and so refined, cannot be tasted but by a suitable Disposition of Soul. The necessity of which appears so great, that I am apt to think (as a late worthy Writer of our Church does) that the whole Moral Excellency of some Vertues is their Qualification for the Happiness of another State, they being of no great consequence to the present Order of this World.

Practical Discourse of Death, p. 76.

Well then, if certain Dispositions of Soul be required to fit us for the Happiness of Heaven, then it follows, that the more disposed any Soul is for the Glories of Heaven, the more happy she must needs be in the enjoyment of them. And if so, then 'twill be necessary to say, either that all Souls are equally disposed, which would be to contradict the Sense and Experience of the whole World; or if one be better disposed than another, then in proportion one will also be more happy than another. The Consequence is plain

plain and necessary, If there must be a Moral Qualification of Soul to fit a Man for Happiness, then certainly the more qualify'd the more happy. Which has made me often wonder at the self-inconsistency of those who allowing a virtuous Frame and Temper of Mind to be a Natural Disposition for Happiness, do yet deny greater Degrees of Glory to greater Degrees of Vertue. Indeed if a Moral Disposition of Soul did not fit us for Happiness, the case were otherwise; but since tis allowed to do that, I cannot conceive but that the Degrees of Happiness must follow the Degrees of Virtue. And indeed how can he that thinks at all, think otherwise, but that a Soul well purged and purified, that has undergon a long course of Mortification, till she is throughly awakened into the Divine Life and Likeness, and is arrived to *the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ*, must find more Happiness in the Vision of God, than a Soul just pregnant with the Divine Form, and that carries away with her only the first Rudiments of Spiritual Life! Certainly that Soul which is most like God will be most happy in the fruition of Eph. 4. 13.

him. This is no more than what may be concluded from the meer natural necessity of things, without having recourse to any Positive Order of God about it. But neither may that be supposed to be wanting. For

Secondly, I consider that the same may be concluded from the Justice and Goodness of God as well as from the Nature of things. And first, from his Justice. Not that there lies an *Absolute* and *Antecedent* Obligation upon God to bestow greater Rewards upon greater Saints; for if Eternal Life it
Rom. 6. 23. self be (as the Apostle represents it) *the Gift of God*, no doubt but the Degrees of it are so too. God cannot become a Debtor to Man, or to any other Creature but by a free Act of his own. He may indeed oblige himself to us by a voluntary ingagement, but we cannot pass any strict Obligation upon him by any thing we can do; and to talk of *Meriting* in this sense is no less than Blasphemy, and I can hardly believe that any Man that understood himself, ever thus held it.

But tho God be not absolutely obliged

liged to his Creatures, but only upon Suppoſition, and conſequently cannot be Abſolutely bound to reward greater Saints with greater Happineſs, yet if we once ſuppoſe him to ingage himſelf by Promiſe to be a Rewarder of Virtue in general; there will be all the reaſon in the World to think that by the ſame Promiſe he has alſo *Virtually* obliged himſelf to crown the greateſt Virtues with the greateſt Rewards. For ſince the reaſon why he ingaged himſelf to be a Rewarder of good Men was not (as is already precaution'd) any Abſolute Merit of theirs, but only to ſhew his great Love of Virtue and Goodneſs, 'tis reaſonable to conclude that by the ſame Motives, and in perſuance of the ſame End, he alſo ingaged himſelf to be a more liberal Rewarder of greater Saints. Since this is as neceſſary a means to ſhew his Love to Virtue and Goodneſs as the other. And therefore tho we ſhould grant (which yet in the ſequel will appear otherwiſe) that God had expreſly promiſed only to be a Rewarder of Virtue in general, yet ſince the End and Reaſon of this His ingagement was to ſhew His great Love to Virtue, this would be warrant

enough to conclude, That he had implicitly and virtually ingaged Himself to have an equal regard to the several Degrees of Virtue, and to reward them after their respective Proportions.

But to rise higher yet, tho God cannot be in *Strict Justice* obliged to reward the best of our Services but by an ingagement of his own, much less to reward them with Eternal Happiness, yet I think there must be acknowledged a kind of *Congruity* or *Becomingness* on God's part so to do, even Antecedently to any Promise or Covenant. There is indeed no strict Obligation till after some Covenant; but there may, and I think must be a Congruity even before. For tho there be no Proportion of *Equivalence* between our best Works and the Rewards of Heaven, and consequently no possible room for any strict Merit, yet I cannot but think with a person of great Judgment and Moderation, that there is a propotion of *Convenience*; that is, as he afterwards explains it, tho there be nothing strictly due from God to the Services of good Men

Le Blanc Theses Theolog. p. 590.

Men, yet tis highly worthy of God to reward them; upon which account they alſo may be ſaid to be worthy, according to that of the *Apocalyps*, *They ſhall walk with me in white, for they are worthy.* Rev. 3. 4.

And indeed unleſs we will admit of this *Congruity*, I do not ſee how to juſtify the ſenſe of that Apoſtolical Maxim, *He that comes to God muſt believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of them that diligently ſeek him.* Heb. 11. 6. Tis plain that the Apoſtle here ſpeaks of the Grounds of Natural Religion, and what ſhould move and qualify a Heathen Man to make his firſt Addreſſes to God. This he tells you is to believe the Being and the Providence of God, that he *is*, and that he is a *Rewarder*. But now how ſhall a Heathen Man believe that God is a Rewarder? By any Revelation of his? But that he is not yet ſuppoſed to admit. He muſt therefore conclude it by his own natural Reaſon, by conſidering the Idea and Nature of God, the τὸ γνωστὸν τῦ Θεῦ, that which may naturally be known of him, and how becoming it is for ſo excellent a Being to reward thoſe who apply themſelves ſeriouſly and heartily to him.

Well then, if it be reasonable to believe upon the Stock of natural Principles that God is a Rewarder, without being assured of it by any Revelation (which is here supposed in the Heathen's Case) then it follows, that even antecedently to any Promise of God there is a great Congruity, tho not a strict Obligation that he should be a Rewarder. For otherwise what ground could the Heathen Man have so to Conclude or Believe? This Congruity therefore must of necessity be allowed, however apt some may be to startle at it, when the word *Merit* is put before it. This is *Prejudice*, but the thing it self as I have here stated and explained it, is both innocent and necessary to be granted. And if there be such a Congruity that God should be a Rewarder in general, then by the same Proportion it follows that he should dispense his Rewards according to the Degrees of Virtue. There being certainly at least as much Congruity in this as in the other.

And besides this, there is no reason to question but that the *Goodness* of God

God which in it ſelf is infinite, and which is already ſuppoſed to exert it ſelf ſo liberally as to reward the little and defective Services of a ſhort Life with Eternal Glories, will alſo be ſo conſiſtent with it ſelf, as to reward thoſe moſt, who have preſſed forward to the higheſt Degrees of Sanctity. And were it not for this, I do not ſee what incouragement there is for Men to *Excel* in Virtue, which yet the Goodneſs of God obliges us to ſuppoſe. For what ſhould move a Man to be eminently good, conſidering how difficult it is to be ſo, and how little recompens'd in this World, if it were not in order to a greater Reward hereafter?

If it be ſaid, that the leaſt Degree of Glory is a ſufficient incouragement for the greateſt Degree of Virtue; I grant it is ſo, were that greateſt Degree of Virtue the neceſſary Condition of it, without which the leaſt Glory could not be obtain'd. But ſince leſs will ſuffice for that (as muſt be admitted, unleſs you will ſay that all glorified Saints are equally good and vertuous) I do not ſee how there can be ſufficient In-

Incouragement for higher Attainments, but only upon the Supposition of greatest Rewards. Which therefore from the Goodness as well as Justice of God there is good Reason to conclude.

Thirdly and lastly, From Principles of Reason I appeal to Holy Scripture, which I think will be found to speak as fully and plainly to this purpose as may reasonably be desired. For there we
Rom. 2. 6. find that *God will render to every man according to his deeds.* And again, that *every one shall receive the things done in*
2 Cor. 5. 10. *his Body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.* And lest this should be refer'd to the general Distribution of Rewards and Punishments, more expressly it is said, that *he that*
2 Cor. 9. 6. *sows sparingly shall reap also sparingly,* and that *he that sows bountifully shall reap also bountifully.* The same again is expressly represented under the Parable of the *Talents* committed to the ma-
Luke 19. nagement of Servants, who were severally rewarded according to their several Improvements. And tho Parables are not allowed to conclude *throughout*, yet certainly as to the thing directly and purposely intended by them

them they are as conclusive as any other Forms of Speech, which in this Parable must be the different Dispensation of Rewards hereafter or nothing. Again, the Scripture mentions different Seats of Glory, *In my Father's house are many Mansions*, says our Saviour, that is, Mansions of distinct Ranks and Orders; For 'twould have been but a small piece of News for our Saviour to have told his Disciples, that in Heaven there were a great many Mansions in number. Nor would this be so suitable to the Introduction of his Discourse, *Let not your hearts be troubled.* Joh. 14. 2.

Again, we read of particular Rewards belonging to Men of particular Characters, as of a *Prophet's Reward*, and a *Righteous Man's Reward. He that receives a Prophet in the name of a Prophet shall receive a Prophet's Reward*, says our Saviour. Why a Prophet's Reward, if there be not some special Reward assign'd to a Prophet? And again, tis plainly intimated that every Degree, and every Act of Virtue shall have its proper Recompence, where 'tis said, *Whosoever shall give to drink* Mat. 10. 41.

*unto*

*unto one of these little ones a Cup of cold*
Mat. 10. 42. *Water only in the Name of a Disciple, shall in no wise lose his Reward.* To which purpose there is also a very express place in the *Proverbs*, *He that hath pity on the poor, lendeth unto the*
Prov. 19. 17. *Lord, and look what he layeth out, it shall be paid him again.* Where there is a Reward promised not only to Charity in general, but to every Degree of it. And if every Degree of Virtue shall be particularly rewarded, it evidently follows that the greater our Virtues are, the more abundant shall be our Reward, otherwise some Degrees of Virtue would go unrewarded, contrary to the Supposition.

To this it may be added, that a greater Degree of Blessedness is every where attributed to Patriarchs, Prophets and Apostles, &c. when their Glorification is expressed by their *Sitting down* in the Kingdom of God, and that of other Saints, by their sitting down with them, in allusion to the Eastern manner of Feasting. This Priviledge of a more eminent Seat is particularly assigned to *Abraham*, *Isaac* and *Jacob* by our Saviour, when he

tells us that *Many shall come from the East and the West, and shall sit down with* Abraham Isaac *and* Jacob *in the Kingdom of Heaven.* And so again to the Apostles, *Verily I say unto you, that ye which have followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit in the Throne of his Glory, ye also shall sit upon Twelve Thrones.* It cannot be denied but that this is meant of the Apostles only, and not of his Disciples at large, because of the Twelve Thrones. And why should Twelve of them only be specified, if they were not to be Thrones of an higher Order? Or what *Extraordinary* would our Saviour have promised to his Disciples? And this is further confirmed by St. *John*, who in the Description of the Heavenly *Jerusalem*, makes the twelve Apostles the Foundations of the City. *And the Wall of the City* (says he) *had twelve Foundations, and in them the Names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb.* A place exactly parallel to that of the Twelve Thrones.

Mat. 8. 11.

Mat. 19. 28.

Rev. 21. 14.

To dispatch all in a word, the Condition of Saints in Glory is expressed in Scripture by their being *made like unto*

Matt. 22. 30 *like unto the Angels*; and 'tis of it self reasonable to think that the same General Order and Proportion shall be observ'd in both these Sons of God, *Angels* and *Men*. But now 'tis most certain that the Angels have their different Orders and Hierarchies, being distinguish'd into Thrones and Dominions, Principalities and Powers, and into Angels and Arch-Angels, and that some of them sit nearer to the Throne of God than others. Whereupon the *Talmudists* call *Michael* the Arch-Angel, *The Prince of Faces*, or the Prince of the Presence, being (as they say) so near to the King of Heaven, as to be admitted to sit down by him, and register the good Actions of the *Israelites*. And says the Angel *Gabriel* of himself, *I am* Gabriel *that stand*

Luke 1. 19. *in the presence of God*. He distinguishes himself as much by his *Station* as by his *Name*. And the Vision of *Isaiah* represents one of the Angelic Orders covering their Faces with their Wings, which supposes them to be nearer than Ordinary to the Presence of God, so as not to be able to abide the Glory of it, without the help of a *Veil*.

Since

Since therefore there is such a Variety in the Angelical Stations, and our future Condition is generally represented by theirs, this alone were enough to put us upon thinking that our Glorification must admit of the like gradual Diversity. And 'tis no more than what natural Order and Decency seems to require, that the Members of Christ's Mystical Body should retain the same Diversity in the other World that St. *Paul* ascribes to them in this, that there should still be an *Eye* and an *Hand*, an *Head* and a *Foot*, more Honourable and less Honourable Parts: Whereof the Natural Heaven exhibits a very convenient Emblem, in which one Star differs from another Star in Glory. And after all, tho there were no plain Proof to be had for this, yet there is such an obvious Congruity in the thing as would *convince* where it could not *silence*. And I believe there is no Man, tho never so forward to raise Objections against what has been contended for, and to equalize the Glories of Heaven (for the other World has its *Levellers* as well as this) that could yet obtain

1 Cor. 12.

obtain Leave of his own Modesty to expect as bright a Crown as the *Virgin Mary*, or St. *Paul*.

Having thus far asserted the different Degrees of Glory, which I have the longer insisted upon, because 'tis a very *practical* as well as *notional* Theory, being of great consequence to the encouragement of Heroic Goodness, I come now to consider the second thing proposed, that one of the Highest Degrees of Glory shall be the Reward of those who suffer Persecution for the sake of Righteousness, that is, of *Martyrs*. And here for the Eviction of this, having already shewn that there are Degrees of Glory in proportion to the degrees or Vertue, I think 'twill suffice to shew that Martyrdom is one of the highest Degrees of Vertue. For the Argument reduced to Form will stand thus:

An higher Degree of Vertue shall have an higher Degree of Glory.

But Martyrdom is an higher Degree of Vertue.

There

Therefore Martyrdom shall have an higher Degree of Glory.

The first Proposition is what we have been proving hitherto. To infer the Conclusion therefore there needs only a Proof of the second. Here therefore my business shall be to give a short representation of the Excellency of *Martyrdom.*

The Honour of Martyrdom was so great in the Primitive Church, that even the Commonness of it, which depretiates every thing else, could not diminish from its Veneration. It was then thought of so great Excellence, as to supply the room of Baptism, and the new Convert, whose early and sudden execution prevented his solemn Admission into the Christian Church, was yet esteemed a very good Member of Christ's Mystical Body, and number'd with his best Saints in Glory everlasting. The same Honour to Martyrs made them chuse their Tombs for the places of their Devotion; and God himself was pleased to signalize his special regard to these his Saints;

St. Jerom against Vigilantius, Book 4.

and to shew how precious their Death was in his sight, by making the places of their Rest the Stage of his Miracles.

Nor is there any thing in all this more strange and extraordinary, than the Excellency of the Vertue it self which was thus honoured. A general representation of which is thus given by the Pen of a Celebrated Writer of the Roman Church. A Church which, by the way, has made more Martyrs, and has fewer than any in the World. But she has dealt long enough in Blood, to be able to form an Idea of Martyrdom from the Martyrs which she has made. *We see* (says one of her Sons) *nothing in the Church more noble than Martyrdom. 'Tis the highest form of Vertue, the last Expression of Charity; and when a Man has shed his Blood and parted with his Life for Jesus Christ, there is not any instance that can further be expected from his Love. Justly therefore may we acknowledge nothing more August in Religion than Martyrs. They are the Heroes of Christianity, the gallant Men of this State, the Noblest Parts of this mystical Body. There is no greatness that gives not way to their Dignity;*

Monsieur Senault Christian Man. p. 336.

*Dignity; whatever we admire is below their worth, and according to the Opinion of one of the wiſeſt Fathers of the Church* (he means St. *Cyprian*) *'tis more to be a Martyr than to be an Apoſtle. Neither hath any thing been ever more Honour'd in the World. Heaven hat wrought an hundred Miracles to diſcover their Innocence, wild Beaſts have reſpected them, the Flames have ſpared their Garments, Tyrants have admired them, and many times their Executioners have become their Diſciples, in ſo much that theſe renowned Champions had great reaſon to be afraid of Vain-glory, at the ſame time that God deliver'd them from Sorrow.* The Deſcription is handſom and elegant, but what *they Deſcribe*, they have left to *our Church* to *Practiſe*.

But more particularly and diſtinctly, to take the juſt *Height* of the Excellency of Martyrdom, we muſt firſt lay down a Meaſure whereby the Excellency of any Vertue is to be eſtimated. Now the Excellency of any Vertue may be meaſured either from the *Goodneſs* of the Object will'd, or from the Degree of *willing* it. And

two Persons that are equally Vertuous with respect to the good that is will'd, may yet be very unequally so with respect to the Degree of Willing, because one may will the same Good, and the same degree of Good more intensely and affectionately than the other. Thus for instance, *Virginity* may be said to be more excellent than a Conjugal Life, and that though you do suppose the States themselves to be equally Pure, because 'tis harder to preserve Virginal than Conjugal Chastity: So that tho the Degrees of Purity be supposed the same in both States; yet because they are more strongly will'd in the one than in the other, the Virgin may be said to be more pure than the Conjugated Person; not perhaps as a Lover of greater Purity, but as a stronger and more pertinacious Lover of the *same*, which he adheres to under more disadvantagious Circumstances.

And this I take to be the Case of *Martyrdom*, whose general Excellency above other Virtues consists in the Degree of Inclination or Adhesion to good, which in the Martyr is supposed to

to be so strong as to determin him rather to suffer death, and the utmost Extremity of it, than to transgress what he knows to be his Duty. And indeed if we consider how sweet Life is, and how naturally averse we are to Death even in the most easy, much more under the most terrifying Circumstances, it must needs be a very strong and peremptory adhesion to Virtue that shall ingage a Man to quit his Life rather than his Innocence, and Dye rather than Offend.

But to be more particular yet. To recommend the Excellency of Martyrdom there is a Concurrence of the greatest Virtues. The most eminent of which (for 'twere endless to reckon up all) are the greatest *Faith*, the greatest *Love*, and the greatest *Courage*.

First, The greatest *Faith*. There is indeed no Faith like the Faith of a Martyr. This is that Faith which overcomes the World, and all that is terrible in it; That Faith to which all things are possible and nothing difficult, and that removes *Fear*, which

is more than to remove *Mountains*. This is that Faith which is more especially the Substance of things hoped for, and the Argument or Demonstration of things not seen. This noble Definition of Faith is never so fully verify'd as in the Faith of a Martyr. This is that Faith that turns the End of the *Perspective*, and shortens the interval of Time, and makes the future World present, and represents Heaven open, and the Son of Man standing on the Right Hand of God ready to defend, and receive, and reward those that will be content to indure the Cross, and despise both the Shame and the Pain of it for his sake. And all this with such certainty and fulness of Perswasion, that 'tis ready to change its Nature, through too much Evidence, and to cease to be any longer Faith, and commence Science or Revelation. For indeed nothing less than this, than such a full down-bearing Perswasion can well inable a Man to drink off this bitter Cup, and to be *Baptized* at this *Bloody Font*. It must certainly be a strange Degree of Affiance and Confidence which that Man has in God, who can resign up all that is good and

pleasant,

pleaſant, and ſubmit himſelf to all that is evil and terrible in this World, and meet Death with all its Natural and Artificial Terrors, and truſt God for his Reward in another Life. What a generous, victorious Faith is this! and what a noble Idea muſt ſuch a perſon have of God! The Faith of *Abraham* is highly celebrated in Scripture for his readineſs to offer up his Son at the Command of God. And no doubt 'twas a very rare and extraordinary Faith that could reconcile him to ſuch an unnatural undertaking. But certainly the Faith of a Martyr is very much beyond this, as much as 'tis an higher act of Reliance to truſt God with ones own Soul, and for ones Eternal Happineſs, than for a Poſterity to inherit a promiſed Land.

Secondly, The greateſt *Love*. There is indeed no Love like the Love of a Martyr. This is that Love which is properly ſtronger than Death, and which is ſo perfect as to caſt out or overcome all Fear. This is a Degree of Love truly *Seraphick*, and which comes the neareſt of any to the Love of Angels and beatify'd Spirits. If

there be any such thing as Seraphic Love in the World, this is it. Not only because 'tis bright and flaming, noble and generous, but because 'tis a Love that gets above all the Bodily Passions, silences all the motions of the lower Life, and makes the Man act as if he were all Soul and Mind. More particularly, Martyrdom is the greatest Love of *Virtue*, and the greatest Love of *God*.

First, Martyrdom is the greatest Love of *Virtue*, because that is valued at a higher rate than Life it self, which the Martyr will rather lose than Sin. Our Saviour makes it the greatest Instance and Argument of Friendship, for a Man to lay down his Life for his Friend. And so doubtless it is. For 'tis then plain that the Man sets a greater value upon his Friend, than he does upon Life. And the like may be said of the Martyr, that he sets a higher value upon Virtue, than he does upon Life, which yet is so dear that (as one observes, who for our safety too well understands the secret Springs and Inclinations of Human Nature) *all that a man has will he give for it.* And yet this

Job 2. 4.

this very Life for which a Man will give all things, is by the Martyr given as a Sacrifice to his Innocence.

Secondly, Martyrdom is the greatest Love of *God*, because the Martyr sets so high a Price upon him, that he will chuse rather to die than forfeit the enjoyment of his Favour and Blessedness, and may truly say with the Psalmist, *Thy loving kindness is better than Life.* Psal. 63. 4. 'Tis an easie thing for a Man in a warm gusty fit of Devotion, when the Evil day is far off, and no probable danger of any competition between his Religion and his Life, to say that he sets a greater Value upon the loving Kindness of God than upon Life. You know who did so. *Tho I should die with thee, yet I will not deny thee*, that is, (to reduce the Words to a more Logical Order) I would rather die than deny thee. This is easily said, but not so easily done, as the Event too sadly shew'd. But he that says he values the loving Kindness of God more than Life, and dies rather than forfeit it, may be believ'd. For what greater Love can there be than this, or what higher Instance or Tryal of it? The greatest

greatest Love of God was to die for Man. God could not signalize his Love to Man by any higher instance than by dying for him; and the greatest Love of Man is to die for God.

Thirdly, The greatest *Courage*. For there is also no Courage like the Courage of a Martyr. He fears no Evil but only Sin and Damnation, which are just and reasonable Objects of Fear, and will undergo any other Evils to avoid these, which is the truest and the greatest Courage. For where is there any like it? I would not have the Man of Honour or Duelist, of all the Pretenders to Courage in the World, offer at a Competition here. For 'tis most certain that he abuses the notion of Courage as well as that of Honour. His Courage is to dare to sin and be damn'd, that he may avoid the Reproach of Cowardize, that is, not to fear and avoid what with all possible concern he should, and to fear and avoid what he should not. And if this be *Courage*, I must then confess that I do not know what is *Cowardise*.

But

But neither may the *Military* Man be a Competitor here. 'Tis I confess great and brave for a Man in a just and laudable Cause, for the Defence of his Prince and Country, to fall a Sacrifice at the Head of an Army. And the *Herald*'s Office supposes as much. But there are also some Allays that qualifie the Glory even of this Action. For the Man is supposed to be engaged with Multitudes and Numbers, which *incourage* as well as *defend*; and to fight in a Heat, when his Spirits are raised, and his Blood runs high, so as scarce to be able to feel a Shot or a Stab that shall be given him, and to want Opportunity of Retreat, and to be kept from reflecting upon his Danger by Noise, Tumult and Confusion, and to have the Spur of Emulation, and the Incentive of Anger, sometimes of Hatred and Revenge; and which is more than all the rest, the Hopes of a safe come off at last. Believe me, this goes a great way, and I question whether among those that venture themselves in War, one of ten thousand would do so, if he knew before-hand that he should certainly die in the Field. But now to have a Man go alone

alone and in cold Blood to the *Stake*, or to the *Scaffold*; When in every Period of his Advance 'tis still in his Power by compliance to recede from his dreadful undertaking, and there calmly and deliberately submit himself to *certain* Execution, and *feel himself die* with all his Thoughts, Reflections and Passions about him; this is Courage indeed, and such a Noble Spectacle as might well deserve to be a *Theatre* to Angels and Men, yea even to God himself.

These are some of those great things that illustrate the excellency of Martyrdom, and shew it to be one of the highest Degrees of Vertue, and consequently that it is intitled to an higher Degree of Glory: Which the Scripture also expressly makes to be the Portion of Martyrs, who are said to *indure tortures, and not to accept of deliverance, that they might obtain a better Resurrection.* A Better Resurrection, that is, a Resurrection to a Better State of Happiness, that being the only Measure whereby one Resurrection may be said to be Better than another. And says the Angel to St. *John* concerning

Heb. 11.

cerning those who are clothed with white Robes, and had Palms in their Hands, *These are they which came out of great Tribulation, and have wash'd their Robes, and made them white in the Blood of the Lamb. Therefore are they before the Throne of God, and serve him day and night in his Temple. And he that sitteth on the Throne shall dwell among them.* Rev. 7. 14.

And now since there is a brighter Crown of Glory prepared for Martyrs, and those that suffer Persecution for the sake of Righteousness, all that further remains is to commend from the Premises these two Practical Inferences,

First, That we entertain no hard Thoughts of the Justice or Goodness of God for suffering so many severe Persecutions in the Christian Church, some whereof were violent, as under the Roman Emperors; some Fraudulent by Hereticks, as *Arius*, *Nestorius*, &c. And some of a mixt nature, consisting both of Fraud and Violence, when both Temporal and Spiritual Power did combine together (as now

as now in the Papal See) against the Lord and his Christ. I say we should learn from hence not to censure the ways of God for this, nor to *charge him foolishly*, since there is so plentiful a Reward laid up for those that suffer in the Cause of Righteousness.

Secondly, That we so fortifie our selves with the Consideration of this Beatitude, That if God should ever honour us so far as to call us to the Trial of the Cross, we may be so true to God, to Religion, and to our own Souls, as to suffer couragiously and thankfully, ever looking up to that glorious *Crown*, that *white Robe*, and those *Triumphant Palms* which distinguish the Noble Army of Martyrs, who eternally sing Hymns of Praise to God for the Blessing of those Crosses, which now spring up into Crowns, and in bearing of which they find so great Reward

*Glory be to God on High.*

## *The Concluſion of the Whole, in a Diſcourſe concerning the* Beatitudes *in general.*

HAving hitherto Diſcourſed upon every Beatitude particularly by it ſelf, I think it may not be improper for the further Accompliſhment of this Work, to conclude all with a Diſcourſe concerning the Beatitudes in General. Where there are three Material Enquiries that ſeem to demand Satisfaction.

The Firſt is, Concerning the Manner and Way of this Divine Sermon, Why our Lord choſe to deliver his Laws and Precepts by the way of *Bleſſing?*

The Second is, Concerning the Number of the Beatitudes.

The Third is, Concerning their Order and Method.

For

For Satisfaction to the first Enquiry, I consider first, That Christ who came into the World upon an *Errand* of *Love*, the greatest Love that an infinitely good God could express to a Creature, and who no doubt had also a Soul well tuned, and a Body well temper'd, and both set to the softest Key of Harmony and Sweetness, was willing to deliver his Laws in the most *indearing* and charming manner that could possibly be, that he might the better recommend both *Himself* and his *Doctrin* to the good Will of his Auditors, and reconcile them thro the Love of the *Former*, to the Obedience of the *Latter*. Which is a very laudable affectation of *Popularity*, first to engage Men's Affections to our *Persons*, that we may the better win them over to the Acceptance and Entertainment of our *Doctrins*. This indeed ought to be the Care and Endeavour of all Preachers; but there was this more particular reason for it in our Lord, because the Love of *his* Person was not only an *Indearment* of Obedience, but also a very considerable *part* and instance of it. He therefore instead of using

uſing an *Imperative* Style, by downright commanding ſuch and ſuch things, choſe rather in a more gentle and condeſcending way to inſinuate what was *his* Will, and *our* Duty, by pronouncing them *Bleſſed* that do ſo and ſo.

Secondly, I conſider that our Lord Chriſt being to act the *Counter-part* to *Moſes*, and to relax the rigour of his Law, by being the Author of a milder Diſpenſation, thought fit to give an early and a ſolemn Specimen of his greater Mildneſs, by varying the Style of his Legiſlation from that uſed by *Moſes*. And therefore whereas *Moſes* deliver'd his Law after an *Imperatorial* way, by ſaying, *Thou ſhalt not* do this, and *Thou ſhalt not* do that: Our Good Lord choſe rather to expreſs his Law more tenderly and *Humanly*, by declaring the *Bleſſedneſs* of thoſe that ſhould obſerve it. And the rather becauſe *Moſes* had arm'd and immured his Law with *Curſes* and *Maledictions*. Firſt in General, *Curſed is every one that continues not in all things which are written in the Book of the Law to do them.* Secondly, more particularly, by annexing a Curſe

as particular Transgressions, as in that famous Commination in the 27 of *Deuteronomy*, to every Clause of which the People were to say *Amen*. And therefore to shew of what a different *Spirit* the Christian Institution was from that of *Moses*, our Lord chose to administer his Law in a form of *Blessing*, in Opposition to *Moses* his *Cursings*; thereby verifying those farewel words of St. Peter's Sermon to the Jews, in a larger sense than he intended them, *God having raised up his Son Jesus, sent him to bless you, in turning away every one of you from his Iniquities.* Acts 3. 26.

Thirdly, I consider that our Saviour was to deliver a *Law* of *Love*, a Law that required Love both as the *Matter* and as the *Principle* of Obedience. Love was both the *thing* to be done, and the *Manner* of doing it. The Son of God was to be the great Prophet of Love. 'Twas reserved for him, as being the *Express Image* of him who is Love it self, and therefore the only Master fit to teach it. This was the Fire which he came to *kindle upon Earth*, the most ardent and affectionate Love towards God and towards Men. Luk. 12. 49.

Men. This was to be the Substance and Accomplishment of his Law, and the distinguishing Badge of those that profes'd Devotion to it. *By this shall all Men know that ye are my Disciples*, &c. But now 'twould not have been agreeable for a Law of Love to begin its recommendation from such Arguments as should work upon the more *Servile* part of Man. *Moses* indeed deliver'd his Law with all the Circumstances and Arguments of *Fear*, and the Nature of his Law required such an Address, but 'twas fit that a Law of Love should come recommended to the World by Motives of *Love*.

Fourthly and Lastly, It may be further considered that this solemn Instruction of our Lord upon the Mount consisted of Precepts. So very sublime and elevated, and withal so strange and unusual, as having had not Credit, if Reception, in the World before, that 'twas but necessary for the Prevention of Prejudice to set a Beatitude in the *Front* of every Duty, and to bribe the Passions of the Hearers with a forward Anticipation of Happiness, lest Men should say of the *Commands*

of Christ, as the Prophet brings them in saying of his *Person*, that *there is no Form nor Comeliness, nor Beauty in them that we should desire them.* Isa. 53. 2.

For these and other like Reasons that may be added, our Divine and gracious Lawgiver was pleased to deliver his Laws rather by asserting the *Blessedness* than the *Obligation* of them. Which while I consider, I cannot but enter into a profound Admiration of the strange Goodness and Condescension of our Lord, that he should so far lay aside the Majesty of a *God* and a *Lawgiver*, that he might the better act the part of a *Friend* and of a *Redeemer*. And to set this Consideration the more home upon our Minds, let us by the aids of Fancy draw the Curtains of this Intellectual Scene, and imagin to our selves that we saw our Saviour seated upon the *Mount of Blessing*, with his Eyes devoutly set towards Heaven, and his Hands affectionately stretch'd forth over the adoring and attentive Multitude, and with Looks full of concern for the good of Souls, gravely and pathetically distilling down upon them the Dew of his Heavenly Doctrin and

and tempering his Authority with the Style of Goodness and Kindness, as well as his Divinity with the Veil of Flesh. Who can with sufficient Wonder contemplate so pleasing a Scene of Love and Sweetness! And who, that well contemplates it, can find in his Heart to transgress a Law delivered with so much Condescension, or offend a Lawgiver so infinitely, so amazingly good!

Now concerning the *Number* of the Beatitudes, why our Lord should assign *Eight* and no more, 'tis not easie to offer what shall satisfie all Minds. Were I minded to amuse my Reader, I could tell him that in the *Mystic Philosophy* 8 is the Number of Justice and Fulness, because it is first of all divided into Numbers equally even, namely into 2 Fours, which Division again is by the same reason made into 2 times 2, that is, 2 times 2 twice reckon'd. And by reason of this Equality of Divisions it received the Name of *Justice*. But I do not believe our Saviour intended any *Rosie-Crucian Mystery* in this matter, tho a certain Gentleman of that Order would fain

Mr. Heydon Rosie-Crucian *Infallible Axioms.* Pag. 73.

insinuate that he did, reckoning this among other Observations upon the Number 8. that there are 8 kinds of Blessed Men in the lesser World, *The Poor in Spirit, the Mourners, the Meek, they that hunger and thirst after Righteousness*, &c. But I think all that can here be warrantably and safely said is, that our Saviour intending (as he signify'd by his Ascent into the Mount) a Discourse of Perfection and Excellence, consisting of such Divine Vertues as were most perfective of Human Nature, and for the Practice of which he himself was most exemplary, was by his Design concern'd to instance only in the most select and excellent Duties both to God and Man. Whereupon premising Humility, as being a Duty common to both, and withal the Foundation of all the rest, he found remaining three extraordinary Duties relating to Man, *Meekness, Mercifulness* and *Peaceableness*; and four to God, *Mourning for Sin, Hungring and thirsting after Righteousness, Purity of Heart, and Suffering of Persecution for Conscience Sake.* So that our Saviour seems rather to have been directed by a natural Measure, and to take

take things as he found them, should proceed by any Arbitrary Measure of his own. And this I think is the only ground of his assigning only the Beatitudes, and not that he had any *Fondness* to the *Number* it self.

Then lastly, as to the *Order* of the Beatitudes, Dr. *Hammond* in his *Practical Catechism* remarks two things. First, That the Grace first named is a general Principal Grace, and the Foundation of all the rest, in which there shews in particular. Secondly, That there is an interchangeable Mixture of these Graces, one towards God, and another towards Man, so interweaved, that the first respects God, the next Man, the next God again, till you come to the last which respects God again. To Verify which Remark, he begins his Computation not from *Humility*, which is a general Fundamental Grace, but from *Mourning*, which is the first particular one, and respecting God. So that the First and the Last both respect God, who is the true *Alpha* and *Omega*, the First and the Last, and those between divide between our Neighbour and God. To teach us that to God belongs

Pag. 114.

belongs the chief, the *First* and the *Last* of our Love, and that our Neighbour is to be regarded after and in subordination to God. To this I further add, that there is also a gradual and descending connexion between all the Beatitudes, the latter still depending upon the former, as well as all the rest upon the first. For from Humility 'tis an easie descent to Mourning. When a Man takes a just Survey of his own Nothingness and Unworthiness by contemplating himself as a Creature and a Sinner, 'twill be so natural for him to mourn and be sorrowful, that the danger is of being overwhelm'd with too much Sorrow. Then from Mourning 'tis easie to advance to Meekness, it being one of the chief Properties of Sorrow to soften and melt down the Spirit, which when meekly disposed, will also be in a fair disposition to Hungring and Thirsting after Righteousness. *The Wrath of Man worketh not the Righteousness of God*, says the Apostle, that is, is no way a Friend to the promoting of Righteousness; whence on the contrary we may gather, that Meekness is a Friend to Righteousness. As it

must

must needs be, since a calm and sedate Soul is most fit for attending to the *Beauty* of *Holiness*, and for admitting the *Spirit* of *Holiness*, which as the Jews say, will not rest upon a *turbulent Mind*. And when once the Soul is wrought up to a quick and lively relish of what is Good and Righteous, 'tis then an easie step to Mercifulness, it being a very just and Righteous thing to shew Mercy. Which also leads a Man to Purity of Heart, as that without which even Mercy it self will not find Mercy. From whence the very next step is to Peaceableness, to which nothing more conduces than a Pure Heart, free from those Lusts and Sensual Affections which are the Seeds of Strife and Contention. And when a Man has attain'd to a peaceable temper, then is he fit for the greatest thing in the World, to be a Martyr, and will readily suffer Persecution rather than occasion any Disturbance either in the Church or State, and with the generous Prophet be content to be thrown overboard to appease the Tempest. So admirably well contrived and full of Order was our Saviour's Discourse, as it became him who

who was the Wisdom of God, as well as the Light of Men, and in whom were *hid all the Treasures of Wisdom and Knowledge.*

Colos. 2.3.

All now that further remains, is that by a strict Conformity to these Excellent Measures of Christian Perfection we endeavour to bring our selves within the Number of these Blessed Persons, whom our Saviour pronounces Happy here, and to whom he will say in a more Emphatical Accent, *Come ye Blessed*, hereafter.

THE END.

Cursory

# CURSORY REFLECTIONS
UPON A
# BOOK
CALL'D, AN
# ESSAY
CONCERNING
*Human Understanding.*

---

Written by *JOHN NORRIS*, M.A. Rector of *Newton St. Loe* in *Somersetshire*, and Late Fellow of *All-Souls Colledge* in *Oxford.*

---

In a Letter to a Friend.

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*LONDON*,
Printed for *S. Manship* at the *Black Bull* over against the *Royal Exchange* in *Cornhil*, 1692.

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*Cursory Reflections upon a Book call'd*
An Essay concerning Human Understanding.

*SIR*,

YOU obliged me so highly by acquainting me with the Publication of so rare a Curiosity as Mr. *Lock*'s Book, that should I dispute your Commands when you desire my Opinion of it, I should hazard the Credit of my *Gratitude*, as much as by my ill discharging them I am like to do that of my *Judgment*. This, Sir, already reduces me to an even Poise. But to this the just Authority you have over me, and the Right your other Obligations give you to all the Service I can do, being added, and thrown into the Scale, do quite weigh it down, and leave no room for any Deliberation, whether I should obey you or no. Without therefore any further Demur or Delay I shall apply my self to the Task

Task you ſet me, in giving you my *Free Cenſure* of Mr. *Lock*'s Eſſay, which I ſhall do by reflecting upon what I think moſt liable to Exception in the Author, Order as the things lie before me.

Introduct. Pag. 1. Sect. 1. *The Underſtanding like the Eye, whileſt it makes us ſee and perceive all other things, takes no notice of it ſelf.* What the ingenious Author intends in this Period, or how to make out any conſiſtent Senſe of it, I do not underſtand. For if his meaning be, That the Underſtanding while it is intent upon other things, cannot at that time take notice of it ſelf; this comes to no more, than that when 'tis intent upon one thing it cannot attend to another, which is too eaſily and obviouſly true of all *Finite* Powers to be any great Diſcovery. But if his meaning be (as it rather ſeems, becauſe of the Particle (All) and the Compariſon here uſed) that the Underſtanding like the Eye, tho it makes us ſee all other things, yet it takes no notice of it ſelf, then 'tis a Contradiction to his whole following Work, which upon this Suppoſition muſt needs be very *unaccountably* undertaken.

Intro-

Introduct. Pag. 2. Sect. 3. *First I shall enquire into the Original of those Ideas which a Man observes*, &c. But sure by all the Laws of Method in the World, he ought *first* to have Defined what he meant by Ideas, and to have acquainted us with their *Nature*, before he proceeded to account for their Origination. For how can any Proposition be form'd with any certainty concerning an Idea, that it is or is not *Innate*, that it does or does not come in at the Senses, before the meaning of the Word Idea be stated, and the nature of the thing, at least in general, be understood? If the Nature of Ideas were but once made known, our Disputes would quickly be at an end concerning their Original, whether from the Senses or not: But till that be done, all further Discourse about them is but to talk in the *Dark*. This therefore ought to have been his *first*, and indeed *main* Business to have given us an account of the Nature of Ideas. And yet this is not only neglected in its proper place, but wholly omitted and passed over in deep silence; which

I cannot but remark, as a *Fundamental* defect in this Work.

In the three following Chapters our Author sets himself to prove that there are no *Innate Principles*. But before I consider whether there be or no, I premise this double Remarque. First, That a thing may be false in it self, and yet not so because, or in vertue of such an Argument. Secondly, That tho a thing be really false, yet it may not become such a Man to deny the Existence of it, who by some other Principles of his may be obliged to hold the contrary. The first of these argues the Writer guilty of *Inconsequence*. The Second of *Inconsistency*. Upon both which Accounts this otherwise very ingenious Writer seems in this part to be chargeable. Which from the Sequel I leave to be collected.

His First Argument against *Innate Principles* is taken from the want of Universal Consent. *There are*, (says he, Pag. 5. Sect. 4. *No Principles to which all Mankind give an universal Assent.* But in the first place how can this Au-

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thor say so, since in several places afterwards he resolves that ready and prone Assent which is given to certain Propositions upon the first Proposal, into the *Self-evidence* of them? There are then even according to him *Self-evident* Propositions. And will he say that Self-evident Propositions are not universally assented to? How then are they Self-evident? There must be therefore, according to him, some Principles to which all Mankind do give an universal Consent. I do not say that this proves them *Innate*, but only that there are such Propositions.

Well, but how does he prove there are no such? why, he instances in some of the most Celebrated, and says *pag.* 5. *Sect.* 5. that *All Children and Idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them; and the want of that is enough to destroy universal consent.* Now I always thought that Universality of Consent had been sufficiently secured by the Consent of all, and the Dissent of none that were capable of either. And what then have we to do with *Idiots* and *Children*? Do any or all of these *Dissent* or think otherwise? No,

that he will not say, because they think not at all, having (as he says) not the *least Apprehension* or *Thought of them*. And how then does the want of their Suffrage destroy universal Consent, when all Persons that think at all about such Propositions, think after one and the same way?

The most therefore that this Author can mean by want of Universal Consent, is that every individual Person does not *actually Assent*. This perhaps may be granted him from the Instance of *Infants* and *Children*. But then the Question will be about the *Consequence* of his Argument, whether Actual Assent from every Individual be necessary to the Supposition of *Innate Principles*? Or, in other Words, whether from there not being any Proposition to which every individual Man gives an actual Assent, it follows that there are no Innate Truths. The Author is of Opinion that it does. *For*, says he, *page* 5. Sect. 5. *It seems to me next a Contradiction to say, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or understands not.* And again in the same place, *To imprint any thing*

*on*

*on the Mind, without the Mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible.* And again, *p.* 12. Sect. 24. *That a Truth should be Innate, and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the same time.* Here we have both the *Consequence* of the Author, and the *Ground* upon which it stands. The Consequence is this. If there be no Truths actually perceiv'd by all Minds, then there are none naturally imprinted. The Proof of it is this. 'Tis impossible that what is imprinted on the Mind, should not be perceiv'd by the Mind. Therefore if there be no Truths actually perceiv'd by all Minds, there are none naturally imprinted. Now on the contrary to this I thus oppose. If there may be Impressions made on the Mind, whereof we are not conscious, or which we do not perceive, then (by the Authors own measure) the not perception of them is no Argument against such Original Impressions. The Consequence is unexceptionable, not only as clear in it self, but as being the very *Reverse* of the Author's own Argument. And now that there may be such Impressions whereof we are not Conscious, is what

the Author himself expressly does own, and what by his Principles he stands obliged to own.

First, 'tis what he does expressly own. For, says he, p. 38. Sect. 6. *Being surrounded with Bodies that perpetually and diversly affect us, variety of Idea's, whether care be taken about it or no, are imprinted on the minds of Children.* And yet they do not perceive them, as he had said before. Therefore by his own Confession there may be an Impression of Ideas where there is no Perception. The same he confesses again, p. 61. Sect. 4. *How often may a Man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is intently employ'd in the contemplation of some Objects, and curiously surveying some Ideas that are there, it takes no notice of Impressions,* &c. And again, Sect. 5. *I doubt not but Children by the exercise of their Senses about Objects that affect them in the Womb, receive some few Ideas before they are born,* &c. And if before they are born, then certainly before they are conscious of them. There may therefore be Impression without Consciousness. Which he also plainly implies in his Account of *Memory.*

*mory.* Which he does not make to be a recovery of Ideas that were *Lost*, but a Re-advertency or Re-application of Mind to Ideas that are actually there, tho' not attended to. *For*, says he, *p.* 65. Sect. 2. *The narrow mind of man not being capable of having many Ideas under View and Consideration at once, it was necessary to have a Repository, to lay up those Ideas, which at another time it might have use of.* And accordingly *p.* 66, Sect. 7. He calls them *Ideas which are lodg'd in the memory.* And *pag.* 67. Sect. 8. He calls them *Dormant Ideas.* So that according to him, to *remember* is to retrieve, not the Ideas themselves, (for they are supposed to be *Dormant* in the Mind) but only the *Perception* or Consciousness of them. This he makes to be the business of Memory, and therefore there may be an imprinting of Ideas without Actual Perception, which may now, it seems, stand well enough together without any danger of a *Contradiction.*

And to the Acknowledgment of this, his own Principles will also oblige him. For since in conformity to the *Aristotelian* Philosophy, he makes all

our Ideas to be derived from our Senſes, or rather by our Senſes from ſenſible Objects he muſt needs ſuppoſe (conſidering the variety of ſenſible Objects wherewith we are ſurrounded) that there are infinitely more Ideas impreſs'd upon our Minds than we can poſſibly attend to or perceive. Which may alſo be argued from the Finiteneſs of our Faculties, as was hinted in the beginning.

Well then, ſince there may be an Impreſſion of Ideas without any actual Perception of them, whether there be any *Innate Ideas* or no (which I ſhall not now diſpute) it does not therefore follow that there are none, becauſe they are not univerſally perceiv'd. Which utterly *ſilences* that Argument taken from the Non-perception of them in Children. And ſince our Author both does, and is by his Principles obliged to allow that there are many Ideas impreſs'd upon us when we have no actual Perception of them, it does not certainly become him, tho there were really no ſuch thing as *Innate Ideas*; and tho the Non-perception of them were an Argument againſt them,

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to bring this as an Argument against the Existence of any such, because they are not universally perceiv'd. This is not to agree with *himself*, however he may agree with *Truth*.

Our ingenious Author further argues against *Innate Principles* from the *Lateness* of the Perception of such which are presumed to be of that number, in that they are not the first that possess the Minds of Children: *Can it be imagin'd* (says he, *pag.* 13. Sect. 25.) *that they perceive the Impression from things without, and are at the same time ignorant of those Characters which Nature her self has taken care to stamp within?* This I take to be a very uncertain way of arguing, and of less Cogency than the Former. For if *Nullity* of Perception will not conclude against *Innate Principles*, much less will *the Lateness* of Perception be able to do it. And besides, there may be many Reasons drawn from the inward, and to us unknown Contexture of Minds, and from the manner of that Original Impression (if any such there be) which would also be to us equally unknown, besides the Order of External

Circumstances, that may be the Cause why these natural Characters may not be so soon read as some others. And therefore I do not see what sufficient ground the Author has for saying, Sect. 26 That *if there be any Innate Truths, they must necessarily be the first of any thought on.* Why? Where is the necessity? The Reason given by the Author is because, *If they are Innate Truths, they must be Innate Thoughts.* Are then Truths and Thoughts the same? Indeed Truth of the Subject is the same with a conformable Thought. But Truth of the Object is not the Thought it self, but that which is thought upon. And why then must Innate Truths be Innate Thoughts?

But our Author proceeds to another Argument wherein he places more Strength. *If*, says he, *pag.* 13. Sect. 27. *These Characters were native and Original Impressions, they would appear fairest and clearest in those Persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them.* He means in Children, who, he says, have no Reserves, no Arts of Concealment to hinder them from shining out in their full Lustre. But how does the

Author know but that this Natural Impreſſion may be ſo order'd that it ſhall not become legible till ſuch a certain Period of time, and without ſuch and ſuch Laws and Conditions? We know very well that we do not come to the uſe of Thinking in *general* till ſuch a certain Period of Time, and the Author himſelf confeſſes *Pag.* 12. *Sect.* 25. That *there is a time when Children begin to think*; And why then may there not be a time ſet for the ariſing of ſuch and ſuch particular Thoughts? And how can he tell that Childhood is that time? Or if it be, why do not the Ideas impreſſed by ſenſible Objects appear faireſt in Children for the ſame Reaſons? If there be any force in this Argument, the Authors own *Hypotheſis* is as much concern'd in it, as that which he would overthrow.

Come we now to his Arguments againſt *Innate Practical Principles*, the firſt of which is from their not being univerſally aſſented to. But what does he here mean by their not being univerſally conſented to? That they are not actually aſſented to by every Individual whether capable or not? Or that

that they are not consented to by all that judge any thing about them; If the former, that proves nothing, as we have shewn already; If the latter, then I deny the Proposition, and affirm that there are not only as *Certain* but as *Uncontested* Propositions in Morality as in any other Science. But one Author demands, *Pag.* 15. *Sect.* 2. *Where is that Practical Truth that is universally received?* I answer by referring him to the 274 Page of his own Book, where he says *Sect.* 18. That this Proposition, *Where there is no Property there is no Injustice*, is a Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in *Euclid*; I add, and as plain too. It needed nothing to assure the Truth of it but only the Explication of the Terms. And I further remarque that in the same place he says that Morality may be placed among the Sciences capable of Demonstration. Well then, if there may be Propositions demonstrated in Morality, then those Propositions must at last be resolved into *Principles evident* and *incontestable*. Since otherwise there can be no Demonstration. There are therefore incontestable Principles in Morality. And he

he confesses as much in expres terms; *I doubt not*, says he in the same place, *but from Principles as incontestable as those of the Mathematicks, by necessary Consequences, the measures of Right and Wrong might be made out to any one*, &c. Here he expressly owns incontestable Principles in Morality, that is, incontestable Truths, that is, Truths that cannot be denied, and therefore *must* be assented to. And how then can he with any tolerable *Self-Consistency* say that there are no Moral Principles universally consented to? If none are universally consented to, then all are by some contested. And yet he says there are in Morality incontestable Principles. How to adjust this I no more know, than he does to reconcile *Morality* and *Mechanism*.

His next Argument is, That *there cannot any one Moral Rule be proposed whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reason*, *Pag.* 16. *Sect.* 4. Well, what then? Therefore they are not *Innate*. I do not see the Consequence. Why may not the same Proposition be Innate, and yet deducible from Reason

ſon too, as well as the ſame Propoſition be the Object of both *Faith* and *Science*? Why may not Concluſions be Innate as well as Principles? Why may not God be ſuppoſed for a further Security of our Vertue to implant even thoſe Practical Propoſitions upon our Minds, which are alſo capable of being demonſtrated from Principles of Reaſon? Whether he has ſo done or, no I do not diſpute; I only ſay that their Dependence on Reaſon is no Argument that he has not.

He argues again, *Pag.* 18. *Sect.* 9. from Mens *tranſgreſſing* theſe Moral Rules with Confidence and Serenity, which he ſays they could not do, were they *Innate*. I do not apprehend here the leaſt Appearance of a Conſequence. Why may not an *Innate Law* be tranſgreſs'd as well as a *Written Law*? An Innate Law only dictates that ſuch a thing ought or ought not to be done, and ſo does a Written Law. He might therefore as well have concluded that there is no Written Law, becauſe it is Tranſgreſs'd, as that there is no Innate Law becauſe it is Tranſgreſs'd.

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The Author seems to have been sensible of the Weakness of this Argument, and therefore to strengthen it, says he, *Pag.* 19. *Sect.* 12. *The breaking of a Rule say you is no Argument that it is unknown: I grant it. But the generally allow'd Breach of it any where, is a Proof that it is not Innate.* Here I remark by the way that he grants that the Breaking of a Law does not prove it *not known*, and why then should it prove it not *Innate?* If a known Law may be transgressed, why may not an Innate Law; Innate being only another way of being known? But says he, *The generally allow'd Breach of it proves it not Innate.* I do not see the Necessity of this neither. The allow'd Breach of a Law is only a more aggravated Breach of it, and if the Breach of a Law does not prove it not to be Innate, why should the allow'd Breach of it do so? And besides, why may not an Innate Law be *Allowedly* broken, as well as a Written Law?

But says our Author, *Pag.* 21. *Sect.* 14. *Did Men find such Innate Propositions stamp'd*

*stamp'd on their Minds, they would be easily able to distinguish them from other Truths, and there would be nothing more easie than to know what and how many they were.* Perhaps not so very easie. For I see no absurdity in Supposing, and 'tis what I can very well conceive, that a Man may be sensible of a *Truth impress'd*, and yet not of the *Impression*, and so may not know that it is impress'd, but think it came some other way, and consequently may not be able to distinguish it from some other that does so. The truth of this may be seen in the Instance of *Inspiration*. Joh. 11.51. Since there have been Prophets (*Caiaphas* for one) who were not able to distinguish Divine Inspirations from their own proper genuin Thoughts: 'Tis therefore no Consequence to say that there are no Innate Principles, because we cannot distinguish them.

These are the main Arguments, and to which all that is further offered may be reduced, whereby this Author impugns the Doctrin of *Innate Principles*; and I think neither any nor all of them are sufficient for the Cause wherein they are ingaged. And I am so far from being

being surprized at their *Deficiency*, that I think it absolutely impossible for him or any Man else upon his Principles, to prove that there are no *Innate Truths*. For since with those of the Peripatetic School he allows that Ideas are impress'd upon the Mind from sensible Objects, he cannot (as another might) object against the *Possibility* of such Impressions. He cannot say they are capable only of a Figurative and Metaphorical Sense; since according to him the same is litterally and really done every Day, every Hour, every Minute. No, he must grant that 'tis possible there may be such Impressions. All the Question then will be concerning the *Timing* of it, whether any of these Impressions be Original Characters or no? And why may they not be at first as well as afterwards? How can he or any man else tell (upon his Principles) whether the Author of Nature has imprinted any such or no? Or whether we brought any with us into the World or no? However that be, I am satisfy'd 'tis impossible for any man that holds *Mental Impressions* to prove the contrary; especially if with that he allows

allows the Possibility of *Preexistence*, which I believe no considering Man will say is Impossible.

For my part, I do as little believe there are any such things as Innate Principles strictly and properly so called, meaning by them certain Original Characters written upon or interwoven with the Mind in the very first Moment of its Being and Constitution, I say I do as little believe this as the Author himself. Not for the Reasons by him alledged, with the Cogency of which I am not satisfy'd, but because I do not allow any such thing as *Mental Impressions*, or Characters written upon the mind, which if it pretend to any thing more than Figure and Metaphor, I take to be mere *Jargon*, and unintelligible *Cant*. You know Sir, I account for the Mode of *Humane Understanding* after a very different way, namely, by the Presentialness of the Divine λόγος or Ideal World to our Souls, wherein we see and perceive all things. For a fuller account of which I refer you to my *Reason* and *Religion*, and to my *Reflections* lately publish'd. I cannot there-

therefore by my Principles admit of any ſuch Innate Characters in a ſtrict and proper Senſe. Only I may, and am alſo inclined to admit ſomething of near Analogy with it. Suppoſing that God may and does exhibt ſome particular Truths of the *Ideal* World more early, more clearly, and more conſtantly to the view of the Soul than others, that by theſe ſhe may be the better directed to the Good of the Reaſonable Life, as Animals by ſenſitive Inſtincts and Inclinations are to the Good of Senſe. This is all that I conceive to be ſtrictly either *Poſſible* or *True* in that grey-headed venerable Doctrin of Innate or Common Principles.

Having thus far conſidered our Author's Impugnation of Innate Principles, I come now to examin the Original which he gives to *Ideas*. Theſe he derives *Book* 2. *Chap.* 1. from this double Fountain, *Senſation* and *Reflection*. Eſpecially from the Former, telling us again and again, that *the Senſes let in Ideas and furniſh the yet empty Cabinet*, Pag. 8. Sect. 15. That *the Senſes convey into the mind ſeveral di-*

*ſtinct Perceptions of things*, Pag. 37. Sect. 3. And that *the Senſes do furniſh the Soul with Ideas to think on*, Pag. 44. Sect. 20. with many other ſuch Expreſſions.

Theſe indeed are Pretty *Smiling* Sentences. But before we go a Step further I would willingly know of the Author what kind of things theſe Ideas are which are thus let in at the Gate of the Senſes. This indeed I expected an Account of in the beginning of the Work; but ſince the Author has been pleaſed to caſt a *Shade* upon this Part, I now demand, what are theſe Ideas? Why you ſhall know that preſently. *Whatſoever the Mind perceives in it ſelf, or is the immediate Object of Perception, that I call Idea*, ſays he, *pag.* 55. *ſect.* 8. Very good; So much my Lexicon would have told me. But this does not ſatisfy. I would know what kind of things he makes theſe Ideas to be as to their *Eſſence* or *Nature*. Are they in the firſt place Real Beings or not? Without doubt Real Beings, as having Real Properties, and really different one from another, and repreſenting things really different. Well, if

Real

Real Beings, then I demand, are they Substances, or are they Modifications of Substances? He will not say they are *Modifications*. For besides that a Modification of Substance cannot be a Representative of a Substance, there being no manner of likeness between a Substance and a Mode; if an Idea be a Modification only it cannot subsist by it self, but must be the Modification of some Substance or other, whereof also there may be an Idea; which Idea being (as is supposed) only a Mode, must have another Substance, and so on without end. As for example, If my Idea of *Figure* be only a Mode, then it must have a Substance wherein to exist as well as Figure it self, which cannot exist alone; and since of that Substance whatever it be, there may be also an Idea, which is supposed to be a Modification, this Idea must also have another Substance, and so on to Infinity. He will not therefore, I suppose, say that our Ideas are *Modifications*.

He must then say that they are *Substances*. Are they then Material Substances or Immaterial? If he says they

are *Material* Subſtances or Corporeal Emanations from ſenſible Objects, I would deſire him to weigh with himſelf, and try if he can anſwer, what is alledged by *M. Malebranch* againſt the Poſſibility of ſuch Emantions. Particularly, let him tell me how this can conſiſt with the *Impenetrability* of Bodies, which muſt needs hinder theſe Corporeal Effluvias from poſſeſſing the ſame *Ubi* or Point, which yet muſt be ſuppoſed, if theſe be the Repreſenters of Objects, ſince there is no aſſignable Point where the ſame, and where multitudes of Objects may not be ſeen. This one Difficulty is enough to make this way *impaſſable*. But let him further tell me how any Body can eradiate ſuch an inconceivable Number of theſe Effluvias ſo as to fill every Point of ſuch vaſt Spaces, without the leaſt ſenſible Diminution. Well, but ſuppoſe they could, let him tell me how theſe Corporeal Effluvias, ſometimes of vaſt Extent and Magnitude, can enter the Eye; Or if they could, how they can do it in ſuch Troops and Numbers without juſtling, refringing, and inverting one another. Or if this might be avoided, where ſhall we find

De inquirend. Verit. Lib. 3. Part. 2. c. 2.

find room to receive such a numerous Company of Corporeal Images? And upon what part will you have them impressed? Upon the Soul? or upon the Brain? But who can understand either of these? How can an Indivisible Substance, as the Soul is, *receive* any Stamp or Impression? And how can such a fluid Substance as the Brain is, *retain* any? The least jog of a Mans Head must needs obliterate such slight and Aerial Traces, as the Wind does the Figures that are written upon the Sand; Not to say that these Impressions coming on so thick one upon another must needs work out themselves almost assoon as they are in, and in a short time consume the very Brain too. But suppose we could get over all this, the greatest Difficulty is yet behind; How will such Corporeal Effluvias be able to represent immaterial and intellectual Objects? They will at the most be able but to represent Material Objects, and not all of them neither, but only those whose Emanations they are. And what shall we do with Ideas that will not do their Office, that cannot represent a quarter of the things which we are concern'd to understand?

These and a thousand more Absurdities must he wade through, that will assert our Ideas to be Corporeal Effluvias derived from external Objects. It remains then that they must be *Immaterial* Substances. And so without all question they are. *All* of them as to their *Essence*, and *most* of them as to their *Representation*. But how shall Bodies send forth such Immaterial Species? They can emit nothing but what is Corporeal, like themselves. How then shall they commence Immaterial? Body can no more *emit* Spirit, than it can *create* it. And what is there after Emission that shall be the Principle of Transformation? Some I know talk of strange Feats done by the Dexterity of *Intellectus Agens* and *Patiens*, which they say refine and spiritualize these Material Phantasms; but I suppose our Author is of too Philosophical a Faith to admit of such a *Romantick Transubstantiaton*.

The short of this Argument is, If our Ideas are derived from sensible Objects, then they are Material Beings, because Matter can send forth nothing but

but Matter. But they are not Material Beings, for the Reasons alledg'd above. Therefore they are not derived from Sensible Objects. Which I think has the force of Demonstration. And to this purpose it may be further consider'd (what I hinted before) that as our Ideas are all of them Immaterial as to their Essence and Substance, so many, perhaps most of them, are also immaterial as to their Representation, that is, they represent after an immaterial manner, as the Ideas of Truth, Vertue, and the like; which *Cartesius* makes to be the difference between *Imagination* and *Pure Intellection*, and whereof he gives an Instance in the Example of a *Chiliagon*, whose Angles we cannot represent in a distinct View, but may clearly *understand* it. But now how can that which represents after an immaterial manner, come from sensible Objects? Again, we have Ideas of thins that are not to be found in the Material and Sensible World, as of a Right Line, or an exact Circle, which our Author himself confesses, *pag.* 283. *Sect.* 6. not to be really extant in Nature. And what does he think of the Idea of *God*? Will he say that *that* is

Meditat. 6. P. 36.

alſo derived from ſenſible Objects? Yes: For, ſays he, *pag.* 147. Sect. 33. *If we examin the Idea we have of the Incomprehenſible Supreme Being, we ſhall find that we come by it the ſame way*, that is, by Senſation. But in the firſt place, how does this agree with what he ſays, *pag.* 341. Sect. 2. *That we have the knowledge of the exiſtence of all things without us (except only of God) by our Senſes?* So then it ſeems we do not know the Exiſtence of God by our Senſes. No? then neither have we the Idea of him by our Senſes. For if we had, why ſhould we not know his Exiſtence by Senſation as well as the Exiſtence of other things, which, as he ſays, we know only by Senſation? For, ſays he, *pag.* 311. Sect. 2. ſpeaking of the knowledge of Exiſtence, *We have the knowledge of our own exiſtence by Intuition, of the exiſtence of God by Demonſtration, and of other things by Senſation.* Then it ſeems we do not know the Exiſtence of God by Senſation, but that of other things we do. But why are other things known by ſenſation, but only becauſe their Ideas come in at our Senſes? For I ſuppoſe he will not ſay that the things themſelves come in at our

our Senses; for then what need is there of Ideas at all? And if other things are therefore known by Sensation, because their Ideas come in by the Senses, then why is not God also known by Sensation, forasmuch as his Idea according to him, comes also the same way? and yet he will not allow that God's Existence is known by Sensation; Which indeed is very true, but then he should not have said that the Idea of God comes in by the Senses.

But what a strange *Adventure* is it in Philosophy to make the Idea of God to come in by our Senses, and to be derived from Sensible Objects! For besides the Difficulties and Absurdities already touch't upon, what is there in the Material World that can resemble God? Nay, what is there in the whole Creation that can represent *him* to our Thoughts? God himself cannot *make* an Idea of himself: For such an Idea, what ever it be, must be a Creature; and can a Creature represent God! Nothing certainly but God himself can do that. He must be his own Idea, or he can have none. There is but one possible Idea of God, and that is his *Son*, the Divine λόγος,

or

or Ideal World, *the brightness of his Glory, and the express Image or Character of his Person.* 'Tis he that is the Idea of God, and of the whole Creation, that both *is*, and *represents* all things. And since the way of knowledge by our Senses turns to so poor an account, I would desire our most Ingenious Author to consider, whether it be not abundantly more rational and intelligible (not to say pious) to suppose that we see all things in God, or the Divine Ideas, that is, in the partial Representations of the Divine Omniformity. For our Author himself confesses, *pag.* 315. Sect. 10. that *Whatsoever is first of all things, must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least all the Perfections that can ever after exist. Nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it has not, either actually in it self, or at least in an higher degree.* God then, even according to him, is all Beings; or, has the whole Plenitude of Being. And I wonder that this Principle had not led this Sagacious Person further. I know whither it would have carried him, if he had follow'd the Clue of it. For why should we seek any further, and

puzzle

puzzle our ſelves with unintelligible Suppoſitions? What elſe *need*, and what elſe *can* be the immediate Object of our Underſtanding but the Divine Ideas, the *Omniform Eſſence* of God? This will open to us a plain intelligible Account of *Human Underſtanding*, yea of *Angelical* and *Divine* too. Here I can tell what an Idea is, *viz.* the Omniform Eſſence of God partially repreſented or exhibited, and how it comes to be united to my Mind. But as for all other ways, I look upon them to be deſperate. But theſe things are already by me purpoſely diſcours'd of elſewhere, and are alſo further to be deduc'd in my *Theory of the Ideal World*. Reaſon & Relig. p. 181.

Having thus far reflected upon the two Principal Parts of this Work concerning *Innate Principles*, and the *Origin* of *Ideas*, in a continued way of Diſcourſe, all that further remains is now to conſider only ſome few ſingle Paſſages as they ſtand by themſelves.

Pag. 16. Sect. 3. *Practical Principles muſt produce Conformity of Action, or elſe they are in vain diſtinguiſhed from Speculative Maxims.* 'Tis enough to di-

diſtinguiſh them from Speculative Maxims, if they are in order to Action, that is, if they are concerning ſuch things as may and ought to be done by us, tho in the event they do not produce any ſuch Conformity. Otherwiſe a Law would not be a Law till 'tis obey'd.

Pag. 57. Sect. 15. *There is nothing like our Ideas exiſting in the Bodies themſelves. They are in the Bodies only a Power to produce thoſe Senſations in us.* The firſt part I acknowledge to be true: For certainly Heat in the Fire is no way reſembling what I call Heat in my ſelf, meaning by it either ſuch a grateful or ungrateful Senſation as I feel, when I approach the Fire more or leſs. But the latter Clauſe I cannot approve, thinking it impoſſible that any Body ſhould directly and properly produce any Senſation in my Soul. 'Tis God certainly that is the Author of all my Senſations, as well as of my Ideas. Bodies can only be Conditions or Occaſional Cauſes of them.

*Pag* 158. *Sect.* 10. Speaking of the Law of Vertue and Vice, ſays he, *If we examin it right, we ſhall find that the meaſure of what is every where call'd and eſteemed*

*Vertue*

*Vertue and Vice, is the Approbation or Diſlike, Praiſe or Diſpraiſe which by a ſecret and tacit conſent eſtabliſhes it ſelf in the ſeveral Societies of Men, &c.* Praiſe or Diſpraiſe may be a probable Sign, or ſecondary Meaſure, but it can never be the primary Meaſure or Law of Vertue and Vice; whoſe difference muſt be founded upon more certain and immutable grounds of Diſtinction than the Praiſe or Diſpraiſe of Men. For Praiſe or Diſpraiſe does not *make*, but *ſuppoſe* the difference of Vertue and Vice as already ſetled, and antecedent to it. A thing is not good becauſe 'tis praiſed, but is therefore praiſed becauſe 'tis good. And how comes this Praiſe or Diſpraiſe to be *eſtabliſh'd by ſuch a ſecret and tacit conſent*, if there be not ſome other more certain meaſure of Good and Evil, according to which our Praiſe or Diſpraiſe is to proceed?

Pag. 185. Sect. 5. *I doubt not but if we could trace them to their Originals, we ſhould find in all Languages the Names which ſtand for things that fall not under our Senſes, to have had their firſt riſe from ſenſible Ideas.* Let him tell me what

what he thinks of the Word (*Although*) Has he not a clear Conception of what is meant by that Word? And yet is there any thing of a *Material Relation* under it? I the rather inſtance in this Word, tho' I might inſtance in a thouſand more, becauſe I have read of a Man (I think the Relation is in Dr. *Cudworth's* Intellectual Syſtem) that was of our Author's Mind, that there was no Word but what ultimately ſtood for ſomething material and ſenſible, and was convinc'd of the contrary by lighting upon the firſt Word of *Tully's Offices* which is *Quanquam*.

Pag. 196. Sect. 19. *The Doctrin of the Immutability of Eſſences proves them only to be abſtract Ideas, and is founded on the Relation that is eſtabliſh'd between them and certain Sounds as ſigns of them.* True indeed with reſpect to us, who becauſe we do not know all the Eſſences of things, muſt be ſuppoſed to make that only the Eſſence which we intend to ſignify by calling it by ſuch a Name. But I hope notwithſtanding this, the Author will allow that there are alſo in reality Immutable Eſſences of things, independent on our Conceptions

ceptions, as may appear in *Mathematical Figures*. Where the *Nominal* Essence and the *Real* Essence are all one.

*Pag.* 205. *Sect.* 9. He tells us that *Essences are only Artifices of the Understanding*. 'Tis true, those Collections of simple Ideas which we bind up together under one Name, which he elsewhere calls *Nominal Essences*, are only Creatures of the Understanding; but as I said before, there are also determinate Essences in the things themselves, tho for the most to us unknown, which have a fix'd and immutable Nature without any dependence on any Understanding but the Divine. 'Tis true indeed, we are fain to sort and rank things by their Nominal Essences, because the Real Ones are most times unknown; but that is no Argument against the Being of real Essences. And this is by the Author himself confess'd, *pag.* 234. Sect. 11. where he says that *in our Ideas of Substances we have not the Liberty as in mix'd modes, to frame what Combinations we think fit, to rank things by, but must follow Nature, and suit our Complex Ideas to real Existences*. So that here we have Patterns to follow, and I desire no more.

Pag.

Pag. 242. Sect. 6. *Were the ſignification of Body and Extenſion preciſely the ſame, it would be as proper and intelligible to ſay the Body of an Extenſion, as the Extenſion of a Body.* Here he ſuppoſes it would be proper, to ſay the Extenſion of a Body upon that Suppoſition, whereas indeed were they preciſely the ſame; neither of them would be proper.

Pag. 244. Sect. 14. *The Platoniſts have their Soul of the World, the Epicureans their Endeavour towards Motion,* &c. Theſe the Author reckons among unintelligible Forms of Speech, and ſuppoſes them to be no better than *Gibberiſh.* As to the Soul of the World 'tis a Subject of too great a Latitude to be diſcours'd of at preſent. But as to the Epicureans *Endeavour* towards Motion, that there is ſuch a thing, he may be ſufficiently convinc'd by looking upon a pair of Scales, where tho the leſſer Weight does not actually weigh down, yet that it preſſes and endeavours towards it is moſt certain, ſince otherwiſe as much Weight would be required to weigh it down as if it were

were quite empty. But this we do not find; whence it must of necessity be concluded that the former Weight tho it did not pass into actual Motion, yet it did something toward it, that is, it *Endeavoured*. The same might also be illustrated from the Actions of the Will, some of which are perfect and compleat Determinations, others only *Vellcities* or *Endeavours*. But if the Author would be further satisfied in this Matter, I desire him to read the 19 and 20 Chapter of Dr. *Glisson*, *de Naturâ Substantiæ Energetica*, where he will find this Argument very curiously handled.

Pag. 274. Sect. 19. *The Ideas of Quantity may be set down by sensible Marks, Diagrams*, &c. *But this cannot be done in Moral Ideas, we have no sensible marks that resemble them.* Very true, which is a plain Argument that such Ideas are not from our Senses.

Pag. 289. Sect. 2. *Truth seems to me to signify nothing but the joyning or separating of Signs, as the things signified do Agree or Disagree one with another.* This

indeed is Truth of the *Mind* or of the *Subject*, but not Truth of the *Thing* or of the *Object*, which consists not in the minds joyning or separating either Signs or Ideas, but in the Essential Habitudes that are between the Ideas themselves. And that these are such, our Author himself implies, by saying, *as the things signified do Agree or Disagree with one another*. Here then is Agreement and Disagreement antecedently to any joyning or separating. And I very much wonder that our Author professing in the Title of the Chapter to discourse of Truth in general, and particularly of that Truth too which has been the Enquiry of so many Ages, should yet confine his Discourse to Truth of Words and Truth of Thoughts without the least mention of Objective Truth. Which indeed is the Principal Kind of Truth.

Pag. 300. Sect. 5. *I think it is a self-evident Proposition, that two Bodies cannot be in the same place.* If the Proposition be Self-evident how comes he only to *Think* 'tis so? If it were only *Evident* he must do more than so.

Pag.

Pag. 323. Sect. 14. *Eternal Truths are so not from being written in the minds of Men, Or that they were before the World. But wherefoever we can suppose such a Creature as Man is, inabled with such faculties, we must conclude he must needs when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his Ideas, know the Truth of certain Propositions*, &c. This is a true *Aristotelian* Account of Eternal Truths. But I demand, Are these Eternal Truths in being before the Existence of Man or no? If not, how comes he to understand them when he does exist? What, does he make that to be true, which before was not so? But if they were in being before the Existence of Man, then their Eternity does not consist in their being understood by Man when ever he shall exist, but in their own fix'd and immutable Relations, whereby they have an antecedent Aptness so to be understood. Which the Author himself seems to imply by saying, *He must needs so understand them.* Why must needs? But only because they are necessarily so and no otherwise intelligible. But

Reason and Religion. p. 76.

of this I have diſcours'd elſewhere.

*Pag.* 344. *Sect.* 8. He takes notice of one manifeſt Miſtake in the Rules of Syllogiſm, *viz.* That *No Syllogiſtical reaſoning can be right and Concluſive, but what has at leaſt one general Propoſition in it.* This our Author thinks to be a Miſtake, and a manifeſt miſtake. But perhaps if we rightly underſtand that Rule of Syllogiſm, there is no Miſtake at all in it. All the Ground of the Diſpute is from the Doubtfulneſs of what is meant by a general or univerſal Propoſition. A Propoſition may be ſaid to be univerſal either when a Note of Univerſality (as *All*) is prefixed before the Subject. Or when tho that Note be not prefixed, yet the Predicate is ſaid of the whole Subject according to the full Latitude of its Predication, ſo as to leave nothing of the Subject out, whereof the Predicate is not ſaid. According to the former Senſe of Univerſality it is not neceſſary that in every concluding Syllogiſm one Propoſition be univerſal. But according to the latter ſenſe of Univerſality (which indeed is the moſt proper ſenſe of it) it is certainly

ly neceſſary. And I dare challenge any Man to ſhew me one Inſtance of a concluding Syllogiſm that has not one Propoſition univerſal in the latter Senſe. For even a ſingular Propoſition is thus univerſal, ſince being Indiviſible, it can have nothing ſaid of it, but what is ſaid of it wholly and univerſally, καθόλου, as *Ariſtotle* expreſſes it. The Author may ſee a further Account of this in Dr. *Wallis* his Theſis *de Propoſitione ſingulari*, at the latter end of his *Inſtitutio Logicæ*.

Theſe, Sir, are the moſt conſiderable Paſſages that at once reading I thought liable to Reflection in this Work, which notwithſtanding theſe few *Erratas*, I think to be a very extraordinary Performance, and worthy of the moſt publick Honour and Reſpect. And tho I do not approve of every particular thing in this Book, yet I muſt ſay that the Author is juſt ſuch a kind of Writer as I like, one that has thought much, and well, and who freely Writes what he thinks. I hate your *Common-place* Men of all the Writers in the World,

who tho they happen ſometimes to ſay things that are in themſelves not only True, but conſiderable, yet they never write in any Train or Order of Thinking, which is one of the greateſt Beauties of Compoſition.

But this Gentleman is a Writer of a very different Genius and Complexion of Soul, and whoſe Character I cannot eaſily give, but muſt leave it either to the Deſcription of ſome finer Pen, or to the ſilent Admiration of Poſterity. Only one Feature of his Diſpoſition I am concern'd to point out, which is, that he ſeems to be a Perſon of ſo great Ingenuity and Candor, and of a Spirit ſo truly Philoſophical, that I have thence great and fair Inducements to believe that he will not be offended with that Freedom I have uſed in theſe Reflections, which were not intended for the leſſening his Fame, but ſolely for the promoting of *Truth* and *right Thinking*.

And this will juſtifie that part of the Reflections, where agreeing with the Author

Author in the Propoſition intended to be proved, I lay open the inſufficiency of his Proofs. For to ſay that a thing is falſe for ſuch Reaſons, when 'tis not falſe for ſuch Reaſons, tho it be abſolutely falſe, is as great an Injury to Truth, as to ſay a thing is falſe when 'tis not falſe. A falſe Inference is as much an Untruth, as a falſe Concluſion; and accordingly he that might reflect upon the Concluſion if falſe, may with as much reaſon reflect upon a wrong way of inferring it, tho the Concluſion it ſelf be true. Which I mention with reſpect to the former part about Innate Principles, where tho I agree with the Author in the thing denied, yet I think his Reaſons are not cogent.

After all, notwithſtanding my diſſenting from this Author in ſo many things, I am perhaps as great an Admirer of him as any of his moſt ſworn Followers, and would not part with his Book for half a *Vatican*. But every Writer has his Alloy, and I exempt not any Writings of my own from the like Defects. Of which perhaps, Sir, I have been convincing you all this

while. But that ſhall not trouble me, if at the ſame I may be able to convince you of my Readineſs to ſerve you at any rate, as it highly becomes,

SIR,

*Your Obliged and*

*Humble Servant,*

J. N.

A

*A Brief Conſideration of the Remarques made upon the foregoing Reflections by the Gentlemen of the* Athenian Society, *in the Supplement to the Third Volume*, &c.

THE Gentlemen of this new Society undertake two things, to *Report*, and to *Judge* of the Contents of the moſt conſiderable Books that are Printed in *England*; which I acknowledge to be a very uſeful and laudable Undertaking, if performed Skilfully and Faithfully, with Judgement and Integrity. But whether they have thus acquitted themſelves in reference to the foregoing Reflections, the Liberty they have taken with the Author, will I think warrant him to Examin.

*Supplement*, Pag. 2. Paragraph 1. *It will be ſufficient to obſerve that Mr.* Norris

*is*

*is a* Carteſian, *and as it ſeems, of thoſe of the* Carteſians *that are of Father* Malebranche's *Opinion. This occaſions that being full of theſe Thoughts, he ſeems not always to have well comprehended his meaning whom he Criticiſes upon.* Why the being a *Carteſian*, and according to the way of *M. Malebranche*, ſhould make me leſs apt to comprehend Mr. *Lock*'s Book, I cannot divine. Were the thing it ſelf never ſo true, yet I think the Reaſon here given of it, is as odd as may be. But 'twill be time enough to ſeek out for the Reaſon of my miſunderſtanding Mr. *Lock*'s Book, when it is better proved than at preſent, that I have done ſo. But as to that, if Mr. *Lock* himſelf had told me ſo, his bare Authority without any Reaſon would have obliged me to ſuſpect my Apprehenſion, and to think once again; it being a Deference owing to every Author to ſuppoſe that he beſt underſtands his own Meaning. But from you Gentlemen, who ſtand upon the ſame Level with me, I expect Reaſon, and to be ſhewn *where* and *how* I have miſtaken him. For the preſent I am rather apt to think that I have comprehended Mr. *Lock*'s Senſe well

enough,

enough, but that you understand neither *Me*, nor Mr. *Lock*.

Paragr. 2. *He upbraideth Mr.* Lock *of attempting to treat of Ideas, without defining what he understood by this Word.* Here is a false *Report*. I did not censure Mr. *Lock* for undertaking to discourse of Ideas, without premising a Definition of the *Name* or *Word*, (for that I grant he has done) but for offering to account for their Origination, without giving a Definition, or any Account of the *thing*. My Words are, *But sure by all the Laws of Method in the World, he ought first to have Defined what he meant by Ideas, and to have acquainted us with their Nature, before he proceeded to account for their Origination.* And again, *This therefore ought to have been his First and indeed Main Business, to have given us an account of the Nature of Ideas: And yet this is not only neglected in its proper place, but wholly omitted and pass'd over in deep Silence, which I cannot but remarque as a Fundamental Defect in this Work.* What is it pray, that is here remarqu'd as a Fundamental Defect? Not sure his not defining the Term Idea (for that I grant pag. 22, where

where I say, that *so much my Lexicon would have told me*;) but his giving no account of the Nature of Ideas, That is there remarqu'd as a Fundamental Defect, and I find no cause yet to think otherwise.

Ibid. *But Mr.* Norris *may see that he's mistaken, if he'll read over again the end of the First Chapter of* Book I. *where the Author begs his Readers Leave*, &c. Mistaken indeed, if he had charged the Author with not defining the Term *Idea*, but not at all mistaken, in case the thing charg'd upon him was the not defining the *Nature* of Ideas; for of that the Author gives no account, neither in the place these Gentlemen refer to, nor any where else.

Ibid. *It was sufficient to him* (viz. Mr. *Lock*,) *to shew in what manner, or if ye will, on what occasion we come to have different Ideas, without it's being necessary to speak of the Ideas themselves.* Here is an implicit Concession that Mr. *Lock* does not undertake to open the nature of Ideas, and withal that that was the thing laid to his Charge, which sufficiently clears the Reflecter from the

the pretended Miſtake. But then withal 'tis affirm'd here, that there was no need he ſhould undertake ſuch an Account. Now this being matter of *Judgement*, not of *Report*, the thing muſt be a little argued. Theſe Gentlemen ſay it was ſufficient to ſhew how we come by our Ideas, without ſpeaking of the Ideas themſelves. Againſt this I contend it was not ſufficient, it being impoſſible to give any ſatisfactory account how we come by them, till their nature be in ſome meaſure diſcover'd. For how can any thing be affirm'd or denied of any thing, unleſs its Nature be known? How can any Attribute be given with any certainty to an unknown Subject? Indeed when the nature of the thing is ſufficiently known and agreed upon, we need only define the Term whereby we expreſs it: As when 'tis ſuppoſed to be known what the Nature of an Angle is, I need only ſay that a Triangle is that which has Three Angles. Which is the Reaſon why *Euclid* in his Geometry thought himſelf concern'd only to give *Nominal* Definitions. For the nature of *Figures* is evidently known; we ſee the very Eſſence of them, and there-

therefore there needs no other Definition but that of the Term only, whereby we signify them; that so there may be no mistake of our meaning; that we may not be supposed to mean a *Square* when we talk of a *Circle*. But when the nature of the thing is not known or agreed upon (as in the present case) then a bare Definition of the Term is not sufficient; but the thing it self must be (at least in general) explained, before any Proposition can be with any certainty advanc'd concerning it. For suppose instead of saying that our Ideas come from our Senses, I should say that *the immediate Object of our Conception* (which is the Nominal Definition) comes from our Senses, what advantage would this be to the certainty of the Proposition; or how could it be decided whether the Immediate Object of our Conception be from our Senses or no, unless it be first made known what this immediate Object of our Conception is? We must know its Nature, before we can derive its Pedigree.

Paragr.

Paragr. 3. *Mr.* Lock *hath maintain'd that there are no Innate Ideas, ſince there is no Principle wherein all Mankind agree. But to that the Author oppoſes the Evident Propoſitions which all the World agrees to*, &c. To that, to what? Here is either a great Blunder, or a very groſs Prevarication. What Mr. *Lock* is here ſaid to maintain, conſiſts of two diſtinct parts, a Propoſition, and a Reaſon of the Propoſition. The Propoſition is, that there are no Innate Ideas; the Reaſon is, becauſe there is no Principle univerſally aſſented to. Now to which of theſe is it that the Reflecter oppoſes Self-evident Propoſitions? Not to the Propoſition certainly, but to the Reaſon of it. He alledges Self-evident Propoſitions not to prove againſt the Theſis laid down, that Ideas are Innate (for that he expreſly denies, *Pag.* 20.) but to prove againſt the Reaſon given, that there are Principles univerſally aſſented to. As may appear from the very Words of the place refer'd to, *Pag.* 4, which I leave the Reader to conſult. The ſhort of Mr. *Lock*'s reaſoning in that part is this, If there are no Principles uni-

univerſally aſſented to, then there are none Innate; but there are no Principles univerſally aſſented to, &c. Now the Minor Propoſition is what the Reflecter denied, and to which he oppoſed evident Propoſitions, a thing granted by the Author. Not that he intended to infer thence, that there are Innate Ideas: For tho it may follow that if there be Innate Ideas they will be univerſally conſented to, and conſequently if not ſo conſented to, they are not Innate: Yet it does not follow that if they *are* univerſally conſented to, therefore they are Innate, that being accountable for upon other Grounds. The Reflecter urges Mr. *Lock's* Conceſſion of Self-evident Propoſitions, only to evince that according to him, there muſt be Principles univerſally conſented to, and conſequently that he ought not to argue againſt Innate Ideas from the want of ſuch Principles. But the Queſtion of Innate Ideas themſelves is not here ſo much as glanc'd at: And therefore ſays the Reflecter, Pag. 5. *There muſt be therefore according to him, ſome Principles to which all Mankind do give an univerſal Conſent. I do not ſay that this proves*

*them*

*them Innate, but only that there are ſuch Propoſitions* wherein he thought he had laid in a ſufficient Caution againſt all Miſtake. And yet theſe Gentlemen would fain inſinuate as if the Reflecter alledged evident Propoſitions in oppoſition to the Theſis laid down, to prove that there are Innate Notions, as plainly appears from the State of the Queſtion which they are ſo kind as to put for him in the very next Words. For

*Ibid.* Say they; *The Queſtion is to know if we underſtand the ſame thing by Innate Notions and Evident Propoſitions, which is not aſſuredly in the Ordinary uſage of the Word Innate, that has not at all the ſame ſignification with that of Evident.* Had I oppoſed evident Propoſitions to the Theſis maintain'd, in order to prove that there are Innate Notions, then indeed the Queſtion might have turn'd upon this Hinge, whether we underſtand the ſame by *Evident* and *Innate*; and their Saying that this is the ſtate of the Queſtion, does impute the other to me. But ſince my Appeal to Self-evident Propoſitions is only to prove againſt

the reason of the Proposition, that there are Principles universally consented to, this is so far from being a true State of the Question, that 'tis an utter mistake of the Argument. 'Tis plain that my Design was not to prove by that or by any other Argument, that there are Innate Ideas, (for I expressly disown them as well as Mr. *Lock*,) but only to prove that there are Principles of Universal Consent. And for this I insist upon Self-evident Propositions; and I see nothing wanting in the Argument to serve the purpose for which it was used.

Ibid. *Yet Mr.* Norris *supposing that the Author of the Essay confounds these Two things, accuses him of Contradicting himself, since he granteth that there are evident Propositions.* Well, I find when Men are once got into a Wood, 'tis a hard matter to get out again. Here is still a further continuation of the same Blunder. I am far enough from ever supposing that the Author of the Essay confounds these Two things, *viz.* Evident Propositions and Innate Notions, and as far from confounding them my self, or from arguing from the Former

to the Existence of the Latter, which I tell you again I expresly deny. Nor do I make the Author's Inconsistency and Self-Contradiction to consist in granting evident Propositions, and denying Innate Notions (which neither of us take to be the same) but in granting evident Propositions, and at the same time denying Principles of Universal Consent: Therein I tax him with Self Contradiction.

Paragr. 4. *One of the Reasons which Mr.* Lock *used to overthrow Inbred Ideas, is that there is no Appearance that any but these Innate Ideas, which he never minded. But Mr.* Norris *maintains that the Consequence is not good, because according to him* (according to Mr. *Lock* it should be) *our Spirit may receive Impressions which we do not at all actually perceive, as are the Ideas which the Memory preserves. It may be replied to him, that he must prove that we may have Notices which we never made Reflection on.* It is replied again, that he need not prove it, since Mr. *Lock* has freely granted it more than once, and is also by his Principles obliged to grant it; as is observ'd in the Reflections them-

selves, *Pag.* 8, 9. whether I refer the Reader.

Paragr. 5. *The Author in reasoning against what Mr.* Lock *had said of the Innate Principles of Morality, insists anew upon this Bottom, that he can evidently prove, even by Mr.* Lock's *Confession, diverse Principles of Morality. He concludes also from thence, that he is in the wrong, to say that there are no Principles of Practice to which Mankind give an universal Consent, since there are Principles of Morality uncontrovertible. But tho a thing be uncontrovertible,* &c. *It does not thence follow that 'tis Inbred or Naturally known.* What again in the same Blunder? Sure these Mens Heads turn round. Who ever said it does follow? Does the Reflecter by this contend for Innate Notions? No certainly; he only infers from evident Principles of Morality, that there are some that are universally assented to, in opposition to the Author, who affirm'd there were no such. But he does no where make that an Argument for Innate Notions, which he expresly declares against. One would think these Men were hard put to't for

for Imployment, thus to frame Conſequences of their own, that they may afterwards overturn them again.

Paragr. 6. *In fine, the Author after having made diverſe Remarks like theſe which we relate, upon Mr.* Lock's *Notions*, &c. But what if theſe hitherto related be none of the *Authors*, but your *own*? However, I believe the reſt of thoſe diverſe Remarques would truly appear like theſe, if repreſented by the ſame Glaſs: But whether in reality they are like theſe or no, I leave to the Conſideration of Better Judges.

Paragr. 7. *This Definition is notwithſtanding like to that of Father* Malebranch. What if it be, is it therefore Sufficient? 'Tis true, Father *Malebranch* in the Second part of his *De Inquirend. Verit.* Pag. 196, does thus define an Idea, *Objectum Immediatum Mentis*, which is only a Nominal Definition, as Mr. *Lock*'s is; but will theſe Gentlemen ſay that he ſtops here, and gives no account of the Nature of Ideas? If ſo, either they have not

read him, or do not understand him or do misreport him.

Ibid. *When we have no design to treat of the Nature of a certain thing, it is sufficient to define the Word which we use.* If the nature of the thing be evident and acknowledged, 'tis sufficient to define the Term, otherwise not.

Ibid. *He enlarges very much, especially to shew that the Ideas are not at all of the Emanations of the Bodies which we see, which yet Mr.* Lock *does not in the least say.* What if Mr. *Lock* does not expressly say so? He says however that they are from our Senses, that is, from sensible Objects: And if so, then supposing that he makes them real Beings, they must either be Corporeal Emanations, or Spiritual Images; the Absurdity of both which I was concern'd to shew. And I think it is shewn sufficiently.

Ibid. *What seems to have set Mr.* Norris *upon these Reasonings, is that Mr.* Lock *says, that most of our Ideas draw their Original from Sense, which signifies nothing else but this, that we could have*

*no*

*no Idea of Diverse things, unless we had perceiv'd them by means of the Senses.* If this were all that Mr. *Lock* contends for, we are better agreed than I was aware of; for 'tis acknowledg'd also upon my Principles, that the Senses are the *occasions* of our having Ideas; that is, that God has establish'd a certain Order and Connexion between such Impressions made upon our Senses and such Ideas. Not that these Impressions do cause or produce these Ideas, but that they are conditions at the presence of which God will, and without which he will not raise them in, or to speak more properly, exhibit them to our Minds. But that Mr. *Lock* means quite another thing from this, when he ascribes the Original of our Ideas to our Senses, I think no one that reads him with even ordinary Attention, can doubt. 'Tis plain, that he means that our Ideas do proceed from *without*, namely, from Sensible Objects, and are by our Senses convey'd into the Mind; according to the Hypothesis of the Vulgar Philosophy.

Paragr. 8. *Mr.* Norris *reproaches the Author of the Essay of saying* Pag. 147.

Sect. 33. *that 'tis by means of the Senses that we form the Idea of the Supreme Being.* 'Twere well if these Gentlemen were as free from Reproaching the Author of the *Reflections*, as he is from reproaching the Author of the *Essay*: I should not then have had this Objection to answer.

Ibid. *But our Critic has undoubtedly strangely err'd in this place.* But what if our *Critic* should prove to be in the Right, and our *Critics* to be they that so strangely err? Undoubtedly this would be but an ill come off after so Magisterial and Decisive a Sentence. But why is the Critic so strongly presumed to have err'd? Why because Mr. *Lock* after having named Sensation and Reflection as the Sources of all our Ideas, continues thus: *It is so in all our other Ideas of Substances, even of that of God* (that is to say, that they are all form'd either by Sensation or Reflection) *for if we examin the Idea which we have of the supreme and incomprehensible Being, we shall find that it comes to us the same way,* (by the one or by the other) *and that the Complex Ideas that we have of God and separated Spirits, are composed*

*posed of the Simple Ideas that we have by Reflection. For example, having form'd in our selves by our own Experience the Ideas of Existence, Duration, Knowledge, Power, Pleasure, Success, and of divers other Properties, which 'tis better to have than not to have; when we will form a just Idea of the Supreme Being, we augment each of these Ideas, joyning that of Infinity to them; and thus we form the Complex Idea of the Divinity. If* Mr. Norris *had read all this Article with Attention, he would have spared himself the pains of seeking Figures of Rhetoric to refute an Opinion which no body maintains.* Now to set this whole matter in a clear and fair light, the short of it is this: I had charged Mr. *Lock* with deriving our Idea of God from the Senses. Herein they say I *reproach* him, pretending that Mr. *Lock* derives the Idea of God not from *Sensation*, but from *Reflection*. Well, be it so, yet this is to set the Idea of God but one Remove further from the Senses still, which will come to one and the same thing at long run. For these Ideas of Reflection are but a Secondary sort of Ideas that result from the various Compositions and Modifi-

cations

cations of those Primary ones of Sensation. This is all that can possibly be understood by this second order of Ideas. They are only a various Composition of the first. For 'tis not in the Power of the Soul to make any new Idea it has not received; she can only variously Modifie and Compound those which she has. So that notwithstanding this Expedient, the Idea of God will be, tho not *immediately*, yet *mediately* and ultimately from the Senses. If it be pleaded that these Ideas of Reflection are not form'd out of those of Sensation, but from the Operation of the Mind about those Ideas. In answer to this, I grant that the Mind may reflect upon its own Operations as well as upon those Ideas they are Conversant about, and that these Operations may then be consider'd as Objects that terminate the Understanding. But then I say that 'tis impossible that hence should spring any new Ideas of a distinct Nature from the rest, it being both against the Nature, and above the Power of the Understanding to make its own Object. And besides, this Expedient is so far from helping, that it rather heightens the Absurdity. For according

ing

ing to this Account, the Idea of God would not only be a Creature, but a Creature of a Creature. Indeed whether it be said that the Idea of God be from Senſation or from Reflection, it would both ways follow that 'tis a Creature; only there's this difference between them, that in the former way, it would be a Creature of God's making, but in the latter way, a Creature of our own making: Which I think is the greater Abſurdity of the two.

Ibid. *He joyneth therewith ſome Reflections, to make Father* Malebranch's *Opinion more probable, with which it does not ſadge, no more than with theſe which he makes on diverſe places of Mr.* Lock's *Book. Thus theſe Gentlemen are pleaſed to ſay; but ſince they offer neither Inſtance, nor Reaſon of it, I ſhall content my ſelf to Reply, that as Wiſe Men are of another Opinion.*

Ibid. *Whom concluding, he highly commends, which a great many People will Subſcribe without Trouble.* Well, I am glad there is ſomething wherein I have the good Fortune to agree with this Noble Society, and if it will be any Pleaſure

to

to them to know how much I do ſo, I ſhall take this occaſion to tell both them and the World, that though I have writ againſt Mr. *Lock*, I have yet as great thoughts of him as any of thoſe that ſo ignorantly defend him; that I both honour his Perſon, and admire his Book, which, bating only ſome few things, I think to be one of the moſt Exquiſite Pieces of Speculation that is Extant. And that were I in order to notional improvement, to recommend but Three Books only in the World, one of them ſhould be this of Mr. *Locks*.

Paragr. 9. *We find furthermore at the end of the Book where the Author retracts, having maintain'd in an Engliſh Book, that Sin was a Real thing, he declares now that he believes 'tis meer Nothing.* This is a groſs Miſrepreſention that ſavours neither of the Juſtice nor of the Civility of the Preſs. *He declares now.* How does he declare it? Expreſly or by Conſequence? Not ſure Expreſly. If by Conſequence, not to remarque the impropriety of declaring a thing by Conſequence, or the injuſtice of charging any Man with the conſequences

ces of any Opinion as by him *declared*, were they never so truly deduced, does it follow, that because I disown the Positiveness of Sin, that therefore I hold 'tis a *meer Nothing*? Suppose I should say, that these Gentlemens Ignorance in Philosophy, and the common Principles of Metaphysicks were not of a Positive Nature, do I thereby say it is nothing? Must Sin either be Positive or Nothing? Is there no Medium? What, did these Gentlemen never hear of a *Privation*? But this 'tis when Nature is not follow'd, when Science is Usurp'd, and when a sort of Men whose Talent was never known to lie much towards Philosophy, will needs turn a Conventicle into a *Port Royal*, and set up for *Vertuoso's*.

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POST-

# POSTCRIPT.

*Whereas in a certain Discourse of Mine Intituled,* Considerations upon the Nature of Sin, *I make Sin to be of a Positive Nature, upon better Consideration I find intolerable Consequences to follow upon that Supposition, and do therefore freely own my self to have been in a Mistake, and do here retract it under my Hand. As to the present Discourses I know of nothing I have to* Correct, *only there is One Notion which I find Occasion to* inlarge *and carry on further than at first I was aware of. It is in the Third Beatitude concerning the* Meek's inheriting the Earth. *By which I am now fully convinc'd is* Principally *meant that they shall possess that* New Paradisiacal Earth *which is to succeed the Great Conflagration, and to be the Seat of the Millennial Reign of Christ. I do not unsay any part of my Former Explication, only I think it defective; and add this as a further Supplement to it. For which Notion I acknowledge my self indebted to the Noble Author of the* Theory of the Earth; *whom the Reader may Consult for further Satisfaction in this Matter.* Part 2. Chap. 5. Pag. 162.

FINIS.

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